



United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM)

Second Edition
January 2020




DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS

Foreword

The UN Infantry Battalion is the cornerstone of UN Peacekeeping Operations. Indeed, it is only through its actions that such operations will be successful. This comprehensive manual should be used a guide rail for Troop Contributing Countries raising, training and deploying UN Infantry Battalions, and for those designated to lead them.

I am deeply grateful to the members of the UNIBAM Member State Working Group who produced this Handbook in conjunction with the Office of Military Affairs. I am confident that this Handbook will contribute to peacekeeping operations being more successful in saving lives - both uniformed and civilian. This is a hugely valuable Handbook – use it.

Jean-Pierre Lacroix
Under-Secretary-General
for Peace Operations



Preface

I am very pleased to introduce the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual, a practical guide for commanders and their staff in peacekeeping operations, as well as for the Member States, the United Nations Headquarters.

I would like to express my sincere gratitude to the Member States Working Group, field missions, training institutions, and other peacekeeping practitioners and stakeholders for the dedicated support and substantial contribution they have provided in the development of this Manual.

The United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual is a living document. We will continue to refine and update this Manual to ensure its relevance to the changing operational environment and to meet the aspirations of the Member States and the United Nations.



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Appreciation is extended to the TCC Working Group for their expertise and time in assisting to draft this manual.

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Introduction

Purpose

The purpose of the United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual (UNIBAM) is twofold. It provides Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) with guidance on how to train, equip units deploying to UN Peacekeeping Missions, and it provides battalion commanders and staff, company commanders, platoon commanders and sub-unit leaders in UN Peacekeeping with a reference to effectively plan and conduct operations and tasks in support of a UN mandate.

This manual does not replace national doctrine. Rather, it is designed to highlight UN operational standards, which should be overlaid on existing doctrine, thereby assisting a conventional Infantry Battalion (Inf Bn) operating in its national role to prepare for UN operations as 'blue helmets'. While this manual is designed to assist the deploying/deployed UN Inf Bn, it should also serve as a guide for national and UN Headquarters (UNHQ) planners, and for those who train, support, enable and utilize UN peacekeeping Inf Bns.

This manual cannot be read in isolation from other UN guidance and policy documents. Readers must first understand the principles of UN missions, the role of the military component (MC) within the mission, and the required ethics and conduct for TCCs, as described in UN mandates and doctrine. This manual is part of broader UN doctrine and should be read with publications including the UN Military Manual (UNMiM), the UN Military Unit Manuals series (UNMUMs), and the UN Military Peacekeeping-Intelligence (MPKI) Handbook.

Rationale

Modern peacekeeping missions are typically introduced into highly complex and volatile environments with unresolved violent conflict between highly capable non-state and state armed groups. The deployment of peace operations into such environments presents an immediate challenge to the safety and security of UN personnel. No longer does the blue beret offer protection. Enhancement of the capabilities and performance of peacekeepers to meet these new challenges is required.

The UN Secretary-General's Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative ^[1], the Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations, and Security Council Resolution 2436 outline guidance from the UN Secretariat, Member States, the UN Security Council to address the changed Peacekeeping environment. The UNHQ and Missions have substantively addressed these requirements with new policies and guidelines related to performance; protection of civilians; human rights; technology; intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR); gender; conduct and discipline; and protection of the environment. These aspects have a direct impact on the preparation, planning and execution of military operations in the field and are reflected in this manual.

This revised UNIBAM supports and aligns with existing and revised doctrine as it is focused specifically on the structure and roles of an UN Inf Bn and accompanies similar military unit manuals (UNMUMs). The conceptual framework and policies governing the generic military role in peacekeeping are now included in the United Nations Military Manual (UNMiM).

Manual Development

The UNIBAM was created through a comprehensive process of consultation and collaboration with TCCs, with a variety of interlocutors at UNHQ, particularly with the Office of Military Affairs (OMA), and with field missions. This process culminated with a Member State Working Group (MSWG), tasked with producing the manual.

Performance

^[1] Through his Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative, the Secretary-General calls on Member States, the Security Council, host countries, troop- and police-contributing countries, regional partners and financial contributors to renew our collective engagement with UN peacekeeping and mutually commit to reach for excellence

The military component plays a vital role in peacekeeping operations, particularly in the protection of civilians which has become a primary focus of modern peacekeeping missions. Performance measurement is based on meeting the standards for tasks identified in this manual, both pre-deployment training and in deployed operations. This manual describes these standards of performance.

Training

The importance of training, as a condition for high-level performance in the field, cannot be overemphasized. Training for commanders and staff to enhance familiarization with the UN military framework and its processes and procedures requires dedicated resources. Mission and battalion task-specific, scenario-based training modules are available and should be used to the maximum extent possible, both during the pre-deployment phase as well as for continuation training in the field upon deployment.

Contingent and unit commanders must ensure that pre-deployment training provides troops with basic soldiering skills, environment-specific training, and the operational mindset and behavior needed to conduct operations in hostile environments. Training must also include how to recognize, respond to and prevent threats to civilians. Infantry training should be complemented with specialized training to prepare troops for specific challenges expected to be encountered in the field, such as operating in diverse environments (for example in jungle or desert areas), mitigating the threat from improvised explosive devices, responding appropriately to child soldiers, and implementing strategies to deter and respond to conflict-related sexual violence. In summary: Is it critical to 'train as you expect to fight' in an UN environment.

Mindset

Peacekeeping units must maintain a proactive mindset focused on mandate implementation, force protection, and the Protection of Civilians (POC). Mindset is the established set of attitudes, assumptions and methods held by an individual or a unit. In peacekeeping, mindset is the mental state of all peacekeepers of all components that entail beliefs, values and dispositions to act in effective ways in the operational environment to implement mandated tasks. The Cruz Report identified mindset as a key area requiring action, empowering peacekeeping personnel to take the initiative to deter, prevent and respond to attacks.

The right mindset is crucial for the success of mandate implementation. The UN mindset needs to be developed throughout pre-deployment and in-mission training, and it encompasses leadership, operational behavior, posture, footprint and threat assessment. Complex and high-risk environments compel peacekeeping personnel to be flexible and alert in their mind-set due to the danger of rapidly changing circumstances. Confining units to camps and restricting patrolling to safe areas decreases the Mission's efficacy, situational awareness and limits the contribution to mandated tasks, particularly those relating to the POC. Units that operate only during daytime and/or with caveats, are not contributing sufficiently to the success of the mission. Effective leadership is key to establishing a proactive mindset in the UN Inf Bn.

Presence, Posture and Profile (PPP)

The presence, posture and profile of UN military forces will influence how the Mission is perceived by the local population. A continued and visible presence during UN Peacekeeping stability operations is required to protect and build the confidence of the local population. This presence assists in creating an environment for the local population to conduct daily activities free from threats. Presence facilitates continuous and close contact with the local population, providing the opportunity for UN personnel to gain required awareness and understanding about threats and concerns in the local community. Ensuring that contact is carried out by both men and women allows a more comprehensive understanding of the human terrain. A thorough understanding of how the local population interacts & communicates, how they honour existing commitments, and how they view the UN and the government is critical.

Force Protection

Force protection should be a key consideration in all peacekeeping operations. From 2013 to 2017, peacekeeping fatalities due to acts of violence increased significantly, with military components representing some 90 percent of fatalities. This increase is attributed to the increasing capability of threat actors, as well as a willingness of armed groups to actively target peacekeepers. Key UN principles of consent and impartiality are being challenged, as local actors undermine or resist the UN presence. Many modern peacekeeping forces operate under mandates and in situations where the consent of relevant parties to a conflict does not exist and where the UN is not viewed as impartial. The combination of new types of violent threats, at least partial lack of consent and erosion of impartiality produce higher security risks for the force and the Inf Bn.

Most injuries and fatalities occur during attacks on movements (patrols and convoy escorts) and camps, reinforcing the idea that peacekeepers need to maintain a more robust and proactive posture to deter such attacks from taking place. Force protection in both fixed bases and during mobile operations must have a high priority in the planning and execution of operations and battalion tasks. The UN military component must adapt its tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs), training, equipment and mindset when operating in hostile and high-risk environments. A high operational tempo must be maintained to reduce fatalities and injuries due to violent acts. A thorough understanding of the operating environment and its threats to mission and population is crucial to effectively adapt. Commanders must balance the requirements for force protection with the requirement to maintain a proactive mindset and robust presence in order to achieve mandated tasks.

Conduct and Discipline

The behavior of individual peacekeepers can have a strategic impact on perceptions of the Mission and of the UN. The excellent work and sacrifices by many units and individuals in UN missions are tarnished by the poor behavior of a few. Adherence to international laws and conventions, respect for human rights, and protection of the environment are expected of all peacekeepers. Sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) will not be tolerated. Pre-deployment and in-Mission training must be conducted to reinforce these standards of behavior. Commanders and staff must be trained on appropriate responses to allegations of misconduct. The Battalion Commander is ultimately responsible for the conduct and discipline of all personnel under his/her command, and it is incumbent on him/her to ensure that UN guidelines and policies are fully disseminated to unit personnel, explained and adhered to.

Success

Success is accomplishment of an aim or purpose. For the UN Inf Bn, success is defined by accomplishment of the Mission's mandated tasks provided in orders from the Sector and/or Force Commander. It is measured by completion of those tasks to the standards described in this manual. Ultimately, the unit commander, with a well-led, well-prepared and dedicated staff and a force of disciplined, motivated and well-trained soldiers must provide the infantry capability required for UN mission to succeed.

CHAPTER 1



EMPLOYMENT CONCEPT

1.1. General

1.1.1. Chapter Focus

This chapter focuses on the structure of a peacekeeping mission at the operational level and describes the mission mandate, integrated strategic framework, type of operations, legal framework, generic mission organizational structures, command and control arrangements, and other support measures. It describes the broad framework in which a UN Infantry Battalion (UN Inf Bn) will function in accomplishment of the mandate. The chapter also provides the primary functions of battalion key leaders and other organizational elements.

1.1.2. Levels of Authority

The system of Authority, Command and Control (AC2) in United Nations peacekeeping operations derives from the United Nations Charter, which designates the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization. Under the Charter, the Security Council establishes peacekeeping operations, provides their mandates, specifies the high-level political objectives of each mission and entrusts the Secretary-General with the responsibility for achieving mission mandates. The General Assembly provides the required annual appropriations necessary to fund mission operations.

To ensure the effective and accountable implementation of the decisions of both the Security Council and the General Assembly, the Secretary-General confers responsibility and delegates authority for mission management to the Head of Mission (HOM). These responsibilities and authorities are governed by the AC2 framework at three distinct but overlapping levels: strategic, operational and tactical. The strategic level includes United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) and overlaps with mission headquarters under the authority of the HOM and Mission Leadership Team (MLT).

The operational and tactical levels of military operations are in the field, under the command of the Head of Military Component (HOMC) who is responsible to the HOM. It is this level of the AC2 framework that concerns the UN Inf Bn. The HOMC shall establish the military operational chain of command. The command and staff structure may include: Force Command, supported by the **U Staff**; Sector Command (Brigade Command), supported by the **G Staff**; and, Battalion Command and sub-units, following national doctrine, or using the **S Staff**. This military chain of command for operations is issued as the "Field Command Framework" which includes chain of command succession arrangements at all levels of command, including Force HQ, Sector/Brigade and Battalion HQs, (considering internal national contingent procedures for the succession of command).

1.2. Principles

1.2.1. UN Peacekeeping Principles.

From UN Peacekeeping Principles and Guidelines, 2008.

UN Peacekeeping operations have three basic principles:

- Consent of the parties.
- Impartiality.
- Non-use of force, except in self-defense and in defense of the mandate.

These principles are fundamental for the execution of a UN mission, and are relevant to both traditional and multi-dimensional peacekeeping operations. UN Inf Bns members are viewed as representatives of the UN when operating in the field, and therefore must respect and comply with these three principles in planning and operations. This is critical in maintaining the support of the host nation and the local population.

1.2.2. International Humanitarian Law (IHL)

From Article 22 of the Hague Convention, 1907.

IHL applies during armed conflict. While those participating in peacekeeping operations are not normally considered a party to armed conflict, these principles compliment UN Peacekeeping Principles. It is critical that the UN Inf Bn consider these principles when planning and the using force in military operations:

- Military necessity.
- Proportionality.
- Discrimination (distinction).
- Humanity.

Adversaries should only be targeted if it is militarily necessary to do so. This means that if an adversary is wounded and can no longer fight, or if a group of adversaries has been defeated then it is militarily unnecessary to inflict further harm. Planners should also be mindful of proportionality. For example, if a mounted UN patrol meets an individual combatant armed only with a machete then it is normally not proportionate to engage them with anti-tank weapons or attack helicopters. Operations must ensure that a distinction is made between civilians and combatants, safeguarding the former, and only targeting the latter. For example, an indirect fire plan should not target a village where civilians live, even if that village is being used by an adversary. Finally, an operation planned according to these principles ensures that the unnecessary suffering of an adversary is avoided and includes planning for the treatment of wounded adversaries.

1.2.3. International Human Rights Law (IHRL)

From the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.

The concept of human rights acknowledges that every single human is entitled to enjoy his or her human rights without distinction as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. Human rights are expressed in treaties, customary international law, bodies of principles and other sources of law, which confer legal status form on inherent human rights. All UN military operations must adhere to International Human Rights Law (IHRL).

The most important characteristics of human rights are:

- **Universality.** Human rights are universal, meaning that they are applied to all people. No one can have their human rights taken away.
- **Interdependence and indivisibility.** Human rights are indivisible and interlinked, meaning that all human rights must be respected, not just some of them.
- **Equality and non-discrimination.** Human rights are founded on respect for the dignity and worth of each person.
- **Rights and obligations.** It is incumbent on the UN Inf Bn Commander to ensure that his/her military plans and operations adhere to the provisions of IHRL.

1.2.4 Rules of Engagement (ROE)

The ROE for each Peacekeeping Operation are issued by the USG/DPO and provide the authority for the use of force and explain the legal framework, policies, principles, responsibilities and definitions of the ROE. ROE must always comply with IHL and IHRL, which are superior sources. ROE provide direction to commanders and soldiers and delineate the parameters within which force may be used by the military

component of a Peacekeeping Operation while executing its mandated tasks. They are founded on the relevant Security Council Resolution(s).

ROE include prohibitions (orders not to take specific actions) and permissions (authority to take specific actions to achieve the aim of the Peacekeeping Operation). While predominantly defensive in nature, ROE allow for offensive action, if necessary, in order to ensure the implementation of the Security Council mandated tasks. The ROE also provides definitions of the circumstances in which the use of force, including deadly force, may be justified.

The ROE are governed by the Charter of the United Nations and relevant principles of international law, including the Law of Armed Conflict. Military personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict, and to apply the ROE in accordance with those laws. ROE are addressed to the Force Commander, who is then responsible for issuing them to all subordinate commanders. Ensuring understanding, application and compliance with the ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. The Force Commander is ultimately responsible for the enforcement of the ROE. TCCs are responsible for publishing ROE soldier pocket cards for each deploying contingent member, and the contingent commander is responsible for conducting refresher training, in accordance with Mission policy.

1.2.5 Status of Forces Agreement/Status of Mission Agreement (SOFA/SOMA)

The SOFA or SOMA is an agreement between a host country and the United Nations which embodies the consent of the host State to the presence of the Peacekeeping Operation in its territory and regulates the status, privileges and immunities of the Peacekeeping Operation in the host country. Under the provisions of the SOFA or SOMA, a government hosting a UN body or entity, including a Peacekeeping Operation, is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of the Peacekeeping Operation, its personnel, premises, and property and to take measures to protect members of the Peacekeeping Operation and its personnel, premises and property from attack, or any action that prevents them from discharging their mandate. The SOFA or SOMA also provides that all members are obliged to respect local laws and regulations, and to refrain from any action or activity incompatible with the impartial and international nature of their duties.

1.3 Military Component (MC) Principles

Military principles underpin all military activities and are designed to both facilitate and place necessary constraints on military action in support of specified end-states. These principles are:

- **Objective.** Direct all efforts towards a clearly defined, decisive, and obtainable goal.
- **Concentration.** Concentrate UN military power at a decisive place and time.
- **Offensive.** A UN Inf Bn should be proactive and seize the initiative in a decisive manner, through force or engagement.
- **Maneuver.** UN military power should be flexible and have sufficient maneuverability to exploit opportunities and find innovative ways to fulfill designated tasks and mandates. With maneuver, the UN military places opponents and threat actors in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of military power.
- **Intelligence-led.** Continuous access to timely, relevant, accurate, all-source MPKI is central to UN Inf Bn operational planning and decision-making processes. MPKI processes allow for the analysis of the physical, human and information terrain in the UN Area of Operational Responsibility (AOR) and evaluates the likely behavior of threat actors therein. This supports the planning and execution of UN Inf Bn tasks, risk management, and guides the establishment of security and force protection measures during operations.
- **Security.** Security is essential for success, ensuring protection of UN military power, deployed personnel, operations, planning and UN MC vulnerabilities. UN military planning is often compartmentalized to control access to information and protect operational security, however this

must be balanced with the need to share information between Mission components, especially in multidimensional and integrated missions.

- **Simplicity.** Plans should remain clear, succinct and easy to understand. Simple plans and clear concise orders minimize misunderstanding.
- **Surprise.** Although UN military efforts must be transparent, this does not mean that the UN MC should necessarily reveal details of their operational plans. Often, mission success is only possible if the UN Inf Bn confronts threat actors in a manner for which they are unprepared or operates in a manner which is difficult to predict. Changing patrol patterns and compartmentalizing military plans can prevent potential threat actors from learning from and adapting to UN Inf Bn TTPs.
- **Economy of Force/Mass.** Concentrate power at a time and place where it matters most and allocate minimum essential military power to secondary efforts.
- **Unity of Command.** A clear chain of command must be established for the successful accomplishment of any operation. During all operations, unity of command is achieved when all designated forces, and assigned or tasked enablers are under the control of one responsible commander that employs all in pursuit of a unified purpose. Centralized control and decentralized execution provide delegation of authority and responsibility, while keeping central accountability.

1.4. Policies and Guidance

The UNIBAM should be read in conjunction with other relevant UN doctrine, to include policies, standard operating procedures, manuals and handbooks, and directives in order to understand the UN Inf Bn's role within the broader mission framework. There is a range of doctrine providing guidelines and best practices on subjects such as protection of civilians (POC), SEA, Conduct and Discipline, Military Planning, and MPKI. Mission-specific SOPs will provide detailed guidance on processes, tasks and responsibilities. It is the responsibility of commanders at all levels, including the UN Inf Bn commander, to ensure they are up to date with the latest UN policy guidance and doctrine. Appropriate information must be cascaded to troops in a straightforward, comprehensible manner.

1.5. Types of UN Peacekeeping Operations

UN doctrine describes three types of peacekeeping mandates (traditional, multidimensional, and transitional), as well as special political missions. In recent years the trend has been towards deploying the more complex, multidimensional model, with wide-ranging mandates, involving military, civilian and police personnel.

1.5.1. Traditional Peacekeeping

Traditional peacekeeping is the original type of UN mission, and generally involves the deployment of a UN military forces to stabilize a conflict and create conditions for a negotiated political settlement. The authority for these missions was usually Chapter VI of the UN Charter. Typical tasks include observation, monitoring and reporting; supervision of a ceasefire; support to verification mechanisms; and support for the creation and control of a buffer zone. If the military component is armed, use of force in a traditional peacekeeping operation (PKO) is governed by the Rules of Engagement (ROE) and is typically limited to defense of UN personnel and facilities since these mandates often do not task Protection of Civilians (POC).

Examples of traditional UN peacekeeping operations include:

- UN Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP);
- UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP);
- UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO);
- UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) on the Golan Heights, Israel-Syria border.

1.5.2. Multidimensional Peacekeeping

The multidimensional mandate is broader than that of a traditional PKO, and may include tasks to facilitate the political process; protect civilians, and in doing so prevent Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV); assist in the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration of former combatants; support the organization of elections; protect and promote human rights; and assist in restoring the rule of law. Multidimensional peacekeeping missions have become the most common type of UN PKO and are normally conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Examples of multidimensional peacekeeping operations include:

- UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO);
- UN/African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID);
- UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS);
- UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA).

1.5.3. Transitional Authority

In rare circumstances, the Security Council has authorized multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations to temporarily take responsibility for the legislative and administrative functions of the State. This measure is taken in order to resolve sovereignty questions, such as the transfer of authority from one sovereign entity to another, or until sovereignty questions are fully resolved, or to help a State to establish administrative structures that may not yet exist. Transitional Authority PKO and are normally conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

Examples of transitional authorities include:

- UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) from March 1992 to September 1993;
- UN Transitional Authority in Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) from January 1996 to January 1998;
- UN Transitional Authority in East Timor (UNTAET) from October 1999 to May 2002;
- UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) established in June 1999.

1.6. Mission Operating Environment

The mission 'operating environment' encompasses the physical terrain (mountains, bodies of water, roads etc.), human terrain (ethnic, religious, tribal groups etc.), and information terrain (communications blackspots (areas where radio/telephone communications means do not have or have limited functionality), media penetration, pro- and anti-UN media coverage etc.), and comprises of the unique conditions and influences which shape the ability of mission elements to carry out the mission mandate. All elements of a multidimensional mission should have a shared understanding of the operating environment, which will allow them to identify threats and opportunities which require a joint response.

The UN Inf Bn must have a thorough understanding of the operating environment within its AOR. An analysis of the operating environment (AOE) will be conducted by the U-2/G-2 (MPKI) staff, with support from other sections and mission components (such as a Joint Mission Analysis Centre). Operating environments are complex and constantly evolving, and the AOE should be a living document which is reviewed and updated regularly. MPKI staff should maintain early warning indicators to provide the commander with advice about changes to the operating environment.

For the kinds of support the MPKI unit must offer to the UN Inf Bn, see chapter 2, paragraph 2.2.3 '*Battalion core capabilities.*'

1.7. Mission Concept (MC)

In an integrated mission setting, the MC is responsible for executing and supporting UN mandated military tasks under the broader mission framework. The Mission Concept is a statement of intent and strategy on how a field mission plans to implement its mandate, informed by the mission's role within the broader UN system. This Mission Concept provides overarching guidance for the subordinate component concepts, including the Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS), which provides more specific direction to the military component on strategy, planning and resources.

1.8. UN leadership

1.8.1. The Headquarters Level

The Under-Secretary-General (USG) for the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) is responsible for providing strategic advice regarding peacekeeping operations. The USG DPO also directs policy development and approves guidance materials related to the planning and conduct of peacekeeping operations based on Security Council mandates and General Assembly resolutions. Additionally, the USG DPO selects the respective Troop and Police Contributing Countries (T/PCC) to be deployed as either formed Units or as individual officers to the peacekeeping missions.

The USG for the Department of Operational Support (DOS) is responsible for operational support to UN Secretariat entities globally, including peace operations. This support includes advisory, operational and transactional support services in the areas of administration, supply chain, logistics, health care management, personnel and information and communications technology. The USG DOS also negotiates Memorandums of Understanding (MOU) with the T/PCCs. The MOU establishes the administrative, logistical and financial terms and conditions governing the contribution of personnel, equipment and services provided by the T/PCC in support of the peacekeeping operation and specifies the UN standards of conduct for personnel provided by the T/PCC.

The USG for the Department of Safety and Security (DSS) is accountable and responsible to the Secretary-General for the executive direction and control of the United Nations Security Management System (UNSMS) and for the safety and security of UN personnel and their recognized dependents at both Headquarters and in the field.

1.8.2. The Mission Level

In UN peacekeeping operations, responsibility for mandate implementation and authority for managing resources are both vested by the Secretary-General in the Head of Mission. Each mission has a Mission Leadership Team (MLT) that supports the HOM in the execution of their functions, and to ensure coordination and decision-making on strategic and operational issues. While MLT composition is specific to each mission, members of the MLT typically include:

- Head of Mission (HOM);
- Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General (DSRSG);
- Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General/Resident Coordinator/Humanitarian Coordinator (DSRSG/RC/HC);
- Mission Chief of Staff (COS);
- Head of Military Component (HOMC);
- Head of Police Component (HOPC);
- Director/Chief of Mission Support (D/CMS).

Dependent upon the size and scope of the peacekeeping mission, senior mission leaders should establish and maintain integration and control structures which allow them to develop and disseminate their intent and take, prepare and implement decisions and adjust operations to reflect changing circumstances and priorities.

1.8.3. Head of Mission

Responsibility for implementation of the mission mandate and authority for managing the resources of the mission are vested in the HOM. To this end, the HOM leads and directs the MLT and ensures unity of effort and coherence among all UN entities in the mission area. In hybrid missions, the HOM reports to both the Secretary-General of the UN and to the senior official of another organization.¹ The HOM often serves as the Designated Official (DO) for Security, the highest ranking official accountable for the safety and security of all relevant individuals in a given area.

In missions where the HOM is the senior UN official in the country in which the mission is deployed, the HOM simultaneously serves as Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for the country. In this capacity, the HOM represents the Secretary-General, leads UN political engagement and speaks on behalf of the UN within the country.

1.8.4. Head of Military Component (HOMC)

25. The HOMC reports to the HOM and exercises “UN operational control” over all subordinate military units and individually deployed military experts (including military observers, staff officers or military liaison officers). “UN operational control” allows the HOMC to assign separate tasks and designate objectives to units and sub-units within the military component, as required, in consultation - not negotiation - with the Senior National Officer (SNO) of the relevant unit/sub-unit, who is responsible for its administrative control. In missions with military contingents, the Force Commander serves as the HOMC, while in missions to which only military observers are deployed, the Chief Military Observer serves as the HOMC.

The HOMC also retains UN operational control of military elements which are not in their direct chain of command, such as enabling units under the tasking authority of the DMS/CMS and military staff assigned to integrated/joint structures. These units and staff shall be responsible to, and report to, the heads of offices of those structures irrespective of whether these are civilian or military personnel.²

A UN Inf Bn operates under the operational control of a Sector HQ, and sometimes under a Force HQ, depending on its role. For example, a UN Quick Reaction Force (QRF) may receive its order directly from Force HQ. The UN Inf Bn will generally have a well-defined AOR within which to conduct peacekeeping operations. It may be employed or redeployed anywhere in the mission AOR according to operational requirements, the provisions in its Statement of Unit Requirements (SUR), and according to the battalion types described in this manual.

1.9. The Military Component (MC)

The primary function of the MC is to provide a safe and secure environment, thereby creating the conditions necessary for the implementation of other elements of the mandate, like the monitoring of human rights, the protection of civilians, national reconciliation, Security Sector Reform, and institution building.

In all peacekeeping operations, but particularly in multidimensional operations, the MC should understand the roles and expertise of non-military components and should share information and collaborate with them to the greatest extent possible. In addition, MCs increasingly operate in conjunction with security forces from external entities, such as regional organizations, international military coalitions, expeditionary forces, and host nation security forces. UN cooperation with these forces must conform with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces.

¹ One example of this dual reporting arrangement is the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) where the HOM (known as the Joint Special Representative) reports to both the United Nations Secretary-General and the African Union Commission Chairperson.

² UN Policy: Authority, Command and Control in UN Peacekeeping Operations. New York: 20 October 2019.

1.9.1. Force HQ (FHQ)

The FHQ structure varies according to the individual mission and is based on an assessment of the mandated tasks, operating environment, threat situation and conflict dynamics. The FHQ organization needs to be dynamic, versatile and multifaceted to function in an integrated environment. At the same time, a certain degree of standardization of the FHQ organization is required to reflect UN methodologies and to ensure all functional areas are represented. A FHQ functions at the operational level with subordinate Sector Headquarters and specific units operating at the tactical level. The main FHQ responsibility is to exercise AC2 over military forces and to develop military operations in close cooperation with other mission components and partners. Military staff functions at the FHQ level are denominated with the letter 'U'. For example, operations are planned by the U3 in conjunction with other elements of the military and mission staff.

1.9.2. Sector/Brigade HQ (SHQ/BHQ)

A SHQ or BHQ operates at the tactical level within its designated AOR, commanding and guiding subordinated UN Inf Bns and units. The main responsibilities of the SHQ/BHQ are to conduct AC2 and execute FHQ operations orders (OPORDs) or fragmentary orders (FRAGOs) in close cooperation with other mission components and partners in the sector, in accomplishment of the mission mandate. Military staff functions at the SHQ/BHQ level are denominated with the letter 'G'. For example, operations are planned by the G3 in conjunction with other elements of the military and mission staff.

1.9.3. Leadership Mindset

In order to operate effectively in a dynamic and often complex mission environment, military leadership at all levels, including the UN Inf Bn commander, should foster an expeditionary posture that allows the unit to be flexible, proactive, and responsive to changing conditions. This will require mission-command style leadership that can respond to challenges through decentralized execution thus providing the tactical space necessary to achieve mission/force objectives. The UN Inf Bn commander further creates conditions for operational success by ensuring that all combat support and service support enablers are in place and supportive of sub-unit efforts down to Company and Platoon level.

UN Inf Bn leaders at all levels must maintain an offensive, proactive mindset (position, posture, and profile) to support achievement of the mandate, and to ensure force protection and the POC. Often this will involve being prepared to execute high-tempo, potentially offensive operational tasks such as the seizing, holding, and dominating of key terrain features and population centers, including by night.

Overall, a high operational tempo within the UN Inf Bn is the surest means of gaining, maintaining, and exploiting the operational initiative, thereby assuring mandate implementation.

1.10. UN Inf Bn Types and Roles

1.10.1. UN Inf Bn Types

There are three types of UN Inf Bn: **Light**, **Mechanized** and **Motorized**. Chapter Three of this Manual outlines the generic organization of each type of UN Inf Bn. Each type is comprised of three or four self-sustaining Infantry Company Groups (ICG), capable of deploying and operating independently to execute tasks as directed in the battalion AOR. The UN Inf Bn, with organic and enabled capabilities, will execute static and mobile operations from defensible, independent and logistically self-sustaining Operating Bases (OB). The UN Inf Bn must have the capability to operate on a 24/7 basis and must be suitably equipped for the Operating Environment, including local climate and weather conditions. **A generic personnel and equipment table are found at Annex A and B.**

Based on the mission environment and operational requirements, the UNHQ OMA prepares a SUR. The SUR describes the mission, tasks, organization, capabilities, equipment and personnel requirements for the UN Inf Bn. Achieving and maintaining these standards through deliberate force generation, careful

resource allocation, integrated training and realistic rehearsals by the battalion is a prerequisite to ensure effective performance in the mission area.

1.10.2. UN Inf Bn Roles

The UN Inf Bn can be deployed in one of three primary roles: as a **Standard UN Inf Bn** (assigned to a SHQ); a **QRF** (typically directly under FHQ and designed to quickly deploy to any part of the Force AO), or as a **Reserve Inf Bn** (normally assigned to the FHQ and designed to reinforce or cover new areas).

The role of the UN Inf Bn will determine its organization and equipment, but a UN Inf Bn will typically comprise of four self-sustaining companies capable of deploying and operating independently. The UN Inf Bn and its companies can be configured as Light, Motorized or Mechanized, depending on the mission requirements.

1.10.2.1. Standard UN Inf Bn

A standard UN Inf Bn is normally assigned a geographical AOR under a SHQ or the FHQ. A standard UN Inf Bn may be required to establish and maintain several Operating Bases, supported by a central HQ. Its SUR organization and equipment reflect mandated tasks that normally keep the unit in a limited AO.

1.10.2.2. Quick Reaction Force (QRF)

A QRF is a UN Inf Bn or separate UN Inf Coy designed for rapid deployment. The QRF will generally operate from a single operating base, often under the direct operational control of the HOMC. Its SUR organization and equipment reflect mandated tasks that normally keep the unit on alert for short-notice deployment anywhere in the Mission AO. Operational deployment may be by ground, water or air. The UN Military Aviation Manual describes Air Assault as a task for Helicopter units in support of a QRF (or another UN Inf unit). *“Air Assault is the movement of ground-based UN military forces by UN military helicopter to protect vulnerable groups, support legitimate forces, secure areas not yet fully secured and to directly engage hostile forces.”*

1.10.2.3. Reserve (RES) UN Inf Bn

Depending on the resources available and the situation in the operating environment, a UN Force Commander may direct the establishment of a reserve force to address contingencies. The reserve force will generally operate from one location and will be strong enough to make a difference to the operating environment. Its organization and equipment will enable the completion of all mandated tasks, in line with the SUR.

CHAPTER 2



UN INF BN CORE FUNCTIONS AND TASKS

Introduction

The UN Military Component, operating either as part of a traditional or a multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation, is central to mandate implementation. The UN Inf Bn is the key capability for the military component and, as such, it is important that it has the training, organization and equipment required to deliver its mission and mandate. In today's complex operating environments, the Protection of Civilians (POC), and the safety and security of UN personnel and installations are priority tasks. Host governments have the primary responsibility for protecting civilians inside their borders, consistent with their obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law. However, when the host government is unable or unwilling to do so, UN military peacekeepers are authorized, and duty bound to undertake actions to protect civilians and carry out mandated tasks in accordance with the Rules of Engagement (ROE).

To function effectively in complex, dangerous, and rapidly evolving UN operating environments, a UN Inf Bn needs to have well-resourced, and practiced operational capabilities, comprising the appropriate mix of personnel and equipment.

In the peacekeeping operating environment, a capability is defined as the ability and readiness to accomplish defined tasks to a clear standard. It encompasses the combination of resources (personnel and equipment), preparedness (organization, process and training), and logistics sustainment required to accomplish those assigned tasks. It is crucial that all such capabilities are delivered within the framework of the mission mandate and the CONOP, fully adhering to the UN Peacekeeping Principles of consent, impartiality and non-use of force except in self-defense and defense of the UN mandate. UN Inf Bn Commanders must recognize and react to imminent threat to civilians, UN personnel and facilities.

It is a TCC responsibility to deploy appropriately trained and equipped units, fully capable of implementing all mandated tasks. This chapter lists and describes the eight core UN military functions of UN Inf Bns, and the 16 primary tasks that units *must* be capable of, in addition to those included in the SUR.

2.1. Purpose

This chapter is designed to facilitate TCC planning and preparation, aid in conducting task-oriented training, advise on Inf Bn functional organization, and the development of equipment tables. It is also designed as a guide for the UN Inf Bn Staff to plan and execute mission mandated tasks. ***The staff planning principles listed below, including the UN Military Decision Making Process (MDMP), complements rather than replaces national doctrine, and is designed to assure interoperability and operational planning consistency between UN contingents, and that UN principles are included in UN Inf Bn planning and operations.***

2.2. Operating Environment

The UN Inf Bn must be organized to complete all operations in their specific Operating Environment (OE). UN OEs include urban, mountain, desert, and jungle terrain, each of which are affected by different weather systems, are populated by different ethnic groups, and are influenced by a variety of different (threat) actors. While the UN MDMP is a useful planning tool, the mission and CONOPS must reflect the uniqueness of each environment. There is no templated solution. What works in a desert environment is unlikely to work in a jungle environment. Conditions in a non-permissive environment are different to those in a permissive environment.

2.3. Planning of Military Operations

2.3.1. Purpose

Good planning is the cornerstone of successful UN military operations. The UN MDMP is designed as a tool to complement national doctrine. Each TCC has its own planning process, but the UN must establish its own standard designed to enhance interoperability, thereby facilitating combined operations at the Force or Sector-level in accordance with the Force Commander's Handbook. The UN MDMP also ensures inclusion of the UN MPKI Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE), incorporating assessments of the physical, human and information terrain, as outlined in the MPKI Handbook.

2.3.2. Overview

To facilitate the planning of peacekeeping operations, the UN Inf Bn staff should integrate the concepts the UN-MDMP. This process includes: an assessment of the operating environment, mission analysis, development and comparison of COAs, COA selection, and the preparation and delivery of orders. It is of critical importance that all UN Inf Bn staff participate in the UN MDMP.

Often, the level of planning involved in completing the UN MDMP to produce an OPORD means that a simple Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) can be issued for the additional tasks outlined below.

2.3.3. The United Nations Decision Making Process (UN MDMP)



Figure 1. Flow of the UN MDMP

2.3.3.1. Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE). This is normally completed by the UN Inf Bn MPKI cell, which should draw on information and intelligence from Sector (G2) and Force-level (U2) evaluations. Additional detail can be found throughout the MPKI handbook, but the AOE is a continuous process and S2 personnel must work to update it constantly, particularly during operations. The AOE involves the following three key phases, which should incorporate the factor, deduction, task analytical framework:

- **Phase 1: Operating Environment Evaluation.** Analyses the physical, human and information terrain. The physical terrain evaluation analyses the effect of terrain features such as terrain relief, bodies of water, road networks, urban areas, culturally or environmentally important sites, natural resources and other physical factors on UN operations and mandate implementation. The human terrain evaluation analyses the effect of human terrain features such as tribal, ethnic, and religious groups, and such things as areas that are supportive of unsupportive of the UN on UN operations and mandate implementation. The information terrain evaluation analyses the effect of communications infrastructure, communications blackspots, internet and media penetration, on UN operations and mandate implementation. Weather and its impact on mobility, visibility, and sustainability of operations must also be considered.
- **Phase 2: Actor Evaluation.** Uses analytical tools to identify relevant non-UN actors' intent, capabilities, strengths, weaknesses and other critical factors. Central to planning will be an evaluation of threat actor capability, intent, and opportunity. A deep understanding of threat actors in the Bn AOR will assist the unit in its contingency planning, its risk mitigation, and will inform planning of all operations, including protection of civilian tasks. Guidance on methodologies relevant to actor evaluation is included in the MPKI handbook, which details tools and techniques for Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats, and Center of Gravity analysis.

- Separate to the threat actor evaluation, this phase also assists planners to understand key local personalities, influencers and community groups, including men and women, who the Mission is likely to engage with during operations. It identifies whether local actors are likely to support or oppose the UN presence, and can generate a greater understanding of vulnerable population groups.
- **Phase 3: Situation Integration.** This is an informed, predictive assessment that integrates the understanding of the operating environment and the actors within it. In this phase, potential future scenarios are generated and actor courses of action (as opposed to UN Mission courses of action) are developed and evaluated.
- This phase allows the UN Inf Bn staff to plan against a range of scenarios, usually focused on the threat actor most likely and most dangerous scenarios. Important to the Situation Integration is the development of these threat actor courses of action, which will inform contingency planning, risk mitigation, and force protection measures.
- In conventional military operations, threat actor COAs are central to the MDMP, but in a UN context, the impact of UN operations on other relevant actors must also be assessed, including the likely reaction to UN operations by local key leaders, and vulnerable population groups.
- The AOE generally precedes mission analysis and it is vital that it is disseminated in written or brief form to the operations section. The phase one brief, as outlined in the UN MPKI manual, should initiate planning.

2.3.3.2. Mission Analysis. This process should result in a restated mission, planning guidance, and UN Inf Bn Commander's intent, incorporating purpose, method and end state.

Once more, the factor, deduction, output analytical framework is central to this process, where the factor is information known to the planner, arranged under a series of headings (outlined below), the deduction is the so what or implications, operational or otherwise, for the UN Inf Bn, and the outputs are the tangible conclusions of the process. Examples of the kinds of tasks resulting from this process are:

- **Tasks:** An effect to be achieved in respect of a threat actor, terrain or UN Forces.
- **Focused Question:** A specific question, normally posed by the UN Inf Bn Commander to the staff.
- **Constraints:** Something that limits the plan.
- **Clarification:** Something that requires clarification from higher HQ.
- **Planning Guidance:** A conclusion that guides the UN Inf Bn staff.
- **an Implied Task:** Something that is not specified by higher HQ in the original order that needs to be carried out to achieve the mission.
- **A Mission Essential Task:** A task that if not included in the plan could cause the unit to fail in its mission.
- **An Information Requirement:** Information that is required for planning purposes.

UN Mission Analysis follows these steps, all of which are evaluated using the process outlined above (factor, deduction, output):

- **Identification of the Sector and Force Commander's intent.** This establishes the reason for the UN mission, and is for use in crafting the restated mission.
- **The identification of specified tasks that must be completed by the UN Inf Bn.**
- **The identification of constraints (something that a unit must do), restrictions (something that a unit must not do), and freedom of action (the absence of any limitation).**
- **Assets available.** The assets that the unit has organic to the UN Inf Bn, and any assets that have been attached to it by a higher level.
- **Acceptable levels of risk.** This is assessed in all spatial dimensions (front, left and right flanks, rear area, and overhead). Risk should be classified (high to low) so that it can be prioritized and mitigated accordingly.
- **Time (key operational timings), threat actor (details taken from the AOE phase), space (determine the AO), and Terrain (from the AOE, identifying key and decisive terrain features, and operational effects that the UN Inf Bn needs to achieve in respect of it).**
- **Actual or Likely changes to the situation.** Use of the UN MPKI S2 cell is necessary in this case. How might the situation change and how will this effect UN operations, and/or how has the situation changed? Much of this will come from the AOE provided by the S2 cell.

- Implied tasks. Tasks that are not specified by higher HQ but must be achieved by the UN Inf Bn to carry out the assigned mission.
- Mission Essential Tasks. Tasks that are essential to UN mission accomplishment.

2.3.3.3. Course of Action (COA) Development. The purpose of course of action development is to establish one or more military options that will fulfil the assigned mission or military tasks. Simultaneously, the MPKI section will develop threat actor COAs for actors with capacity to interfere/influence the UN operations. While it is important to establish threat actor reactions and COAs, it is also important, particularly in a UN context, to consider what second order effects a UN mission might have. For example, what impact will the UN COA have on local key leaders or on vulnerable civilian populations?

For a UN Inf Bn COA to be valid, UN Inf Bn Operations personnel must ensure that it is feasible (it can be accomplished with available resources), that it is acceptable (to UN policy, and levels of risk), that it is complete (that it addresses all aspects of the mission or task), that it is exclusive (when comparing it to other UN COAs it is markedly different, thereby ensuring that different COAs are not subtle variations of a favored plan) and that it is suitable (that it will accomplish the plan). This acronym is known as the **FACES** acronym and should be considered when COAs are being developed.

It is important that a COA has the following elements:

- What (the tasks that the UN Inf Bn will execute in respect of relevant actors and terrain).
- When (critical timing parameters).
- Where (geographical locations where military effects will be achieved).
- How (the UN Inf Bn concept of operation, incorporating tasks).
- Why (the purpose of the mission which must align with command levels at least two levels up).

Generally, a COA will be depicted visually and in words, often on a COA board, which normally outlines: the mission, commander's intent, a scheme of maneuver (overlaid on the relevant geographic terrain, with all phases of the operation clearly shown, including the shaping, operational, and sustainment phases), a purpose, method and end state, and information requirements. An example of a COA board is contained in the MPKI manual.

UN Inf Bn staff should develop at least two courses of action for each assigned task, with each adhering to the FACES acronym.

Each COA must then be considered from a threat actor perspective. This process is known as wargaming. During this phase, Operations personnel play out the operation as the UN Inf Bn staff, while MPKI personnel decide how the threat actor is likely to react. This process must be recorded so that when a COA is eventually selected, likely threat actor reactions and courses of action can be mitigated or otherwise planned for.

Once more, it is necessary that the UN Inf Bn staff considers the impact of its COAs on non-threat actors such as vulnerable civilian groups, local key leaders, and other important actors of the local environment.

2.3.3.4. COA Comparison and Selection. The purpose of the COA comparison is to determine the most suitable COA. This involves the identified COAs are first analyzed individually and then compared against each other using approved criteria.

Several analytical frameworks can be used for this, but a simple Strengths, Weakness, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis will reveal the relative merits a COA. Alternatively, UN Inf Bn staff may just list the advantages and disadvantages associated with each COA. It may also be useful to measure a COA against a set of weighted criteria such as: surprise; flexibility; simplicity; security; force protection; and the POC. A UN Inf Bn may also consider the impact on UN principles such as the effect of a UN COA on the perception of its impartiality, consent, and the non-use of force, except in defense of the mandate.

2.3.3.5. Decision and OPORD Production

The COA comparison is presented to the UN Inf Bn commander who, having been supplied with an overview of each COA, together with their relative strengths and weaknesses, likely threat actor reactions, and any UN-specific criteria (ROE, UN principles, POC, etc.) makes an informed decision as to which COA he/she will choose.

The UN Inf Bn commander should then issue his/her decision and concept, which forms the basis of warning orders to subordinate units and commanders. An OPORD or, if appropriate a FRAGO will then be produced

All orders should include the following: Situation, Mission and Concept, Execution, Logistics, and Command, Control and Communications paragraphs. Examples of both a UN OPORD and FRAGO are attached at Annex H and I to this Manual.

2.4. UN Inf Bn Core Functions

2.4.1. General

OMA prepares the Statement of Force Requirements (SFR) and UN Inf Bn SUR, based on consultation with the Mission, and a thorough understanding of the specific Operating Environment. The mission, tasks, organization, equipment and personnel requirements for the UN Inf Bn are described in the SUR and are agreed to by the TCC. UN Inf Bns are organized and equipped in line with these documents and required to be fully capable of executing all specified and implied tasks. Achieving and maintaining the capacity to carry out all mandated tasks through deliberate force generation, careful resource allocation, integrated training and realistic rehearsals are a prerequisite to ensure effective performance in the mission area.

2.4.2. UN-specific Core Functions of a UN Inf Bn

The UN Inf Bn has **twelve core functions** that complement the national doctrine of the unit to ensure that UN-specific requirements are included in the training of a UN Inf Bn. The ability to conduct these core functions enables a national Inf Bn to organize and function as a UN Inf Bn, able complete its mandated tasks and the requirements of the CONOPS. The core functions are:

1. Administration/ Personnel (S-1)	2. Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (S-2)
3. Mobility and Manoeuvre (S-3)	4. Sustainability (S-4)
5. Planning (S-5)	6. Signal / communication (S-6)
7. Training (S-7)	8. Engagement / CIMIC (S-9)
9. Command and Control	10. Firepower
11. Protection and Security (including Protection of Civilians and Force Protection)	12. Interoperability

Some of these functions may align with the staff functions found in national doctrine. All these core functions should be included in UN Inf Bn planning.

2.4.2.1. Command and Control (C2). In peacekeeping operations, decisions of a tactical nature can have strategic consequences. Tactical decision-making can affect political perceptions that can have a critical impact on the credibility of the mission. Generally, the strategic level will not possess the detailed knowledge required to effectively manage such situations in real-time. It is therefore important that the UN Inf Bn has the capability to make informed tactical decisions. Command and control are executed through capable, experienced, trained leaders who demonstrate initiative, are practiced in decision making and can clearly communicate those decisions to subordinate units.

Required Actions: The UN Inf Bn HQ must plan and organize to be capable of:

- Exercising effective command and control of all subordinate and attached elements and resources with dependable and responsive means specifically adapted to the UN operating environment.

- Establishing command hierarchies that clearly assign responsibility and accountability for all subordinate elements.
- Clearly assigning tasks and objectives to subordinate units.
- Maintaining effective control of ongoing operations in accordance with plans, directives and policies, thereby retaining the capacity to direct events through the timely transmission of orders.
- Continuously control operations in all weather conditions, by day and night, in a designated AOR to perform mandated tasks.
- Enabling leaders at all levels to take the initiative during operations.

2.4.2.2. UN Military Peacekeeping Intelligence (MPKI)³

UN Inf Bns work in increasingly complex, high-risk and unpredictable operating environments. MPKI is a critical capability for UN Inf Bns. Where possible, the UN Inf Bn staff should ensure that operations are intelligence-led.

The S2 section supports the Battalion Commander, battalion staff, subordinate units and SHQ with MPKI products to support the UN MDMP and the conduct of operations, down to section-level patrols. The S2 section manages the battalion MPKI processes and internal and external information requirements. The S2 section provides early warning of threats to battalion operations and contributes to security tasks within the battalion. The S2 section is an important and integrated MPKI capability for the mission MPKI chain and should therefore be appropriately staffed for its task. Details of its organization are covered in Chapter Three of this manual.

Required Actions

- The management of the UN Inf Bn MPKI Cycle, in line with the UN MPKI Handbook, through the direction, acquisition, analysis and dissemination phases. This is to ensure that the Battalion Commander's decision-making process is fully supported with timely, succinct, and relevant peacekeeping-intelligence products.
- Ensure that UN Inf Bn information acquisition activities are conducted in support of Sector Priority and other Information Requirements (IRs). To this end, the S2 section will maintain an Information Acquisition Plan (IAP) that fully aligns with Sector Headquarters IRs. This will be regularly updated.
- In conjunction with the S3 cell and other staff functions, ensure that appropriate acquisition assets are tasked to acquire relevant information.
- Produce timely, relevant, concise, and predictive peacekeeping-intelligence products to support the protection of UN personnel and civilians, as required. This will include intelligence to support all operational activity down to section-level operations.
- Develop a most likely and most dangerous threat actor course of action, and briefs this to all patrol commanders and staff planners to allow operational threat mitigation.
- Identify relevant trends and threats.
- Conduct a full AOE and Actor Analysis for the entire Bn AOR, per the guidelines in the UN MPKI Handbook.
- Ensure that a full AOE, and Actor Evaluation is carried out by all subordinate units down to Company level, or whenever a new TOB is established. This will allow these units to identify their respective strengths and vulnerabilities and implement measures to prevent isolated bases and/or POC sites from attack.
- Work with the Military Gender and Protection Advisor, to ensure a gender and protection perspective is mainstreamed into all peacekeeping-intelligence products.
- Ensure that all relevant information and peacekeeping-intelligence is provided to higher and subordinate units in a timely fashion

2.4.2.3. Mobility & Manoeuvre

³ See the Military Peacekeeping Intelligence Handbook, April 2019, for further elaboration on Military Peacekeeping Intelligence and battalion tasks for UN Peace Operations.

Definition. Mobility, and manoeuvre are distinct yet related terms. *Mobility*, in military terms, refers to the ability of a combat unit, armed force, or weapons system, to move toward a military objective. *Manoeuvre* denotes a tactical movement, or series of movements to improve or maintain a unit's operational situation in a competitive environment.

Mobility produces the flexibility required for successful maneuver. Flexibility is the ability to change readily to meet new circumstances, comprising of agility, responsiveness, resilience, acuity and adaptability. The UN Inf Bn staff must ensure that operations are planned with capabilities that assure unit mobility in the operating environment, a scheme of maneuver that is tactically suited to the ground over which it will move and a plan that provides enough flexibility to react to situational developments on the ground.

Required Actions

In this context, the UN Inf Bn must be capable of:

- Providing constant, unimpeded, safe, and secure movement to all subordinate elements and weapon systems of the battalion, as well as to all UN elements and to the local population throughout the battalion AOR. Where safety is challenged, the staff must plan to mitigate the risk.
- Quickly adapting to changing environmental and operational conditions.
- Conducting proactive, mobile operations to dominate its UN AOR in the execution of its mandated tasks. By doing so, the UN Inf Bn maintains a visible presence in areas of potential threat, enhances security, encourages confidence within the local population, and supports the mission security framework.
- Operating by day and night, every day, and in all weather conditions.
- Moving tactically and non-tactically to position military force in the most advantageous location in a timely fashion.
- Deploying from by land, sea, or air, as appropriate or required by the SUR and/or mission.

2.4.2.4. Sustainment

Definition. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services required to maintain and prolong operations until successful mission accomplishment. Sustainment provides support in the areas of supply, maintenance, transportation, medical, general engineering, construction and field services. The UN Inf Bn must be capable of completing all mandated tasks unique to the peacekeeping environment, as required under the terms of the SUR/SFR/MOU, without unplanned interruption.

It is worth noting that the UN Inf Bn battalion is expected to meet the standards of self-sustainment detailed in accordance with the terms of the SUR/SFR/MOU and the Manual on Policies and Procedures Concerning the Reimbursement and Control of Contingent-Owned Equipment of Troop/Police Contributors Participating in Peacekeeping Missions (COE Manual). The UN Inf Bn must be capable of providing and maintaining the necessary resources and personnel to support the contingent administratively and logistically for the duration of the mission. Categories of self-sustainment required to be deployed by TCCs will be based on the SUR, the logistical support available from the Mission or other units.

Required Actions. UN Inf Bn Staff are to plan operations that:

- Have a fully self-sufficient and independently sustained logistics capability (for supplies that are the responsibility of the unit). This includes, but is not limited to the provision of food, water, accommodations, hygiene and sanitation (for women and men), mobility resources, repair and recovery, preventive maintenance, medical support, welfare, waste management, and engineering resources.
- Support unit operations through timely, effective and enduring provision of the above, including timely replenishment.

2.4.2.5. Engagement/ CIMIC

Definition. Engagement is the interaction of the UN Inf Bn with representatives of the population and other government and non-government actors within the AO to improve cooperation, and reporting. The intent of military engagement is to deconflict military activities with those of other actors in the AO, ensure the military does not negatively impact the local population and other actors, and that military operations are not affected by the activities of others.

Engagement can improve force protection through better situational awareness and ensure that violations of UN policy or international law are recognized and reported. Engagement with the host government, parties to the conflict and other armed groups may help improve the relationship between the Force and the local community. Engagement should seek to deter and prevent Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) and other Human Rights abuses and conduct advocacy of peaceful processes, inclusion of women in dialogue and conforming to International humanitarian Law. Collecting information from the local population can help identify the unique needs and risks of men, women, boys and girls. Monitoring and analyzing those risks can identify 'hot spots' that can be targeted by increased military presence to prevent escalations of violence.

Engagement includes, but is not be limited to, interaction with local community authorities, local community organizations, key political and community leaders, national military and police, parties to the conflict, and the local population, including women and men. Engagement with children should be limited and should focus on advocacy and the prevention of the 6 Grave Violations of a child (killing and maiming of children; recruitment or use of children as soldiers; sexual violence against children; abduction of children; attacks against schools or hospitals; denial of humanitarian access for children.) Appropriate coordination is required with other UN entities, and with International and Non-Governmental Organizations (IOs/NGOs) to ensure that the community (especially children) are not placed at further risk.

All UN Inf Bn engagement tasks should be coordinated with the Sector and Force, in accordance with mission priorities and directives, utilizing mission-designated liaison processes. A UN Inf Bn normally includes both a Civil-Military Coordination (CIMIC) Section and an Engagement Platoon (EP) that is comprised of both women and men in order to facilitate interaction with the entire community (this concept is described further in paragraph 3.6). The scope of engagement activities performed by CIMIC and EP capabilities are closely aligned, though the scale of expertise and experience to be found in CIMIC Sections is usually of greater depth than the tactical 'first responder' capability offered by EPs. It is expected that CIMIC and EP capabilities can work together or separately, and alone or on UN Inf Bn patrols to provide comprehensive engagement results. UN Inf Bn Commanders can determine the most effective means of utilizing these capabilities, either by attaching EP teams at the Coy level for concurrent activities or basing them at HQ with the CIMIC Section.

For current guidance on CIMIC, refer to the DPKO/DFS Policy: Civil-Military Coordination in UN Integrated Peacekeeping Missions (2013). Handbooks for the CIMIC Section and EP have not yet been published. The UN Inf Bn must include engagement in its planning and operations to enhance the battalion's situational awareness. This will assist with minimizing the impact of civilian actions on military operations and minimizing the impact of military operations on the civilian population. UN Inf Bn and Coy commanders must be prepared to task its CIMIC Section and/or EP, as well as other mission military assets (including Military Observers, Military Liaison Officers, and interpreters) to support the below actions, normally in close coordination with other UN offices, agencies and programs, as well as national and IO/NGO partners.

Required Actions. UN Inf Bn Staff are to plan operations that incorporate the following tasks:

- Patrol
 - Engage with the local population and report relevant information about their stated needs and interests.

- Map and report on local groups, and their situation, interests and needs as well as the potential, or imminent risks and on-going threats they face.
- Observe, monitor and report on areas with vulnerable and at-risk populations. Develop, collect and report early warning indicators.
- Support humanitarian operations, when required.
- Identify past, current and future roles, missions and structure of local leaders/major actors of communities including women's groups and facilitate dialogue and engagement.
- If required, collect information on key sites, witnesses, and other evidence related to key ongoing or potential UN investigations (including Human Rights).
- If required, participate in joint patrols with government security forces.
- Liaise
 - Engage in dialogue with the men and women of communities by trust-building negotiation, and mediation, if required.
 - Coordinate with any humanitarian assistance providers in the AO, if needed.
 - Coordinate with other Mission elements (including the Head of Office and Community Liaison Assistants) and UN funds/programs/agencies within the AO.
 - Maintain regular contact with key communicators of local communities.
 - Coordinate, integrate and liaise with Military Gender Advisers and Women's Protection Advisers, generally located at the Sector HQ.
- Assess
 - Determine and report if there are threats to UN operations, personnel or facilities.
 - Determine and report if there are threats to civilian population.
 - Determine and report if there are indications of violations of UN policies or international law including CRSV and Human Rights.
 - Determine and report imminent humanitarian crisis from lack of food, water or security.
 - Recommend possible community development plans, including whether a Quick Impact Project (QIP) or other CIMIC project is feasible. Such projects should be designed to strengthen the role of local government, where possible (supporting the political goals of the Mandate). Improving the image of the UN and relationship with the local community are secondary outcomes.
 - Identify and assess capabilities of potential political party leaders and structures
 - Determine and report the local population's existing protection and prevention strategies and develop plans to integrate with and enhance their own security mechanisms.

2.4.2.6. Protection and Security (including Protection of Civilians and Force Protection)

Definitions.

Protection. The act of protecting or the state of being protected; preservation from injury or harm a thing, person, or group.

Security. Freedom from, or resilience to potential harm caused by others.

Force Protection (FP). FP include the measures to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities equipment, material, operations and activities from harm caused by threats and hazards to preserve freedom of action, movement, and enhance operational effectiveness thereby contributing to the mission success.

Protection of Civilians (POC).⁴ POC is the legal responsibility of the host government. However, POC remains a critically important task, sometimes specified, always implied, in all peacekeeping missions. In many peacekeeping missions, all necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, are

⁴ See UN Guideline, "Protection of Civilians: Implementing Guidelines for Military Components of United Nations Peacekeeping Missions", February 2015.

authorized to prevent or respond to threats of physical violence against civilians. These tasks and authorities are found in the Mission Mandate, Rules of Engagement (ROE), CONOPS and SUR.

Rationale. To preserve freedom of movement, action and to enhance operational efficacy thereby contributing to mission success. Failure to provide security in the UN Inf Bn AOR, or to provide protection and assure force protection would directly or indirectly undermine the ability of the UN Inf Bn to accomplish its mission.

Required Actions. In this context, the UN Inf Bn must facilitate and plan to:

- Provide individual and collective force protection to all mission elements in the AOR, whether such mission elements are mobile or static.
- Maintain its bases in a state of good repair, ensuring that potential adversaries are aware that these bases are occupied by a highly professional, proactive UN Force.
- Protect civilians, particularly vulnerable population groups, and other relevant actors in the AOR. This necessitates the projection of force, and proactive patrolling throughout the AOR.
- Proactively identify and mitigate risks to civilians, and identify potential safe havens.
- Inform and sensitize troops to potential threats through regular operational and MPKI briefings.
- Align physical force protection measures and immediate actions with known threats, both direct and indirect. Force Protection personnel (including engineers and security officers) plan responsive and preventative measures, including planning calibrated responses that minimize collateral damage.
- Develop and rehearse contingency plans for POC, including stand-to drills and reaction to adversary attack/ambush.

Further description of Force Protection is at Annex A.

2.4.2.7. Firepower

Definition.

Firepower is the UN Inf Bn's capacity to direct force, within UN ROEs, and in line with International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (IHL/IHRL), at a target in support of mandate implementation.

Firepower incorporates the whole range of direct and indirect fire weapons and weapons systems. As appropriate and in support of mandate implementation, the UN Inf Bn must be able to integrate field artillery, mortars and air attack (if available) into operations. The staff will plan, synchronize and integrate an artillery/indirect fire/air attack support plan into the UN Inf Bn concept of operations. This support plan will be in accordance with UN principles and permitted by the mandate and ROE. It will incorporate available armed and unarmed reconnaissance and security capabilities.

In order to execute the mission and support effective mandate implementation the UN Inf Bn must be trained and ready to use force in accordance with the mission's ROE, International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law (IHL/IHRL).

Required Actions

The UN Inf Bn Staff must plan to:

- Use of direct and indirect fire support weapons.
- Employ weapons and weapons systems attached from higher HQ, as necessary.
- Use direct and indirect fire support weapons, when available.
- Assure self-sustainment for all organic Inf Bn direct and indirect fire support weapons.
- Assure self-sufficiency in organic indirect or direct fire support weapons and weapons systems to platoon level.
- Employ company support weapons and weapons systems on mobile platforms.
- Employ flexibility in organizing the task organization of indirect and direct fire support weapons as the situation dictates.

- Be capable of directing indirect fire and/or fire from attack helicopters, when needed.

2.4.2.8. Interoperability

Definition

Interoperability is the ability for all elements of the UN Inf Bn to work together seamlessly in the execution of assigned tasks. In a UN context this also refers to the ability of different military contingents to work (plan, operate, and communicate) together to conduct of combined operations and/or joint operations.

Rationale

Interoperability is an integral part of UN peacekeeping operations. It is a critical capability for a UN Inf Bn to be capable of operating in an integrated, multinational and multidimensional environment. For example, a UN Inf Bn will often have to execute complex operations working alongside contingents from other TCCs. These diverse military units must be able to work together (plan, operate, and communicate) in order to achieve mission success. Interoperability can only be achieved through continuous liaison, the establishment of coordinating measures, and through cross-training, and rehearsal. Moreover, peacekeeping operations should be prepared for, planned and conducted in a manner that makes the best use of the relative strengths and capabilities of all participants.

Required Actions

To be interoperable in a UN mission, the UN Inf Bn must:

- Adhere to the UN MDMP.
- Plan operations in an integrated manner, either in a national, multinational or interagency context.
- Establish well-coordinated Command and Control arrangements with other nations, incorporating interoperable communication systems for combined or joint operations.
- Thoroughly plan and practice Casualty Evacuation (CASEVAC).
- Effectively communicate with all other deployed TCCs, including using interpreters or organic language experts.
- Establish common SOPs and standards for shared understanding. This is best accomplished *before* neighboring units are required to conduct operations. It is imperative that the UN Inf Bn commanders and staff use their initiative to facilitate interoperability as soon as possible after initial deployment.

2.5. UN Inf Bn Tasks

The most common UN military operational tasks required to support UN mandates are outlined below, complete with planning considerations and guidance on their conduct and execution. Some of these sixteen tasks are best planned and executed at battalion-level, due to their complexity and/or resource requirements, while others are typically delegated to the company or even platoon-level. However, almost all tasks require battalion-level combat support and/or combat service support, and battalion staff must plan to facilitate this. For example, the establishment of a Temporary Operating Base (TOB) will require engineering and medical support, together with incorporation into the battalion-level indirect fire plan. Similarly, some tasks, listed here as company or platoon tasks, may also have to be executed at the battalion level. For example, the battalion will also have to establish an Operating Base and may have to conduct Relief in Place.

Examples of **Battalion-level** tasks:

- Conduct Protection of Civilians.
- Support Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.
- Conduct Cordon and Search.
- Conduct Offensive operations.
- Conduct Extraction.
- Conduct Withdrawal.

- Casualty Evacuation

Examples of **Company or Platoon-level** tasks:

- Establish an Operating Base
- Establish a Checkpoint.
- Establish an Observation Post.
- Conduct Defensive operations (for a Temporary Operating Base (TOB)).
- Conduct Convoy Escort/Tactical Move.
- Conduct a Patrol.
- Conduct a Relief in Place.
- Conduct Reinforcement.
- Conduct Civil Disturbance Control or Crowd Control.

2.5.1. Introduction

A UN Inf Bn will deploy as a **Standard Battalion**, a **Quick Reaction Force**, or as a **Reserve**. Its companies are designated as **Light**, **Motorized** or **Mechanized**. It normally includes a platoon in each Coy trained and equipped for crowd/riot control and has engagement as well as Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities. Regardless its role, the UN Inf Bn is required to plan according to the planning principles outlined above and to conduct tasks, according to the guidelines below.

To understand how the planning principles and tasks combine to enable mission completion, consider the following example. A UN Inf Bn deploys to uphold the POC aspect of its mandate, in line with international humanitarian and human rights law (IHL/IHRL). While deployed, the UN Inf Bn will be required to execute several *tasks*, either concurrently or sequentially, involving units of different sizes. To assure POC the UN Inf Bn will have to set up Check Points, Observation Posts, and conduct patrols. These tasks may have to be completed safely (Force Protection), while working with other contingents (interoperability) and may require the UN Inf Bn to use force (employment of firepower). The UN Inf Bn may also have to deploy its Engagement Platoon (EP) to interact with community leaders (engagement).

2.5.2. Purpose

The purpose of this section is to provide guidance to the UN Inf Bn Commander, to Battalion HQ staff and to leaders at other levels on how to plan and execute some of the most common peacekeeping tasks. It is important to note that these guidelines complement and do not replace national training and should be considered the 'blue helmet' overlay.

Clear understanding of these tasks will facilitate TCC planning and preparation, task-organization, and the conduct of task-oriented training.

2.6. UN Inf Bn Task Descriptions

Primary Tasks:

- Task 1** - Conduct a Patrol.
- Task 2** - Treat and Evacuate Casualties.
- Task 3** - Conduct a Convoy/ Escort.
- Task 4** - Establish/ Conduct a Checkpoint (CP).
- Task 5** - Conduct Cordon & Search (C&S).
- Task 6** - Conduct Defensive Operations.
- Task 7** - Establish/ Conduct an Observation Post (OP).
- Task 8** - Establish/ Operate an Operating Base (OB).
- Task 9** - Conduct Relief in Place.

2.6.1. TASK 1 – Conduct a Patrol

2.6.1.1. Purpose

Patrols are typically carried out for the following purposes:

- Block or deny threat actors freedom of movement.
- Dominate terrain not covered by UN observation posts.
- Dominate terrain by night.
- Confirm and/or supervise a ceasefire.
- Gather information, per the Information Acquisition Plan.
- To prepare for future operations.
- To establish and maintain links with isolated communities.
- To conduct observation in areas normally not visible.
- To provide a physical link between adjacent but relatively isolated positions.
- To provide security to the local population.
- To interpose troops between opponent elements during periods of tension.
- To establish contact with threat groups.
- To show a UN presence.
- To enhance interoperability with other UN actors and civilian groups.

2.6.1.2. Desired Effect

To deny terrain to threat actors, to safeguard the local population and vulnerable groups, and to assure mandate implementation through the robust and proactive projection of force by day and night.

2.6.1.3. Planning Considerations

All planning should stem from the planning guidance issued by the Operations section of the UN Inf Bn, based on UN-MDMP.

Generally, patrol commanders should consider the following:

- Type of terrain (difficult and very difficult terrain; vegetation changes - likely ambush spots; rivers and other bodies of water; obstacles; vulnerable points, including areas where friendly forces are canalized; areas where IEDs have been laid in the past).
- Human population (key leader locations; areas where the population is friendly or unfriendly to the UN; ethnic, religious fault lines; areas where threat groups are known or suspected to have the support of the local population; POC sites; IDP camps).
- Communication blackspots.
- Threat actors (where are they, what are they likely to do, why will they do it, when will they do it, and how will they do it).
- Mission. What will the patrol need to do if it is an area domination patrol, a POC patrol, a combat, or reconnaissance patrol.
- What will the patrol do on entry/exit of friendly lines; what will the patrol do at a short/long halt; what will the patrol do in the event of a breakdown; how will the patrol react to contact – left, right, front, and rear; what will the patrol do if there is a casualty.
- Plan for actions if a vehicle breaks down and requires repair or recovery. Review self-recovery procedures. Plan actions in case a vehicle becomes stuck and not recoverable.
- Full rehearsals of actions should take place before the patrol.
- Four is generally the minimum number of vehicles to conduct an operation. If one vehicle is disabled or destroyed, recover it while the others provide security.
- It is important to develop a CASEVAC and Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) Plan that always considers the *golden hour*, which refers to the period following a traumatic injury during which there is the highest likelihood that prompt medical and surgical treatment will prevent death.
- Logistics provision (food, water, petrol and oil).

- Communications means.
- Command and Control considerations. Prior to departure, establish and test the secondary means of communications.

When formulating a patrol plan, the UN Inf Bn must be cognizant of the following:

- Patrols must happen by day and night, ensuring an enduring/sustained presence in vulnerable areas.
- Long-range, multi-day patrols should be used to cover remote areas, including during the night.
- Patrols should be accompanied by interpreters.
- Deployment of Engagement Teams, taken from the EP, which include female personnel to reach out to the local population.
- When operating from armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and vehicles, the infantry may be required to operate on foot, either to address threats (under the protective watch from APCs) or to engage with communities.
- Helicopter borne patrols can significantly enhance presence and visibility in a wider area, thereby reassuring the vulnerable sections of the population, deter armed groups and perpetrators of CRSV, and deter human trafficking.

2.6.1.4. Conduct of the Task

After planning the task, the patrol leader should consider the following whilst on or just before the operation:

- The patrol leader should give a full patrol order before departing the base camp.
- Patrol orders should include the situation, the mission, concept of operations incorporating commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, execution including immediate actions and timings, service support, and command and control.
- Patrol members should depart on a patrol confident of the patrol's capabilities and should be aware of their individual responsibilities. This is gained through detailed knowledge of the mission's task and purpose, the likely threats to be encountered during the patrol and good situational awareness and understanding.
- Task organize and the vehicles to maintain all-round security and, for urban areas, and for high-low threat situations.
- Consider vehicle spacing, taking the ground, weather conditions, and the threat (IEDs) into account. Generally, vehicles should be not less than 10m from one another.
- Carefully consider leader locations in each vehicle and within the convoy to maximize flexibility and control.
- Avoid unnecessary stops as this can create a potential kill zone;
- The mounted patrol will often need to dispatch dismounted troops. Plan for the mounted section to perform overwatch for the dismounts. It is a good idea to have dismounted personnel to provide additional security when patrolling in urban or other go-slow areas;

2.6.1.5. Organizational Considerations

A patrol organizes to perform specific tasks, and its task organization will vary according to the mission, the ground, and the threat. A patrol generally consists of a headquarters and the elements needed for the mission. A patrol often organizes into a HQ element, an assault (main effort) element, a security element, and a support element. According to the situation, the leader of the patrol must decide what elements are required, he/she must select patrol members to be part of those elements and teams and decide what weapons and/or specialist equipment is required. He/she should use his/her unit's normal organization and chain of command (squad leaders and platoon sergeant) to man the patrol.

Attachments. The patrol leader must ensure all personnel attached to the patrol are introduced to the other patrol members and briefed thoroughly on the tactical SOP; all patrol special orders; and existing chain of command. Interpreters and language assistants.

2.6.1.6. Support to Conduct the Task

Logistics support to a patrol is key to its success. Logistics support considerations are not just limited to food, water, and POL. They include engineering and other enabling support.

Patrols should be capable of self-sustainment for the task and duration of the patrol under all weather conditions and should:

- Have adequate water and food for all personnel, with at spare capacity of at least one extra day of operations.
- Carry enough fuel to accomplish the mission and have a refueling plan.
- Have communications equipment (VHF and HF radio at a minimum), including a secondary means, such as satellite phones.
- Obtain and coordinate medical support and attachments, ensuring that all members are aware of CASEVAC/MEDEVAC procedures.
- Obtain transportation support and ensure preventive maintenance and checks are accomplished.
- Where required, have additional mobility support (engineers, C-IED teams).

2.6.2. TASK 2 – Treat and Evacuate Casualties

2.6.2.1. Purpose

Casualty management in the field must meet the requirements of military and civilian peacekeepers in remote locations without easy access to other medical care providers. It is also important that UN Battalion Staff incorporate plans to treat and evacuate both civilian and adversary casualties in line with the provisions of international humanitarian and human rights law (IHL/IHRL).

CASEVAC is the primary evacuation of any casualty from the point of injury (POI) to the closest appropriate medical facility, utilizing the most appropriate means of transportation. Medical research proves that the risk of death or permanent disability is significantly reduced if people are treated as soon as possible after the onset of a life-threatening injury or illness. Based on this evidence, it is of utmost importance that appropriate life, limb and eyesight saving procedures are provided as quickly as possible. The stages of CASEVAC are referred to as the ‘**10-1-2 goal**.’

- **The first 10 Minutes (10).** Immediate lifesaving actions (First aid): in the battlefield, most casualties die within the first ten minutes of the trauma. Injured/ill personnel must receive immediate lifesaving actions at the POI with the first 10 minutes, commonly referred to as ‘Platinum 10 Minutes.’ These are mandatory skills for every peacekeeper trained during pre-deployment.
- **The first hour (1).** Represents the first hour when Advanced Lifesaving Support (ALS) and Damage Control Resuscitation (DCR) must be started to increase the chances of survival for a patient initially treated with only Buddy First Aid (one soldier giving basic first aid to another). ALS is a set of life-saving protocols and skills that extend to further support the circulation and provide an open airway and adequate ventilation. DCR is a systematic approach to the management of the patient with severe injuries that starts in the emergency room and continues in higher level hospitals through the operating room and the intensive care unit (ICU). This care is provided by: Forward-Medical Teams, an Aero-Medical Evacuation Team, or Level 1 hospital.
- **The second hour (2).** Represents the recommended maximum time of two hours where the necessary Damage Control Surgery (DCS) must be provided, where Level 2 and higher-level hospitals provide surgical and life-saving capabilities, as well as common hospital services. A Level 2 medical facility provides all Level 1 services and in addition, provides DCS, post-operative services and high-dependency care; an Aero-Medical Evacuation Team (AMET) capability; intensive care-resuscitation; in-patient services; basic imaging services; laboratory, pharmaceutical, preventive medicine and dental services; as well as record maintenance and administrative support.

2.6.2.2. Desired Effect

Lifesaving measures applied that prevent the loss of life, limb and/or eyesight are available to all UN Inf Bn personnel in line with the 10-1-2 goal.

2.6.2.3. Planning Considerations

The medical support plan identifies the principal considerations and recommendations for establishing an integrated healthcare system, which is aimed at maintaining the physical and mental well-being of UN personnel in a mission. It begins with conducting a health risk assessment of the battalion's area of operation to determine the staffing and materiel resources required to execute the plan. Key components of the medical support plan are the following:

- Medical facilities
- Casualties/ Medical Evacuation
- Medical Evacuation Assets
- Health protection
- Medical Staffing
- Material resourcing and medical logistics plan
- Training of medical and non-medical personnel
- Communications and information management

2.6.2.4. Conduct of the Task

The UN Inf Bn must:

- Ensure that all its personnel are trained in basic first aid.
- Ensure that a Level 1 facility is in place at Battalion HQ.
- Ensure that appropriate CASEVAC contingency plans and procedures are in place to ensure that the 10-1-2 goal is considered.
- Carry out a medical risk assessment prior to going on operations. This will help guide medics and Inf Bn Staff to more effectively draw up contingency plans.
- The CASEVAC plan must function effectively for all UN Inf Bn deployments, not just for static deployment locations such as TOBs.
- The CASEVAC plan must be communicated to all soldiers and should be a part of all orders.
- The CASEVAC plan must be rehearsed to ensure that it is fit for purpose.
- Where possible, the UN Inf Bn should rehearse or otherwise test mission-level CASEVAC procedures. This will improve interoperability and will highlight any shortcomings.

The UN Inf Bn must ensure that the mission has established the following:

- Establish a dedicated communication channel across the mission to support CASEVAC. This system must be operational across the entire area of responsibility and provide reliable communication with the mission JOC, field office or the equivalent CASEVAC coordination system on a 24/7 basis.
- Equip all mission personnel performing duties outside TOBs with interoperable communication equipment capable of accessing CASEVAC support; preferably with GPS capability, and with helicopter landing zone marking capability.
- Provide continuous training to all mission personnel in basic first aid, primarily to stop the bleeding and secure the airway.
- Ensure that all personnel are well trained and that they can compile and send the standard alert message by radio communication for CASEVAC support to the mission JOC, field office or the equivalent CASEVAC coordination center using the communication system provided.
- Plan for the treatment of civilian and adversary casualties.

It is a TCC responsibility to ensure the following planning is conducted:

- All UN Inf Bn members are to deploy with their Individual First Aid Kit (IFAK) as provided in the current COE Manual.
- TCCs must conduct enough medical training for personnel; generate and deploy embedded and mobile medical capacity; clarify and implement CASEVAC planning and include medical personnel in operational planning. Provide continuous training to all mission personnel as per the UN Buddy First Aid Course (UNBFAC) in basic first aid, primarily to stop the bleeding and secure the airway.
- TCCs must conduct enough medical training for the entire peacekeeping personnel based on the United Nations Buddy First Aid Course (UNBFAC); generate and deploy embedded and mobile medical capacity; clarify and implement CASEVAC and include medical personnel in operational planning.
- TCCs must ensure that every Battalion has the required number of Field Medic Assistants trained as per the United Nations Field Medic Assistant Curriculum (UNFMAC).

2.6.2.5. Organizational Considerations

CASEVAC is a team effort. It is the responsibility of all soldiers-not just the medics. This includes combat lifesavers, infantry squad leaders, staff officers, the medical platoon leader, and the Battalion Commander. The use of appropriate ground and air evacuation techniques based on mission variables and patient categories (Alpha-Critical, Bravo-Urgent, and Charlie-Delayed or Hold) will determine precedence of evacuation. Refer to the UN DPO/DOS/DPA/DSS Policy 'Casualty Evacuation in the Field,' 2019 for a detailed description.

2.6.2.6. Support to Conduct the Task

The UN Inf Bn must plan to have a medic on all operations. It must also ensure that all its personnel have first aid kits and are qualified in basic first aid. No soldier should go on patrol without this. The logistics plan must assure that the UN Inf Bn is self-supporting in terms of meeting the 10-1 parts of the 10-1-2 goal. It must also have designated CASEVAC routes, and enough organic transport assets, or mission assets on standby to fulfill its responsibilities in this regard.

2.6.3. TASK 3 – Conduct a Convoy/ Escort

2.6.3.1. Purpose

Escort and convoy operations are conducted to escort a personnel or supplies, often non-military, in a secure manner from a designated start point to an intended destination. They are carried out for:

- The movement of UN personnel (civilians, police or military or a combination).
- A Force logistics supply.
- Administrative convoys of deployed troops.
- The movement of humanitarian aid and personnel.
- The movement of election staff and equipment.
- The escort for dignitaries / very important persons (VIPs).
- The movement of refugees/internally displaced persons (including women and children).
- The movement of prisoners/detainees.

2.6.3.2. Desired Effect

Good Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TPPs) cause threat actors to consider the convoy not to be a 'soft target' and elect not to engage it.

2.6.3.3. Planning Considerations

All planning should stem from the planning guidance issued by the Operations section of the UN Inf Bn, which should have completed a UN MDMP.

Generally, the convoy escort commanders should consider the following:

- Type of terrain (difficult and very difficult terrain; vegetation changes - likely ambush spots; rivers and other bodies of water; obstacles; vulnerable points, including areas where friendly forces are canalized; areas where IEDs have been laid in the past).
- Carrying out a route reconnaissance to determine route conditions. This may not be possible in some environments (high threat locations). In that case a map reconnaissance will suffice.
- Human population (key leader locations; areas where the population is friendly or unfriendly to the UN; ethnic, religious fault lines; areas where threat groups are known or suspected to have the support of the local population; POC sites; displaced persons sites).
- The effect of the weather on movement.
- The type of vehicles being escorted, including: their ability to move through terrain, their level of force protection.
- Where possible and appropriate, the convoy being escorted should be included in actions on rehearsals for all potential incidents.
- All actions on planning must allow for the fact that some convoy vehicles will have low levels of force protection, limited mobility and no firepower. It should also be noted and included in all planning that the convoy personnel may have little or no military training.
- Communication gap areas (where signals cannot reach).
- Threat actors (where are they, what are they likely to do, why will they do it, when will they do it, and how will they do it).
- What will the convoy do on entry/exit of friendly lines; what will the patrol do at a short/long halt; what will the patrol do in the event of a breakdown; how will the patrol react to contact – left, right, front, and rear; what will the patrol do if there is a casualty; what will the vehicles being escorted be expected to do at each of these decision points;
- Engagement teams should be incorporated to the convoy escort when IDPs of refugees are being escorted;
- Logistics provision (food, water, petrol and oil);
- Communications means;
- Command and Control considerations.

2.6.3.4. Conduct of the Task

The convoy/ escort leader should consider the following whilst on or just before the operation:

- The convoy should give a full patrol order before departing the base camp. This orders group should include all members of the convoy being escorted so they are familiar with the situation and what is expected of them during the movement. All convoy members should depart on a patrol confident of the patrol's capabilities and should be aware of their individual responsibilities. This is gained through detailed knowledge of the mission's task and purpose, the likely threats to be encountered during the patrol and good situational awareness and understanding.
- A convoy escort order must include the situation, the mission, concept of operations incorporating commander's intent, scheme of maneuver, execution including immediate actions and timings, service support and command and control.
- Full rehearsals of actions on contact should take place before the convoy exits friendly lines, including with the drivers and personnel of the convoy being escorted.
- Rehearsals must account for the fact that those being escorted may have limited or no military experience. Rehearsals with these personnel will highlight shortcomings, particularly as the convoy vehicles will often not share the movement, force protection and firepower characteristics of military vehicles.
- During the mission, vehicles are to maintain all-round security. This is particularly important at halts. There should always be an overwatch element.
- Consider vehicle spacing, taking the ground, weather conditions and the threat (IEDs) into account. Generally, vehicles should be not less than 10m from one another

- Carefully consider leader locations in each vehicle and within the convoy to maximize flexibility and control.
- Check radio contact at irregular intervals.
- Deploy a reconnaissance element to the front of the convoy to check for obstacles, threats and to proof the route. Consider deploying C-IED and engineering assets with this element.
- Give regular situation reports to higher HQ.

2.6.3.5. Organizational Considerations

A convoy escort organizes to perform specific tasks, and its task organization will vary according to the mission, the ground and the threat. A convoy escort generally consists of a headquarters and the elements needed for the mission. A convoy escort often organizes into a HQ element, a reconnaissance element, which can include engineers and counter-IED personnel to proof the route and check for obstacles and other threats, the main body of which may include an assault element (main effort), a security element, a reserve and support elements.

According to the situation, the leader of the convoy escort must decide what elements are required, he/she must select personnel to be part of those elements and teams and decide what weapons and/or specialist equipment is required. He/she should use his/her unit's normal organization and chain of command (squad leaders and platoon sergeant) to man the convoy escort.




Figure 2. Example of convoy/ escort organization

Because of the task organization of the convoy escort mission, command and control is critical. The relationship between the convoy commander and all operational elements, including the vehicles being escorted, must provide unity of command and effort, particularly if combat operations are required.

In most cases, all military and other attached elements will be at least TACCON (Tactical Control is the command authority over one unit, delegated to another for a specific mission or maneuver), and usually OPCON to the convoy escort commander, who is under command of the UN Inf Bn.

Serious consideration must be given to the command relationship between the convoy being escorted and the convoy escort commander. It is worth noting that it will not always be possible for the convoy escort commander to give orders to those being escorted, particularly when they are comprised of non-UN elements or civilians/ IDPs/refugees.

The convoy escort commander should exercise command and control by adjusting formation and distance during the move, based on terrain and threat level.

Attachments. The convoy escort leader must ensure all personnel attached to the convoy are introduced to the other convoy escort members and briefed thoroughly on the tactical SOPs; all special orders; immediate actions; and the chain of command.

2.6.3.6. Support to Conduct the Task

Logistics support to a convoy escort is central to its success. Logistics support considerations include food, water, and POL, as well as engineering and other specialist support.

Convoy escorts should be capable of sustaining themselves for the task and duration of the patrol under all weather conditions and should:

- Have adequate water and food for all personnel, with a spare capacity of at least one extra day of operations.
- Carrying enough fuel to accomplish the mission and have a refueling plan.
- Have communications equipment (VHF and HF radio at a minimum), including secondary means such as satellite phones. All equipment should be tested prior to departure and should have adequate spare batteries. It is vitally important that the convoy escort can communicate with the vehicles being escorted.
- Obtain and coordinate medical support and attachments, ensuring that all members are qualified for CASEVAC/MEDEVAC procedures.
- Obtain transportation support and ensure preventive maintenance and checks.
- Where required have additional mobility support (engineers, C-IED teams).

2.6.4. TASK 4 – Establish/ Conduct a Checkpoint (CP)

2.6.4.1. Purpose

The establishment or operation of CPs is a high-frequency task for a UN Inf Bn, particularly when part of area security operations. A CP is a point used as a means of controlling movement in support of UN operations. A CP is a manned and self-contained position deployed on a road or track to observe/check, inspect/search personnel or vehicles and control movement into and out of a designated area. A CP can be either permanent or temporary. A CP is usually manned by platoon-sized (or less) formations.

A UN Inf Bn may be directed to establish a CP for the following reasons:

- To support a variety of UN operations;
- To support POC tasks;
- To show a military presence;
- To survey vehicular and pedestrian movement along roads;
- To check and or inspect and register all personnel and vehicles moving in and out of the controlled area;
- To survey airspace, coastal areas, airfields, cease-fire lines, and borders;
- To enforce the terms of peace agreements;
- To deter threat group movement;
- To control movement into an area of operations or along a specific route;
- To prevent the smuggling of contraband;
- To ensure proper use of routes by both civilian and military vehicles.

2.6.4.2. Desired Effect

The CP has the desired operational effect and executes its mission in a safe and secure manner, optimizing force protection, respect for human rights, and the POC. The CP assists in effective mandate implementation.

2.6.4.3. Planning considerations

All planning should stem from the planning guidance issued by the Operations section of the UN Inf Bn, which should have completed the UN MDMP.

- Conduct a map reconnaissance.
- If possible, conduct a physical reconnaissance, checking for **C**over, **O**bstacles, **A**venues of Approach, **K**ey terrain, **O**bservation and **F**ields of Fire. Communications should also be checked. This is known as **COAKO**.
- Consider the ground for natural cover the CP can take advantage of for force protection, obstacles hindering movement or the establishment of the CP, Observation from the CP, which should afford 360 degree visibility, avenues of approach to the CP, ensuring that there are no approach routes covered from view or fire, fields of fire so that the CP can engage threat groups on all approaches, and key terrain so that the CP can dominate the local terrain.
- The activity of flanking and partner units must be known to all CP personnel. Similarly, the location of the CP must be known to all flanking and partner units. This is best ensured by adequate liaison.
- Ensure actions on attack, ambush, secure vehicle inspection, secure pedestrian search, contraband finds, taking prisoners and taking casualties are well prepared and rehearsed.
- The check point should be manned as a defensive operation and should include overwatch elements and other security precautions should be taken.
- The threat will dictate what overwatch elements are required. For example, if there is a suicide-VBIED threat then anti-tank weapons may need to be sited to defend against them.
- Enough space must be allowed for stop and search of both pedestrians and vehicles without stopping all traffic along the route. It is essential that the UN Inf Bn does not unnecessarily interrupt transport routes. Traffic must continue to flow. This will ensure good relations are maintained with the local community.
- CPs require both men and women interpreters, and it is often culturally appropriate to include female soldiers to question or search women.
- Military CPs may include UN Police and/or local police and civil administration officials. Additionally, experts from the civilian components of the mission (e.g., DDR, public information, etc.) may also be positioned along with the CP. The CP personnel should have good cultural awareness, respect local customs and traditions, have functional linguistic ability and conduct themselves in a friendly and professional manner.
- It is normally advisable to have host state security forces involved in checkpoint operations as early as possible. As checkpoints provide much of the direct contact that military forces have with the population, it is vital that leaders ensure soldiers conduct themselves professionally and do not abuse or extort civilians.
- CPs must not be set up in communications blackspots. Prior to the establishment of a CP, communications must be checked to both flanking units and to higher HQ.
- CPs need to be able to self-sustain.
- A resupply plan must be considered.
- A medical or casualty evacuation plan must be considered.
- Specialist search equipment may be required. If the CP is checking for contraband or explosives, then dog teams may be required.




Figure 3. Example of UN checkpoint organization

- CPs may need other specialist equipment, including defensive stores and anti-ram barriers. The layout, construction, and manning of CPs should reflect the factors gathered by Military Peacekeeping Intelligence about the situation environment, especially the time available for emplacing them.
- Report formats for all potential outcomes must be kept on site.
- A chain of evidence log and evidence bags must be available.
- Photographic equipment and video/CCTV cameras may be considered, if the local situation permits or if it is not considered culturally inappropriate;

2.6.4.4. Conduct of the CP Operation

Commanders should issue an order to the unit establishing CPs, which should include the situation, including likely threat actor courses of action, the location and activity of flanking units, the mission and concept, the execution and tasks, the logistics concept, and command, control and communications detail.

- Actions on contact must be rehearsed, and these must be explained to any attachments to the CP.
- A minimum of two soldiers should man the CP depending on traffic and the general situation. One soldier examines people and vehicles and the other soldier covers the area where people and vehicles are checked. All military personnel in the area must be armed.
- Communications checks are carried out at least twice every 24 hours (three times is recommended).
- All CPs are connected to their unit or directly to the battalion operations center by radio, and by at least one other communications system.
- Personnel control is conducted in different ways. Personnel should watch for people acting strangely or with bulging clothing. If there is a danger of car bombs, special attention should be paid to cars containing only one person. When conducting body searches, personnel should feel along clothes and not just pat them. Special attention must be paid to the lower parts of the back and from the shoes up to the knees. Armpits also must be checked. The wide trousers used by some cultures should be carefully examined. Personnel should also check boots and hats.
- Carrying out a body search of women and religious personnel may lead to strong local reactions. Using military women assigned to the unit to conduct a body search of women at a CP may be advisable, if available.
- If no women soldiers or police are available, women are usually only checked with a metal detector. Elderly women often may remain in the vehicle during inspection of a car.

2.6.4.5. Organizational Considerations

A CP may be organized as follows: a HQ element, a reserve element, which can be resting, an overwatch element, and a search element, comprising both male and female searchers.

Ideally, military police or military contingent personnel adept in handling evidence should be at the CP. CPs may also include the UN Police and/or local police and civil administration officials.

Additionally, in some situations, experts from the civilian components of the mission may also be positioned along with the CP. The CP personnel should have good cultural awareness, respect local customs and traditions, have functional linguistic ability and conduct themselves in a friendly and professional manner.

On UN operations, all attachments should be made known to and, where necessary, integrated with the military component; actions on contact should be rehearsed and clear lines of command and control must be established.

2.6.4.6. Support to Conduct the Task

The UN Inf Bn is required to sustain the CP.

Many items of equipment are used to reinforce a CP, providing an important role and support to carry out this task. Some of the recommended equipment includes:

- Barrels filled with sand, water, or heavy concrete blocks (emplaced to slow and canalize vehicles).
- Concertina wire (emplaced to control movement around the CP).
- Secure facilities for communications with the controlling headquarters.
- First aid kit and a medic.
- Evidence bags and a chain of evidence log;
- Binoculars, night vision devices, and or flashlights.
- Long-handled mirrors (used to inspect vehicle undercarriages).
- Signs stating the speed limit into and out of the CP (the text of these signs must be written in the mission language and the local language).
- For CPs of prolonged duration, the provision of ablution facilities, latrines, and covered, well-insulated rest areas must be considered.

Moreover, elements manning a deliberate CP may require access to specialized equipment such as:

- Floodlights.
- Thermal imaging.
- Specialist search units.
- Generators.

2.6.5. Task 5 – Conduct Cordon & Search (C&S)

2.6.5.1. Purpose

The primary purpose of a Cordon & Search (C&S) is to isolate a location to search the area for armed groups or material of evidentiary and/or peacekeeping-intelligence value. *Site exploitation* is a series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of C&S operations. This process includes the synchronized and integrated application of scientific and technological capabilities and enablers to answer information requirements, facilitate subsequent operations and support host-nation rule of law. The unit conducting the C&S will receive additional individuals with the requisite technical expertise to assist in this process. Information gained from site exploitation provides the commander with additional information to identify and interdict armed groups and materials.

2.6.5.2. Desired Effect

In peacekeeping operations, the C&S task is designed to: locate and confiscate illegal weapons and weapon caches (explosives, equipment and materials); to find and confiscate contraband materials; to arrest and detain suspects, unauthorized personnel and wanted criminals or persons countering the reconstruction of peace and security, if the mandate allows for this; to protect potential targets of armed groups through timely action in obtaining evidence of illegal activities; to build the confidence of the local population (include women and children); to deter violence and risks of gross human rights violations; and, to display UN resolve in enforcing the mandate to support peace and security.

2.6.5.3. Planning Considerations

Given the complexity of the Cordon and Search Operation, and the strong likelihood that it will be a combined and joint operation, the Bn Staff must be involved in planning. All plans should be informed by the UN MDMP as outlined earlier in this Chapter.

- C&S operation may be conducted at battalion, company or platoon level depending upon the size of the objective and the respective threat level.

- Consulting relevant mission civilian focal points to ensure assistance/programming is appropriate and in accordance with identified mission priorities.
- Consideration must be given to how the local population will be engaged during C&S. For example, ensuring that female peacekeepers are part of the team is critical to ensure that female members of the population are appropriately treated.
- Soldiers should be prepared to face local resistance in differing forms including, but not limited to, a lack of cooperation, civil disobedience, peaceful resistance, stone pelting, physical assault, IED initiation (see UN EOD Unit Manual), sniper fire, riot or armed resistance from the local population, militia or regular armed forces. Immediate actions and rehearsals must reflect this.
- The force should be clear on the processes for effecting arrest, detention and turnover of belligerent members of the population and armed groups to the police in a peacekeeping operational environment, as per relevant SOPs and guidance documents.
- The ROE must be a clear part of the planning process and all members of the C&S team must be in no doubt as to their obligations in this regard. Training serials must be conducted ahead of C&S operations to practice TTPs and to draw out ROE considerations and to ensure there is no ambiguity in their interpretation.
- Violation of human rights will not be tolerated, and any reports of this activity will be dealt with in an appropriate manner.
- All efforts to avoid collateral damage are essential and any instances must be reported at the earliest opportunity to ensure reparations are fair and proportionate. This includes damage to property. Mission SOPs should also direct a post search damage-assessment to assess and determine reparations.
- Contingency planning should be conducted ahead of a C&S operation to anticipate potential reprisals against the civilian population who may be perceived to be supporting such activity, for example.
- Exemplary conduct and respect for (and understanding of) local customs is always mandatory along with consulting local leaders and/or elders.
- If possible, approach routes should be selected to avoid alerting adversaries that a C&S operation is about to occur in an area; it may be advisable to use multiple converging routes.
- The security element must quickly establish the cordon to prevent suspects from fleeing and to secure the operation from external threats. The security element may also control subsequent access into the objective area.
- Depending upon the size of the perimeter and available observation, the security element may need to conduct patrols to secure the site effectively. Once the cordon is established, other elements can move into the objective area. It may be necessary to provide instructions to the population and this should be planned before beginning C&S (e.g., stay at home or assemble in a central location).

2.6.5.4. Conduct of the Task

The principles of C&S are comprehensive and fundamental rules exist guiding the commander on the conduct of this task. The principles are not a checklist. While the commander considers these principles, they do not apply in the same way to every situation, rather, they summarize characteristics of successful C&S operations. The value in these principles lies in assisting the commander in analyzing a pending operation while synchronizing efforts to know when to deviate from the principles based on the current situation. The principles of cordon and search include:

- Speed
- Surprise
- Isolation
- Proper objective identification
- Timeliness
- Accountability
- Minimization of collateral damage
- Detailed search
- Legitimacy

The general steps for conducting this task are:

- Utilize previous UN MPKI analysis to assist the decisions of the commander. It is therefore critical that MPKI provides a summary report assessing actor intentions, information regarding caches, maps and weapons. Good MPKI is required for successful C&S operations, which in turn can provide additional information that should be acted upon as rapidly as possible.
- Make every effort not to inconvenience the local population.
- Identify forces (assault & security elements) to establish an inner cordon around the objective building with the primary intent of preventing movement out of the objective building.
- Military security is fundamental in both planning and execution. Leaking of planning results and objectives should be avoided to keep the momentum of surprise and prevent casualties.
- Designate a reaction force to establish an outer cordon perimeter. Cover routes leading into the area to prevent outside interference or reinforcement.
- Identify a reserve force to reinforce either the inner or outer cordon, or address problems such as a civil disturbance.
- Designate search teams. Search teams should be assigned with objectives and work methodically, with due consideration to potential security threats (e.g., trip wires).
- Once cordons are established, the commander, with assistance of local police and/or translators, should address the following: inform the local population that a building is about to be searched; establish a house curfew if permitted by higher HQ; request that all occupants remain indoors; and instruct occupants within the target house to gather at a central location to facilitate the search operation.
- HQ element coordinates for required assistance (local police, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD), translators, dog team, etc.) conducts the search; and includes a female searcher if appropriate and available.
- Request the head of the household accompany the search party throughout the search to prevent accusations of theft and/or looting against UN soldiers. Search teams should not antagonize the local population by humiliating them or by damaging or stealing their property.
- Have a prominent member of the local community accompany the search party (if possible) to act as a witness. Treat personnel in the objective area respectfully, but firmly if necessary. In some situations, it may be appropriate to knock on doors and request permission to enter.
- Evacuate any suspicious/apprehended persons as soon as possible.
- Search the entire building(s), to include unoccupied structures, while documenting the rooms identified with illicit material. Arrange to secure unoccupied buildings until its occupants return; either with local police or own forces. See the UN MPKI Handbook for documenting recovered evidence.
- In some cultures, it is *essential* to have females present during the conduct of searches; therefore, force composition decisions should include women wherever possible, and local gender norms and cultural dynamics must always be considered.
- Ideally, conduct the search with the assistance of combat engineers using mine detectors to locate hidden arms and ammunition.
- Avoid unnecessary force and damage to property.

2.6.5.5. Organizational Considerations

Often, the C&S operation will be combined and joint. C&S forces will also comprise UN military/UNPOL or local police personnel, civilian and military interpreters, CIMIC and MPKI officers.

The task can also include a crowd control force, with non-lethal equipment, trained to protect personnel and property from public demonstrations.

Designated teams specializing in firefighting, engagement, EOD and use of working dogs are often required to assist the conduct of this task. If available, information operations will inform the local population about the reason for the C&S operation whilst it is in progress. The local population should not be warned ahead of a C&S operation.

Wherever possible, the C&S efforts should link to appropriate identified welfare and CIMIC activities (medical assistance, distribution of food and necessities, assistance to the elderly, women and children etc.) in support of well-being and confidence-building—all in line with presence, posture and profile (PPP).




Figure 4. Example of cordon and search organization

At a minimum, the force consists of a security element that establishes the C&S area whilst before search of the objective area takes place. The security element should be able to control entry or exit from the objective area through observation or its physical presence. It is also possible that a support element is needed to assist the search teams with close-in security, take custody of detainees or evidence, dispose of explosives, exploit sites discovered by search teams or perform other functions. Finally, the command and control (C2) element provides mission commander and potentially engages with local leaders.

Units will need to protect sources and civilians who cooperate with units during these operations, in close coordination with the human rights component. These operations will generally be more effective if host-nation security forces play a prominent role. However, such integration may undermine operations security and can be counterproductive if these forces are not respectful of human rights and international humanitarian law. Information sharing on a need-to-know basis is important to reduce the risk of these occurrences. Operations should be conducted in a manner that does not reduce the local population's support or result in civilian harm; however, these missions can quickly become violent when adversaries are located.

2.6.5.6. Support to Conduct the Task

The following should be considered as key requirements to support the C&S during the planning process:

- UN military/UNPOL, including female elements
- Local police personnel
- Military Police
- Civilian and military interpreters
- CIMIC officers/EP
- MPKI officers
- Local population coordination element
- Firefighting team
- EOD team
- Working dog team
- Medical team

2.6.6. TASK 6 – Conduct Defensive Operations

2.6.6.1. Purpose

A perimeter defense is a method of establishing protection in all directions. By design, this defensive measure has a secure inner area with most of the combat power located on the perimeter. The purpose of the secure inner area is to provide Soldiers a place to rest, repair equipment, rehearse for upcoming missions, analyze information, and synchronize operations.

Perimeters vary in shape and size depending on the terrain and situation. The shape of a defensive perimeter conforms to terrain features which best integrate friendly observation and fields of fire. The commander in a perimeter defense designates the trace of the perimeter, battle positions, contact points, and lateral and forward boundaries. When the commander determines the most probable direction of armed groups attack, that part of the perimeter may receive additional resources to counter the likelihood of attack.

2.6.6.2. Desired Effect

The commander successfully holds key or decisive terrain, while denying access to threat groups. This includes countering threat group reconnaissance efforts, protection from indirect fire attack and fending off attacks. A well-executed defense compliments establishment of operational bases.

2.6.6.3. Planning Considerations

- The Commander and staff identify potential threats, incorporating likely threat group avenues of approach, hostile schemes of maneuver, and fields of fire. This detail is provided by the MPKI staff.
- Generally, covered or concealed avenues of approach should be denied to a threat group. Local key terrain must be dominated, obstacles should be incorporated into the defensive plan and the perimeter should have excellent observation and cleared fields of interlocking fire.
- The Battalion staff prepares the plan for the Commander's approval, utilizing the UN MDMP.
- Defensive preparations include designating a reserve, conducting rehearsals (to include employment of the reserve and counterattack forces), positioning forces in depth and emplacement of obstacles to deter and mitigate attacks.
- Establishing 360-degree security with interlocking fields of fire while maximizing use of cover and concealment are key to establishing an effective perimeter defense.
- The overwhelming use of combat power should be employed on targeted engagement area(s) to deter and fend off potential attacks. The Commander must be audacious in the employment of combat power to destroy or compel hostile elements attacking the perimeter.
- The defensive plan should incorporate indirect and direct fire plans.
- Mission level support may be required. The incorporation of Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) to the Information Acquisition Plan (IAP) or the use of attack helicopters for reinforcement should be considered.
- Engagement areas (EA) are an essential element of perimeter defense. Although EAs may also be divided into sectors of fire, it is important to understand that defensive systems are not designed around the EAs but rather focused on the avenues of approach. Properly designed EAs and sectors of fire do not restrict fires or cause operations to become static or fixed, but rather concentrate fires and optimize system effects.
- Listed below are seven steps to plan an EA:
 1. Identify probable hostile avenues of approach.
 2. Determine probable hostile scheme of maneuver.
 3. Determine kill zones.
 4. Plan the integration of obstacles.
 5. Weapons systems emplacement.

6. Plan and integrate indirect fires.
 7. Rehearse the execution of operations in the engagement area.
- The defender gains flexibility through anticipation, sound preparation, rehearsals, defense in depth, responsive employment of reserves, and effective command and control. Defensive operations are characterized by rapid simultaneous planning with flexible execution. UN MPKI provides the Commander with hostile group capabilities, trends and most probable actions. Commanders use this information to anticipate and prepare for possible contingencies.
 - Commanders must ensure a proactive defensive posture through: Preparation of bunkers; clearing sectors of fire; establishment of entry control points; utilization of sensors (e.g., radars, cameras, infrared and other intrusion detection systems).
 - Forward observation posts should also be deployed and equipped with: night vision equipment, laser range finders, special weapons and ammunition to defend the OP.
 - Standing patrols should be deployed to cover areas that cannot be observed from the perimeter. These patrols should be deployed by day and by night.
 - Plans for CASEVAC and resupply during a defence operation should be rehearsed.

2.6.6.4. Conduct of the Task

Priorities of work for a defensive perimeter include:

- Establishment of forward observation posts and coordinated reconnaissance and security patrols.
- Crew-serve weapons emplacement and integration of overlapping sectors of fire.
- Clearing sectors of fire of concealment which may be used by hostile elements.
- Establishment of mortar positions and lines of final protective fires (FPF).
- Emplacement of early warning devices.
- Continued improvement of fighting and survivability positions.
- Placement of obstacles to impede hostile advance.
- Establishment of internal and external wire communications.
- Designation of points for secured resupply and CASEVAC.
- Conducting rehearsals.
- Maintaining weapons and equipment. Establishing and enforcing the following criteria to maintain adequate security and fire support:
 1. No more than 33 percent of the machine guns and individual weapons are cleaned at the same time.
 2. No more than one antitank weapon in each company is cleaned at the same time.
 3. No more than one 60-mm mortar in each section is out of action at the same time.
 4. No more than 33 percent of the equipment (for example, night vision devices (NVDs), chemical alarms, Communications systems) in each platoon are cleaned or serviced at the same time.
 5. In each two-soldier position, no more than one weapon is cleaned at the same time, and no more than 33 percent of the total weapons in each platoon are cleaned at the same time.

2.6.6.5. Organizational Considerations

This task of defense is applicable to all types of operating bases, whether temporary or permanent, as well as all units from squad to battalion. Executing the priorities of work during initial occupation and then always working to improve (and upgrade) the position is critical to success. Organizing the teams to address these priorities will ensure the overall mission of conducting peacekeeping operations continues.

The prerequisites for a successful perimeter defense are aggressive combat and reconnaissance patrols and security operations outside the perimeter. The commander designates checkpoints, contact points, passage points, and passage routes for elements operating outside the boundary of the perimeter. Forces within the perimeter can perform these activities, or another force external to the battalion can perform them.

2.6.6.6. Support to Conduct the Task

Engineering assets are the primary support asset required for the preparation of a defensive position. Some of the tasks for engineers are construction, clearing fields of fire and building defensive berms. Other supporting assets include aviation and artillery critical to a successful defense. Equipment such as barrier materials are essential to the employment of an obstacle plan.

2.6.7. TASK 7 – Establish/ Conduct an Observation Post (OP)

2.6.7.1. Purpose

An OP is a position established to monitor and observe a certain area, object or event. An OP can be permanent, temporary, static or mobile and is used when other observation means (including UAVs, radar or cameras) are not available or practical, or to augment other observation means. Staffing depends on the mission but is normally no less than two soldiers. Reports from OPs provide timely, accurate and relevant information to higher HQ and adjacent units. It facilitates increased security in the AO by demonstrating a vigilant and visible peacekeeper presence to all parties and populations in the area. Observing and reporting from OPs is a cornerstone peacekeeping operations task.

2.6.7.2. Desired Effect

Timely OP observations and reports provide the UN Inf Battalion Commander and staff with critical information required for early warning, situational awareness and mandate implementation.

2.6.7.3. Planning Considerations

All planning for the siting and establishment of OPs should stem from the planning guidance issued by the Operations Section of the UN Inf Bn, which should have completed a UN MDMP.

All OPs must be capable of completing their mandated tasks and, at a minimum, a visibility study should be carried out to ensure maximum fields of observation over the target area.

Planning guidance includes:

- Conduct a map reconnaissance, paying attention to key terrain features where an OP could be located. The OP should have uninterrupted fields of view that align with mandate implementation. Ideally, the OP's fields of view will overlap with other OPs to ensure that no part of the target area is shielded from observation.
- After identifying potential locations, a physical reconnaissance is necessary. This is particularly important if a permanent or semi-permanent OP is being put in place, but it will also be important in the establishment of a temporary OP. Put simply, if UN personnel cannot observe what they are supposed to observe then they must relocate.
- The following “**COAKO**” method should be used: UN personnel should check for **C**over, **O**bstacles to fields of view and movement, **A**venues of Approach, **K**ey terrain, **O**bservation and Fields of Fire. Communications should also be checked.




Figure 5. Example of observation post location

- UN personnel should consider the ground for natural cover the OP can take advantage of for force protection, obstacles hindering movement or the establishment of the OP, Observation from the OP, which should afford visibility of the area under consideration, Avenues of Approach to the OP, ensuring that there are no approach routes covered from view or fire, fields of fire so that the OP can engage threat groups on all approaches, if necessary and in line with the mandate. OPs should generally be sited on key terrain so that the OP can dominate the local area.
- The OP should also establish covered positions from both direct and indirect fire. Longer term OPs should consider the construction of bunkers and covered firing position.
- OPs must plan to observe the target area on a 24/7 basis and should be manned accordingly. The observation and manning plan should allow for the period of observation, resting and recreation for each soldier.
- OPs must not be set up in communications blind spots. Prior to the establishment of an OP, communications must be checked to both flanking units, and to higher HQ.
- The activity of flanking and partner units must be known to all OP personnel. Similarly, the location of the OP must be known to all flanking and partner units. This is best ensured by adequate liaison.
- The OP should have separate entrances and exits.
- Actions on attack, withdrawal from the OP, fire, reinforcement, resupply and casualties must be established, well prepared and rehearsed;
- The OP should be manned as if it were a defensive operation;
- If operating as one of several OPs then dead ground between OPs should be patrolled, and every effort should be made to ensure overlapping fields of view.
- The threat will dictate what security elements are required.
- OPs need to be able to self-sustain for the period of their deployment.
- A resupply plan must be considered.
- A CASEVAC/MEDEVAC plan must be considered.
- Ideally long-term OPs should be constructed with concrete, and windows should be made of bullet proof material. All measures employed will align with the mission, mandate, and threat. Other means for ensuring security would be the maintenance of a reserve or a QRF at the OP site.
- OPs may need other specialist equipment, including defensive stores, and anti-ram barriers. The layout, construction, and manning of OPs should reflect the factors gathered by MPKI about the situation environment, especially the time available for emplacing them.
- OPs will need to be able to carry out its mission by day and night. Appropriate Night Vision Equipment (NVE) must be provided. OPs should also be able to complete its mission in adverse weather conditions. Thermal imaging equipment, if available, should also be given to OPs as a priority.
- The OP will need to be equipped with binoculars, spotting scopes, range cards and observation logs.
- Report formats for all potential outcomes must be kept on site.
- Photographic equipment and video/CCTV cameras may be considered if the local situation permits or if it is not considered culturally inappropriate.

2.6.7.4. Conduct of the Task.

- The OP must be manned to assure 24/7 observation of the target area.
- Each OP must be operated by a minimum of a squad or, in high threat environments, a platoon. A platoon may also be required for permanent OPs. These numbers are required due to the need for continuous observation.
- The OP leader establishes an operational plan incorporating operational activity, including observation, reporting and security duties, rest, recreation and reserve duties.
- The OP leader must also allow time for patrolling dead ground between OPs. The Squad operating the OP must reconnoiter other OP sites and patrol dead space between OPs.
- Soldiers manning OPs must search the assigned area on a 24/7 basis. One soldier with binoculars, or another observation device, searches the entire area for obvious targets, unnatural colors, dust, shiny objects, outlines or movement.
- Central to the OP's mission is observing and reporting. Reports to higher HQ must be made on a regular basis. Two reports covering each 12-hour period should be made for routine observation

reports, or at a frequency recommended in UN mission-specific SOPs. Reports should be made in the form of Situation Reports.

- Templates for reports will vary mission to mission, but should include who is reporting, what is being reported, when incidents occurred, where (including map coordinates) incidents occurred and why incidents are reported. Occasionally, there will be a requirement for the immediate transmission of a report to higher HQ. In this case, the same format should be used for reporting. OPs should not wait until they have a 'perfect' report to send to higher HQ. Any information gaps can be bridged in follow-on reports. As situations rapidly develop on the ground, the most important thing is that UN Inf Bn situational awareness is maintained in real time.
- Communications checks should be carried out at least twice per day.

2.6.7.5. Organizational Considerations

Permanent OPs are both overt (conspicuously visible, unlike their tactical counterparts) and deliberately constructed. They are similar in construction to bunkers and are supported by fighting positions, barriers and patrols. When planning the layout of OPs ensure the sleep area, showers and toilets are close together to ensure they are safe to use at night. If the operating environment permits, make sure there is lighting to provide additional safety. If necessary, the company team can also employ hasty OPs which are like individual fighting positions. Permanent OPs may include specialized facilities such as the following:

- Observation tower.
- Ammunition and fuel storage area.
- Generator area.
- Power sources.
- Supporting helipad.
- Separate entrance and exits
- Kitchen, sleep area, separate male and female shower and toilet.

2.6.7.6. Support to Conduct the Task

Different Combat Support and Combat Service Support assistance will be required at different stages in the life cycle of an OP. OPs should be designed to be self-sustaining. As such, they must be set-up to allow for the safe storage of food, water, and fuel. Cooking facilities should also be on site in the case of longer-term facilities (see more on this in the organization section below). However, there is a limit to what the OP will be able to store. Therefore, it is important that the UN Inf Bn plans to regularly resupply the OP.

During planning, the UN Inf Bn staff will be central during OP construction, security and engineering assets will be required and during operations, specialist equipment and Bn or mission-level resources such as helicopters and indirect fire assets may be periodically required.

Elements manning a permanent OP may require access to specialized equipment such as:

- Floodlights.
- Thermal imaging;
- Generators.

2.6.8. TASK 8 – Establish/ Operate an Operating Base (OB)

2.6.8.1. Purpose

An OB is a military position (permanent or temporary) used as a secure location from which the UN Inf Bn/Coy projects combat power in support of operational goals and tactical objectives. The establishment and maintenance of a secure and functional base of operations for the battalion and its sub-units is an important responsibility of the UN Inf Bn Commander. There are two types of OB:

- **A Permanent Operating Base (POB).** Typically, this is a permanent base for a UN Inf Bn or a UN Inf/ Coy. This base may be occupied only by the UN Inf unit, or the unit may be collocated with other UN

military, UN police, UN civilian, or other organizations (sometimes referred to a 'super-camp'). If the POB is occupied only by the UN Inf unit, the commander is responsible for POB security/FP. If the POB is shared, Mission SOP will dictate the security/FP responsibilities and arrangements. Permanent accommodation and other mission support are provided after six months for UN Inf units assigned to a POB.

- **A Temporary Operating Base (TOB).** Typically, this is a temporary base for a UN Inf Coy or UN Inf Platoon. Temporary can be hours, days or months, depending on the unit's mission. Given the SUR of most UN Inf units, UN Inf Platoons are not equipped to self-sustain for extended periods of time and should be supported by their UN Inf Coy. The level of TOB security/FP depends on the capability of the unit but remains the responsibility of the UN Inf Bn Commander and subordinate commanders.

An OB is established:

- On the initial deployment of a UN Inf Bn to a new AO.
- On the initial deployment of subordinate units, usually of Company and Platoon size, to a new AO.
- When UN Inf Bn staff deem it necessary to change the geographical focus of operations.
- When UN Inf Bn staff deem it necessary to increase its presence in certain areas.
- When the UN Inf Bn is ordered by higher HQ to adjust or change its operational footprint.
- When the mission, mandate or task make the establishment of an OB an operational requirement.

An OB is designed to be self-sustaining and is sited to maximize force protection. An OB is normally established for a UN Inf Bn HQ, and for subordinate elements, normally at least Company-sized. In some circumstances, a platoon will establish an OB, but this is dependent on the situation, mission and mandate. An OB will have operational and logistical facilities and may be used for an extended period or may be a semi-permanent operational deployment. UN Inf Bn Main Operating Bases are required to provide combat and combat service support to them.

An OB may be established for a specific purpose and duration in accordance with operational requirements.

In the context of CRSV, TOBs are deployed to cover vulnerable areas and hotspots by the fastest means available. Once deployed, they carry out day and night operations through mobile and static elements. Their unexpected presence in potential vulnerable areas can prevent CRSV. TOBs enhance the confidence of the population in the peacekeeping operation and deter armed groups from settling in the vicinity of villages and committing atrocities. OBs can also be interposed between armed groups in times of rising tension, and this is especially relevant when the modus-operandi of such groups includes SGBV. Therefore, it is a prerequisite that battalion operational bases are secure and functional before the battalion and its sub-units can achieve overall mission success in the conduct of other battalion tasks.

2.6.8.2. Desired Effect

Secure bases serve as the planning, administrative, combat and combat support hubs of UN mission support in the UN Inf Bn AO. They are used as a platform from which the UN Inf Bn projects combat power. Their presence supports UN Operations and POC tasks, facilitates the establishment of safe and secure environments and mandate implementation.

2.6.8.3. Planning Considerations

All planning for the siting and establishment of OBs should stem from the planning guidance issued by the Operations Section of the UN Inf Bn, which should have completed a UN MDMP.

Ideally, the establishment of OBs should be based on operational requirements relating to mission, mandate and likely tasks such as POC.

In many instances, UN Inf Bns establish or deploy to static base camps for the duration of their deployment. Companies, or in exceptional cases platoons, can be required to operate from OBs. The commander must therefore carefully consider site suitability for an extended time as well as operational and environmental requirements as factors for site selection.

Practical planning guidance includes:

- Conduct a map reconnaissance, paying attention to key terrain features where an OB could be located. Attention should be given to establishing OBs in areas where there are vulnerable population groups.
- Where possible, OBs should be accessible by road to facilitate resupply, casualty evacuation and to support all-weather operations;
- OBs should be mutually supporting;
- OBs should generally occupy key terrain features, which dominate the local terrain from a force protection perspective;
- If possible, OBs should be within the artillery or air support radius;
- The surrounding physical terrain should be studied to identify areas of COAKO;
- The human terrain should be studied to identify the locations of different ethnic, tribal, and religious groups, and possible fault lines;
- A threat actor evaluation should be completed to include likely courses of action that could be taken against a UN presence;
- Consideration should be given to establishing OBs close to sites with a known POC risk, and urban areas that facilitate key leader and local community engagement;
- After identifying potential locations, a physical reconnaissance is necessary. This will allow planners to identify features that are not visible from maps. For example, a physical reconnaissance will facilitate a communications check and will uncover route conditions. It will also facilitate local engagement and sensitize the local population to a UN presence;
- Generally, there should be no hidden or covered approaches to a UN OB;
- UN personnel should consider the ground for natural cover for force protection, obstacles hindering movement or the establishment of the OB, observation from the OB, which should afford visibility of the surrounding area by day and night.
- Avenues of approach to the OB should ensure that there are no approach routes not visible or able to be covered by fire. Establishment of an OB often attracts civilian population. Consideration should be given as to where such a “safe haven” would best be located and how to manage security of the OB in relation to such a gathering of population.
- Where necessary, fields of fire should be cleared to ensure that the OB can engage threat groups on all approaches, if necessary and in line with the mandate;
- Planners should decide what facilities are needed at the OB, but generally secure ammunition/weapons, POL, food and water storage facilities, a cook house, ablution facilities (separate for women and men), accommodation (separate for women and men), a protective perimeter, watch towers and bunkers will be required at a minimum;
- Accommodation and bunkers should be hardened to withstand or mitigate the impact of indirect and direct fire;
- The perimeter fence should afford cover from view and direct fire. A wire fence is insufficient. When wire is used, it should be set up in three coils (2 on the bottom and one on top, well staked down and attached with wire). Consideration should be given to requesting engineering assets to construct an earthen berm as a short-term protective measure. **The ultimate responsibility for keeping the perimeter in good repair and free of vegetation falls to the UN Inf Bn Commander;**
- The activity of flanking and partner units must be known to all OB personnel. Similarly, the location of the OB must be known to all flanking and partner units. This is best ensured by adequate liaison;
- The OB should have separate entrances and exits;
- Actions on attack, withdrawal from the OB, fire, reinforcement, resupply, and casualties must be established, well-prepared and rehearsed;
- If operating as part of several OBs, then dead ground between OBs should be patrolled;
- Direct and indirect fire plans must be generated;
- Ammunition storage must be in accordance with the UN Arms and Ammunition Manual, 2019;

- The threat will dictate what security elements are required, but every OB should have a camp guard, a QRF, a reserve, and personnel detailed to put out fires;
- OBs need to be able to self-sustain for the period of their deployment;
- A resupply plan must be completed;
- A CASEVAC/MEDEVAC plan must be completed;
- During the initial establishment phase, units may need other specialist equipment, including defensive stores. The layout, construction, and manning of OBs, should reflect the factors gathered by MPKI about the situation environment, especially the time available for emplacing them;
- OBs will need to be able to carry out its mission by day and night. Appropriate NVE must be provided. OBs should also be able to complete their mission in adverse weather conditions. Thermal Imaging equipment, if available, should also be given to OBs as a priority;

2.6.8.4. Conduct of the Task

The unit will establish framework operations to ensure mandate implementation.

These tasks should include:

- POC patrols; area domination patrols; key leader engagement; convoy escort; and all other essential tasks outlined in this manual. The UN Inf Bn will conduct proactive patrolling by day and by night in order to dominate the surrounding terrain. This is a measure to dominate the local environment and to ensure force protection. Patrols should occur at different times and on different routes so that a pattern is not established.
- Regular rehearsals of immediate actions must be completed, including base attack, which should include how to activate the QRF.
- Interlocking arcs of observation and fields of fire must be allocated to specific units for emergency situations. Firing positions around the perimeter wall must be established, thereby ensuring all-round security.
- The indirect and direct fire plans must be rehearsed and changed as necessary.
- The unit will continue to acquire information about the local environment and will develop its understanding of the operating environment.
- The unit will adapt and update SOPs and TTPs as required.
- The unit must ensure that Engineer, MPKI, and other required CS and CSS personnel and assets have been provided.
- OBs/TOBs should be designed to be self-sustaining. As such, they must be set-up to allow for the safe storage of food, water, and fuel. Cooking facilities should also be on site in the case of longer-term facilities (see more on this in the organization section below). However, there is a limit to what the OB/TOB will be able to store. Therefore, it is important that the UN Inf Bn plans to regularly resupply the OB in all weather conditions.
- It is strongly recommended that the UN OP have a qualified paramedic, and the facilities necessary to ensure that the UN Inf Bn can adhere to the 10-1-2 goal. A medical and CASEVAC plan must be in place and rehearsed. The medical support of an OB/TOB will be guided by unit and mission SOPs.
- In order to ensure uninterrupted reporting to higher HQ, the OB must have several forms of communications. This should include radio, telephone (ideally land line) and satellite phone. Communications checks should be carried out twice in each 24-hour period.

2.6.8.5. Organizational/Structural Considerations

- Task Organization will include: the establishment of a permanent camp guard, a QRF, a reserve, an operational element, and personnel detailed to put out fires.
- OBs require an earth berm and wire obstacle perimeter (barbed and concertina wire).
- OBs should be covered from view and fire.
- No covered or concealed approaches.
- 360 degree cleared fields of fire.
- Various structures (tents on hard stands) for accommodation and a command post.

- Communications facility.
- Guard post inside the perimeter near the main gate.
- Protected firing positions along the perimeter, ensuring 360-degree fields of fire.
- Protection of accommodation (sand bags in the case of a TOB), messing and other areas.
- Bunkers for cover from indirect fire.
- Main gate with a drop-arm structure added.
- A secondary vehicle access gate located on one other perimeter wall.
- At the main access point extending out 50 meters, should have vehicle access control barriers, along with a vehicle search compound including a security bunker.
- OB should include vehicle parking, sleeping, ablutions and messing activities.
- Ammunition and fuel points will be established as required.
- The area needs to be prepared to receive heavy vehicles (ground preparation).
- Easy access to an all-weather road.




Figure 6. Example of temporary operating base

2.6.8.6. Support to Conduct the Task

Different Combat Support and Combat Service Support assistance will be required at different stages in the life cycle of an OB, be it temporary or permanent. The UN Inf Bn staff must be fully involved during planning. Security and engineering assets will be required During POB/TOB construction. Specialized equipment and Bn or Mission resources, such as helicopters and indirect fire assets, may be required during operations.

2.6.9. TASK 9 – Conduct Relief in Place

2.6.9.1. Purpose

The purpose of relief in place is to relieve all or part of a unit in a designated AOR by an incoming force. It is an operation in which a mission or responsibility is handed over from one unit to another without disrupting operations.

2.6.9.2. Desired Effect

The underlying principle in relief operations is to sustain a level of operational capability through the transfer from one unit to another while ensuring continuity of operations. Relief can be executed as a component of a deliberate operation, rotation of forces, response to emergency operations such as catastrophic loss, or otherwise when unit requirements change between units or headquarters.

2.6.9.3. Planning Considerations

The relief should be scheduled to ensure minimal disruption of operations. The relief offers a practical continuity of services and an efficient turn over in order to facilitate a deliberate transition of responsibilities. This task requires significant planning and coordination between units. Units must interact with their respective commanders to determine the relief schedule.

Close coordination with the Mission Support Division for movement and arrival, operational readiness and repatriation inspections is required for successful execution. Precise management of the movement timeline will ensure the synchronization of activities. Factors to consider include: deployment of advanced and main body deployment parties; reception and onward movement of the new unit; security arrangements; familiarization of AOR; and, integration of the new unit into Mission operations.

2.6.9.4. Conduct of the Task

In a deliberate relief, units exchange plans and liaison personnel, conduct briefings, perform detailed reconnaissance and publish orders with detailed instructions. In a hasty relief, the commander abbreviates the planning process and controls the execution using oral and fragmentary orders. The relieving unit receives current Military Peacekeeping Intelligence, operations, and sustainment information from the battalion being relieved, as well as from common higher headquarters, adjacent units and subordinate elements.

Commanders establish early liaison between the stationary and the relieving subordinate forces and identify measures to control the relief. Commanders must implement control measures to mitigate risk of fratricide between friendly units. This is accomplished through identification of: boundaries, positions, checkpoints, observation posts, local villages/towns, routes, assembly areas, Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM) and direct fire control measures, such as target reference points and engagement areas.

2.6.9.5. Organizational Considerations

Both units involved in a relief in place should be of similar type (such as mounted or dismounted) and task organized to help maintain operations security. The relieving unit usually assumes, as closely as possible, the same task organization as the unit being relieved. The relieving unit assigns responsibilities and deploys in a configuration like that of the relieved unit.

The relieving unit establishes advance parties to conduct detailed coordination and preparations for the operation, down to the company level and possibly to the platoon level. The unit normally includes a tactical command post that co-locates with the main headquarters of the unit being relieved. The commander may also attach additional liaison personnel to subordinate units to ensure a smooth changeover between subordinate units.

2.6.9.6. Support to Conduct the Task

The execution of this task requires significant coordination with Mission Support Division, the Force and the Sector HQs. For new units entering the Mission, commanders may consider designation and exchange of temporary movement control liaisons during the deployment phase to synchronize reception and onward movement of their units.

2.7. Support Tasks

This portion of the chapter covers UN Inf Bn tasks in support of other components of the Mission, including other military components. Usually, this supportive role is performed through the execution of one or many of the primary tasks covered above.

Task 10 - Support Security Sector Reform (SSR)/ Defense Sector Reform (DSR).

Task 10A - Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).

Task 11 - Control of a Civil Disturbance.

Task 12 - Conduct Reinforcement.

Task 13 - Execute Withdrawal.

Task 14 - Extraction.

Task 15 - Conduct Offensive Operations.

Task 16 - Assure POC.

2.7.1. TASK 10 – Support Security Sector Reform (SSR)/ Defense Sector Reform (DSR)

2.7.1.1. SSR/DSR

Security Sector Reform (SSR) is the process of assessment, review and implementation of security institutions to enhance effective and accountable security for the state and its population. It involves rebuilding the local security forces, as well as establishing or reestablishing the institutional framework that manages, directs and provides oversight for security. The security sector includes defense, law enforcement, corrections, intelligence services and institutions responsible for border management, customs and civil emergencies. SSR has become a core element of multidimensional peacekeeping and is essential for sustainable peace and development.

The military component of the Mission may provide support to the overall SSR strategy which, in the military context, will most commonly include the training of government or local security forces and providing subject matter expertise under a comprehensive Defense Sector Reform (DSR) program. The goal of UN engagement in DSR, according to UN policy, is to support national efforts to enhance the effectiveness, accountability and affordability of the defense sector and its components in order to contribute to sustainable peace, security, good governance and development.

2.7.1.2. Desired Effect

To provide basic training to local security forces so they are capable of defeating threats to the state and to civilians, are viewed as legitimate by the population, and comply with international humanitarian law (IHL) and human rights obligations. An effective local security sector can enhance the population's confidence in local authorities, support protection of civilians, institute appropriate accountability mechanisms and ultimately prevent relapse into conflict.

2.7.1.3. Planning Considerations

It is important to identify any requirements for the UN Inf Bn to support SSR/DSR at an early stage in the mission planning process. This will facilitate adequate allocation of limited resources and ensure appropriately trained and equipped units are available for the task. Higher headquarters should provide clear guidelines and terms of reference on the scope of the UN Inf Bn's involvement, along with adequate coordination mechanisms and integration with other elements.

SSR and DDR are focused on institution-building at the national level. The MC will play a supporting role to this overall effort. Commanders should be aware of core SSR/DSR principles, such as local ownership and long-term sustainability.

There are often a variety of non-UN actors involved in DSR activities with military training and equipment provided on a bilateral or multilateral basis. UN forces should ensure that they are aware of related

activities happening in the AOR and that efforts have been coordinated at an appropriate level, where required.

All training and other forms of support for local security actors must be provided in accordance with the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy (HRDDP). Further information is available in the Guidance Note on HRDDP on United Nations Support to Non-United Nations Security Forces (2015).

2.7.1.4. Conduct of the Task

The UN Inf Bn will never be the lead for SSR. Typically, the unit will be ordered to support SSR through the execution of its tasks, such as providing a safe and secure environment to facilitate the process.

Supporting tasks are likely to include the following:

Training

- Provide basic training to local forces. Note that United Nations policy does not allow provision of advanced military training or equipment.
- Provide training in related areas such as gender and human rights (this is likely to be conducted with the substantive civilian elements responsible for these areas).

Subject-Matter Expertise

- When ordered, provide advice in support of the development of national-level strategic assessments or defence sector analyses.
- Capture, compile and share lessons learned and good practices on DSR-related activities.

Logistic Support

- Provide logistic/administrative support to the SSR/DSR staff and for the SSR/DSR process, if specifically tasked.

2.7.1.5. Organizational Considerations

The Inf Bn is likely to remain under standard military command and control for the purposes of this task, but extensive coordination will be required with other elements.

2.7.1.6. TASK 10A – Support to Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

DDR is a process that contributes to security and stability in a post-conflict recovery context by collecting and disposing of weapons, discharging combatants from armed groups and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society by finding sustainable civilian livelihoods. The MC often possesses a wide range of skills and expertise to contribute to effective implementation of a DDR program.

2.7.1.6.1. Desired Effect

To support the conduct of a secure and professional DDR program in which former combatants feel safe to participate, spoilers are deterred, collected weapons are destroyed in accordance with SOPs and the local population has been protected from any adverse effects.

2.7.1.6.2. Planning Considerations

It is unlikely that the UN Inf Bn will play a lead role in DDR. However, it may be allocated a range of supporting tasks, including provision of a safe and secure environment to facilitate DDR processes. Considering that DDR encompasses a wide range of operational efforts and is likely to be a joint and

combined operation, it is essential that planning is completed at UN Inf Bn level with direct guidance from higher HQ.

Planning considerations include:

- The UN Inf Bn must maintain good communications with all Mission and non-Mission elements involved in the DDR program being supported.
- The Bn Staff should have a good understanding of the broad scope of the program, which elements are eligible to participate and the practical details (for example, what kind of screening of participants will take place). Commanders should review the UN “Operational Guide to the Integrated DDR Standards”.
- It is important to remember that DDR activities often include child soldiers (boys and girls), women combatants and male and female persons of all ages that have been trafficked and used in support roles or as sex-slaves. It is essential to plan for the unique needs of all those entering the DDR process.
- Enhanced security will likely be required at DDR facilities such as reception centers, weapons storage points and relocation camps. Planning should consider the possibility that the DDR process will be used for intelligence-gathering, for combatants to assess the strengths of opposing armed groups or for vigilantes to identify individuals associated with armed groups.
- Particular attention must be paid to protecting vulnerable civilians who are otherwise left unsecured or who may be targeted by armed groups who are frustrated with the DDR process. For example, communities that have a culture of possessing weapons are more prone to violence, including CRSV. Measures to confiscate/reduce the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in communities are crucial to curb CRSV.
- **Safe-Haven/Safe Corridors:** IDPs/refugees are most vulnerable during movement and in temporary camps. The UN Inf Bn may be involved in providing area security or protected corridors in UN-designated areas to ensure safe passage of displaced populations and protection of camps/safe areas where refugee or IDPs have congregated.
- **Human Rights:** The close cooperation between human rights and the military components is a crucial link to the successful implementation of the mandated tasks. This includes the time-sensitive sharing with human rights components of relevant information collected by the Force during patrols, the joint follow-up by human rights and the Force on individual protection concerns and joint monitoring and investigation missions. The military component is crucial not only for its protective function but also to share its specific detailed expertise on ballistics and weapons, military tactics and command responsibility structures. Refer to OHCHR/DPO/DPA/DFS joint policy: ‘Integration of Human Rights in Peace Missions. The UN Inf Bn can also identify hotspots based on patterns of human rights violations, movement of armed groups and foresee any potential POC threat.
- **Command and Control:** Usually, a UN Inf Bn supporting DDR remains under normal military command and control arrangements and the higher HQ will direct activities. However, it is important to distinguish between operational military tasks in support of these programs, which are directed by the military chain of command, and engagement in the often politically sensitive DDR planning and policymaking process, which is led by the civilian Chief of the DDR component and senior Mission leadership.

2.7.1.6.3. Conduct of the Task

Most of the primary tasks of a UN Inf Bn described in this Chapter are applicable to support a DDR program. The supportive role of the Inf Bn to DDR usually falls under one of the following categories:

Security

- Provide security for those participating in the program, including movement escort.
- Provide security of weapons and ammunition that have been handed in or are being stored as part of a DDR program.
- Provide security of disarmament and/or demobilization sites or cantonment areas (whether semi-permanent or mobile).

- Provide security to routes that former combatants will use to enter the program.
- Provide support to civilian-led focused public information/sensitization campaigns, which may include the creation of incentives and disincentives for former combatants to join or remain outside a program through constructive engagement.

Information Gathering, Reporting, Dissemination and Sensitization

- Gather information on the locations, strengths and intentions of former combatants.
- Provide support to public information and sensitization efforts.
- Conduct joint patrols with civilian DDR staff. Consider using the Engagement Platoon for reassurance and support when it is known that women and children have entered the DDR process.
- Monitor and report on armed groups.
- Provide intelligence on groups or individuals who may disrupt, undermine or threaten the DDR process.
Provide specialized weapon and ammunition expertise.
- Provide special expertise and support during the disarmament phase.
- Record and share lessons learned and good practices on DDR-related activities.

Logistic Support

- Provide logistic/administrative support to the DDR staff and for the DDR process, if specially tasked.

2.7.1.6.4. Organizational Considerations

In practice, joint activities between the battalion and DDR components are often pursued at a relatively low level. For example, the DDR component or field team may approach a company commander for support within the company's AOR.

2.7.2. TASK 11- Control of Civil Disturbance

2.7.2.1. Purpose

In principle, the responsibility for restoration and maintenance of law and order lies with the host nation, with operational support or advice provided by a UN Formed Police Unit (FPU) or UN Police (UNPOL), in accordance with the mandate. UNPOL are usually in the lead for coordinating actions with Mission HQ, civil and police authorities. In the exceptional case of civil authorities being unable to cope, military units can assist so long as the mandate permits the action and the ROE specify the use of crowd management means by the military. In this case, the Inf Bn is usually the military unit called to support such a mission. Each UN Inf Bn has one platoon per Coy equipped and trained in crowd control. Those platoons can be used in support of UNPOL, national security forces, or on their own, if needed. Rehearsal of this task by the Riot Control trained platoons is critical to success.

For example, an operation may be directed in the aftermath or against the backdrop of a heightened conflict situation, reflecting possible lawlessness, dysfunctional legal institutions and an ineffective police organization. Local populations may undertake demonstrations in towns and villages to voice their concerns, project problems or protest issues that directly or indirectly affect them. Such gatherings, though mostly political and peaceful in nature, may turn violent leading to disturbances and riots. The target of such demonstrations may be the host government, socio-political or ethnic groups, or UN personnel or facilities. In such cases, orders, ROE, UN policy and principles apply.

2.7.2.2. Desired Effect

The desired end state for the UN Inf Bn is to help restore calm and hand over any instigators of violence to law enforcement, as soon as possible.

2.7.2.3. Planning Considerations

Civil disturbance control is normally a joint mission. Planning should be conducted in conjunction with other responsible agencies. Joint planning should be completed well in advance of any deployment, particularly if this task is included in the SUR or if it is in the mission mandate. Consideration should be given to involving all relevant actors in planning, or at least sensitizing them to the role of the UN Inf Bn.

Contingency riot control training will also be required for all soldiers tasked. Soldiers will need to know how to deal with Molotov cocktails or the appearance of weapons and shooting from a largely unarmed crowd.

Before any commitment to support crowd management, many aspects should be taken into consideration.

- Structure: platoon/company level elements might be required to conduct crowd management. Ideally, one company at battalion level and the platoon at each company level are equipped and trained to perform this task.
- Planners must ensure that they do not box a crowd in. Allow escape routes for protestors. Another technique is to split the crowd into separate streets, thereby reducing the size of the crowd.
- Planners must ensure that military action does not worsen the situation. Soldiers must act with firmness and restraint. The crowd must believe that the soldiers know what they are doing.
- Planners must ensure they allow for all possible immediate actions such as the presence of weapons in the crowd, shooting from the crowd and evacuating casualties, both military and civilian. Explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) and firefighting capability is also helpful to have on standby.
- The presence of women and children, either in the crowd, on the periphery of a crowd or used as human shields, may affect operational decisions at the tactical level. Tactics and procedures may need to be adapted about how women and children are handled physically and how the use of force is restrained. Plans for this must be included in orders and communicated to all soldiers. Rehearsals for such situations are vital and units delegated with this responsibility must practice regularly and certainly immediately prior to an operation.
- Another factor to keep in mind is the media, as what is happening in the crowd and the activities of the military/police will be closely monitored and captured by the media. Women and children may be brought into the crowd by agitators for publicity purposes, as well as a protective cover for agitators. Having women military or police involved may help effectively handle women and children.
- The UN Inf Bn, in conjunction with the police and civil authorities, should plan to provide first aid and evacuate patients to the nearest medical facility.
- Detainees, if any, should be handed over to the UNPOL and/or host nation police as quickly as possible in accordance with the Interim SOP on Detention and mission SOPs. Taking prisoners is a specialized drill and it must be rehearsed. A guard force for detainees will be required unless there is other authority present to whom they can be handed over.
- Military action in support of the civil authorities may be the subject of subsequent enquiry. It is therefore essential to be able to establish what happened, and maintain a complete record of all events as they occur. Important aids to keep evidence include photography/videography from ground and air (helicopter) with digital still cameras, video recorders, pocket tape recorders and cell phone recorders. All military commanders should designate someone to record important events in chronological order.
- Reliable communications down to section level must be available. Consider the effect of the terrain on communications. A method to communicate to the crowd must also be in place (public address system/loudspeaker). These are normally part of unit riot control equipment.
- Crowd/Riot Control equipment (body protection for soldiers, batons, shields, helmets, etc.) is part of the UN Inf Bn SUR.

2.7.2.4. Conduct of the Task

Whatever scenario the UN Inf Bn faces, the method of execution and the resultant outcome of a Crowd Management Operation are likely to have significant positive or negative ramifications on the Mission and the peace process. An inappropriate response to the crowd can trigger aggravation and greater

disturbances. The basis for any posture is a firm, fair and friendly conduct of operations. Most demonstrations are lawful. The primary aim of a security force, whether UN Inf Bn or police, should be to facilitate and allow the demonstration to proceed peacefully. In most cases, there will be no need to disperse the crowd. However, a crowd may also contain agitators who will seek to provoke the security forces into ill-considered, hasty action. Ensure that only minimum necessary force is used to disperse a crowd and that the methods employed are appropriate to its mood and the local situation. The use of force in these situations should always be based on the principles of necessity, proportionality/ minimum level of force, legality and accountability. All actions of UN military and police should be aimed at the protection and preservation of human life, property, liberty and dignity. Dialogue and mediation should be applied whenever possible. The use of force is the last resort, when all other means of peaceful de-escalation have failed. Any use of force is to be conducted in accordance with mission ROEs and the UN manual on the use of force.

The following points are to be considered during the execution of any kind of support to control civil disturbance:

- Early, robust action to separate agitators of violence and communicate what is being done to the crowd (and why) is perhaps the most effective method to quickly defuse violence.
- If the soldiers move on transport, disembark quickly to a practice drill site, away from the crowd, unless armored or special vehicles are used and if it is advantageous to disembark close to the crowd.
- Transport should be left under guard at an appropriate distance. One or two vehicles may carry a small party including police officers. The vehicles may also carry blocking equipment to create obstacles or divert the crowd, wherever required. These vehicles should be fitted with vehicle protection kits and fireproof canopy (cargo tarp) and may carry a public address system.
- The use of APCs has a deterrent function since their presence as much as their firepower delivers the impact. Their use should always be proportionate. It is not advised to use tracked vehicles for crowd management purposes, as they may be reported as "tanks" in the media and have a counterproductive effect on the local population.
- Soldiers should be prepared to intervene the moment they arrive at the scene of the disturbance so that the situation does not deteriorate through unnecessary delay. They should therefore, have a well-rehearsed deployment drill. This does not mean that soldiers should always be used at once. Preferably, the armored vehicles should not make a premature appearance, which may rob a commander of the advantage he would gain later from the shock effect of their sudden intervention. Soldiers should never be brought to the scene of a disturbance until their intervention is required.
- In such situations, there is no definite sequence of events and most actions take place concurrently and overlap. Commanders should take the following actions on arrival:
 - Obtain information about the situation from UN police and/or host police/civil authorities, roof-top standing patrols and helicopters.
 - Assess the best direction to disperse the crowd; some factors to consider would be the mood and intentions of the crowd, the existence of attractive targets, and alternative dispersal routes.
 - Preferably, give time and room during which those non-violent elements in the crowd can be separated from trouble makers and dispersed as appropriate.
 - The process for coordination with the local authorities should be established.
 - Deployment should ensure all around protection to prevent rioters from encircling security forces. It should be decided whether there will be a deterrent value in arresting ring-leaders.
 - Every effort is made to identify individuals in the crowd, especially ringleaders.

2.7.2.5. Organizational Considerations

The crowd control unit should consider task organizing with a control element, which engages with the crowd, sometimes physically, a reserve element, a HQ element, a guard force for detainees, liaison officers in the case of joint operations and snipers to observe the crowd from a distance and to be prepared to take direct action, within ROE, if fire is coming from the crowd. Medics should also accompany the deploying unit, along with fire prevention officers complete with all required equipment.

Depending on the size of the crowd and the scope of the task, mission support may also be required.

2.7.2.6. Support to Conduct the Task

The combat support and service support required for this task is like that identified in the task of conducting a patrol regarding logistics, engineering, aviation and medical. However, specialized equipment will be required.

Equipment

- Crowd management baton and shield, body protection, gas mask, disposable handcuffs, crowd management helmet with facial protection.
- Soldier equipment and UN field uniform should not include rifles, until and unless the level of threat is elevated to one of a military nature. These need to be readily available in a secure location (such as an APC), if the security situation deteriorates.
- Sniper-qualified personnel to observe and take direct action, within the ROE.
- "Non-Lethal Weapons" such as OC-spray (Oleoresin Capsicum), CS-gas (tear gas), tear gas launchers, tear gas hand grenades, smoke grenades, water cannons, and flash and bang/stun grenades. **NOTE: The use of rubber bullets by UN police units has been banned by DPO.**
- Vehicles/APCs reinforce the display of robust and determined strength.
- Handheld loud speakers and video or digital cameras.
- Stores for barricading.
- Handheld metal detectors according to the nature of the operation/task.
- Availability and employment of a language assistant is needed to facilitate the understanding of the crowd and for tactical negotiation with the crowd.

2.7.3. TASK 12 – Conduct Reinforcement

2.7.3.1. Purpose

Reinforcement may take place for the reinforcement of an Operating Base (OB) within the battalion AOR, and/or the reinforcement of another contingent OB or military component. This task can also involve assistance to host nation security forces within the mission or even outside the mission AOR, as part of Inter-Mission Cooperation (if authorized).

2.7.3.2. Desired Effect

Enable the reinforced unit to execute its assigned mission.

2.7.3.3. Planning Considerations

Maintaining dedicated, trained reserve forces in an operational readiness status that can adequately respond with assigned/tasked enablers is required for such an operation. Readiness levels will often be laid out in Mission SOPs.

UN Inf Bn planning staff must consider:

- The mission should be specific, clearly laid out and within the capability of the battalion.
- Ensure routine physical and electronic monitoring of activities and gain early warning of impending/actual ground situation inputs through Community Liaison Assistants and Community Alert Network.
- Analyze and evaluate implications that such reinforcement may alarm the parties to the dispute and risk escalation.

- Liaise and coordinate with all elements involved in the conduct of the operation (local government officials, community leaders, local police, etc.) and organize appropriate means for the passage of information and support.
- The force employed should be adequately resourced, prepared and trained based on likely scenarios and contingencies.
- The force employed for operations should be self-sufficient in terms of fire-power and logistics including transportation (for specific duration after which local dependency will be effective).
- Ensure there are dedicated personnel trained and equipped to conduct the operation and maintain them in a high state of readiness.
- The unit being reinforced, and the HQ concerned should facilitate rapid response (terrain accessibility, air/surface mobility and operational readiness). Mission-level support may be required.
- Reestablish a reserve once initial reserves are committed.

2.7.3.4. Conduct of the Task

The execution of the reinforcement will depend on the mission, but the following are to be considered during the conduct of any kind of reinforcement:

- Situational Awareness: Commanders should remain well informed on developments and threat and establish monitoring mechanisms.
- Composition: Force composition should be based on task and threat.
- Availability: Reserves utilized should be kept preferably uncommitted with no fixed ground deployment.
- Readiness: Keep the force on standby readiness and concentrated at one location. Issue timely warning orders and preposition resources (helicopters/vehicles/ APCs) for quick mobility.
- Movement: Coordinated, integrated and centrally-controlled movement and employment will greatly help reducing the timelines.
- Reception: Exchange of liaison officers, communication arrangements, link up, reception, provision of guides, movement and deployment in the earmarked area.
- C2: Clearly demarcated AOR and well-defined channels of command, control and communication.
- Exit Plan: A safe and secure move back, once the task is completed.

2.7.3.5. Organizational Considerations

This is typically a reserve function and it is the responsibility of the commander to organize assigned/attached units in a manner that reserves are always available to conduct reinforcement operations.

2.7.3.6. Support to Conduct the Task

Necessary support needs to be included for from unit resources as well as from the unit(s) being reinforced. Available support in terms of enablers (engineers, air assets, surveillance assets, interpreters, etc.) should also be coordinated in advance, usually with the higher HQ.

2.7.4. TASK 13 – Conduct Withdrawal

2.7.4.1. Purpose

Withdrawal (of UN Personnel): Withdrawal refers to deterioration in the security situation in the host country/UN mission AOR that results in relocation or evacuation of UN personnel to a different area in the same country or to outside the host country. Withdrawal of UN forces entails the judgment of mission leadership, a high degree of situational awareness and the capability of the mission components to respond quickly in emergencies.

Evacuation (of Vulnerable Civilians): Evacuation is a term associated with the withdrawal of vulnerable civilians. In the field, all UN peacekeeping operation missions have a centrally-controlled overall security plan for managing the security and evacuation plans of its personnel. This security plan is established by the Department of Security Services (DSS) and describes the various security measures to be taken and arrangements to be followed in the event of serious criminality or emergencies such as hostilities, internal disorder or natural disasters. The “Mission Security Plan” outlines the responsibilities of specific individuals, the actions to be carried out and the sequence to be followed to execute an evacuation. It will also direct the preparation of contingency plans for movement and concentration of personnel and eventual evacuation to safe areas/safe havens.

The role of the military component is to establish dominance to ensure protection in vulnerable areas and is crucial in the implementation of the evacuation plan. Typically, UN Inf Bn bases will act as temporary staging areas where UN personnel concentrate. They are then escorted to designated safe areas by the battalion.

2.7.4.2. Desired Effect

Withdrawal of all UN personnel in the affected location or the evacuation of vulnerable civilians to safe havens, ensuring the safety and protection.

2.7.4.3. Planning Considerations

- Execution of a withdrawal requires a high degree of coordination and regular rehearsals. It is imperative that the plan be coordinated with all outside agencies and that UN base occupants understand the conditions for withdrawal, the scheme of maneuver and the details of the plan.
- If the operation is combined then central planning, command and control will be required.
- The withdrawal may require the unit to carry out numerous tasks concurrently. For example, the UN Inf Bn will have to secure the area through proactive patrolling, while also securing and protecting the withdrawal.
- An evacuation could occur under hostile (non-permissive) or permissive circumstances. An operation may entail ground evacuation to a safe haven several kilometers away, or it may be a complex operation using multiple modes of transportation to other countries. In some cases, all evacuees will be transported at once; while in others, small groups will be shuttled because of a shortage of available transportation.
- There may be a requirement for Mission-level logistics support.
- Mission-level capabilities, such as air assets, may be required.
- Diplomatic negotiations, such as a temporary ceasefire, may provide the time and conditions required to evacuate large numbers of personnel.
- Commanders should anticipate that evacuees may require medical treatment, assistance with movement (such as aged, hospital patients, handicapped, etc.), and essentials such as food or water. Commanders should ensure participation of the Senior Medical Officer to develop a medical support plan for the evacuation/relocation.
- Reserve capacity should also be planned for each stage of the operation, to include back-up transportation assets. Military forces may be responsible for reception at final safe havens, though this function could also be the responsibility of a civilian agency.

2.7.4.4. Conduct of the Task

The UN Inf Bn may be assigned specific tasks to support the evacuation operation, such as to provide C2 at a location, secure and/or operate key nodes (Assembly Areas, Evacuation Control Center, and Embarkation Sites), escort evacuees, transport evacuees, provide on-call fire support, or other functions.

A typical evacuation may be structured in the following phases:

Phase I - Preparatory Operations:

Information is gathered and processed into MPKI; the evacuation force and supporting logistics are assembled and prepared; planning, training, and rehearsals are conducted; notifications are made; other administrative preparations are accomplished.

- **Phase II - Insertion Operations:** The evacuation force is deployed (including forcible entry if necessary and other operations to shape the environment); the necessary sites are secured.
- **Phase III - Evacuation Operations:** Evacuees are assembled, marshaled and transported to an intermediate staging base (ISB). An ISB may be required to stage evacuation resources or to remove evacuees from immediate risk and to free transportation assets by allowing them to return quickly for more passengers. In other cases, evacuees may be sent directly to a final reception center at a safe-haven.
- **Phase IV - Withdrawal:** The evacuation force redeploys, if its withdrawal does not occur along with the last group of evacuees. During this phase, the UN Inf Bn conducts operations as part of a larger force and has received an OPORD or FRAGO directing it to disengage and withdraw immediately from the area and reposition itself for another mission. The withdrawal may or may not be conducted under pressure and is unassisted. The battalion is directed to designate a detachment left in place. It has communications with higher, adjacent, and subordinate elements and has been provided guidance on the ROE. Some iterations of this task should be conducted during limited visibility conditions.




Figure 7. Example of evacuation of vulnerable civilians.

2.7.4.5. Organizational Considerations

A military force may be responsible for the overall operation or other organizations may be in control once evacuees have been moved away from the risk area. Civilian organizations such as national embassies or international organizations may also be involved in an evacuation. In such cases clear demarcation of responsibilities, authorities, and command relations between all actors is required.

The evacuees could include all civilians in the area, or members of a group, such as humanitarian workers, third-country nationals or members of an ethnic group.

2.7.4.6. Support to Conduct Task

For the task of withdrawal or an evacuation, prior coordination is required with Sector, and Force HQs. Support is also required from Mission Support, NGOs, host country authorities as well as the authorities of the countries where the evacuees are to be relocated.

2.7.5. TASK 14 – Extraction

2.7.5.1. Purpose

Extraction involves the mobilization of appropriate force to the place of an incident/action; negotiation to resolve the issue or release; isolation, containment and domination of the incident location; physical exfiltration in accordance with the ROE and directives on the use of force; and conduct of an organized move from the extraction point.

A UN Inf Bn may be tasked to support the extraction of military peacekeepers, UN personnel or civilians (personnel from international organizations, NGOs, host nationals, etc.) who are either detained, taken hostage or under imminent threat. In such situations, the battalion is required to ensure rapid and

coordinated action from the nearest TOB or the military element operating in the vicinity of the supported element.

2.7.5.2. Desired Effect

Execute the extraction within the capabilities of the battalion.

2.7.5.3. Planning Considerations

An extraction is a complex operation requiring a full UN MDMP, and the incorporation of the full range of skills outlined in this chapter.

Planning support a subordinate unit tasked to conduct an extraction will depend on the type of support required. Important planning parameters include:

- Coordination and communication mechanisms should be established with the supported unit. All vehicles and personnel detachments should have communication systems to contact the HQ in any emergency.
- All planning must be transmitted to the supported unit, particularly when such planning requires action on its part. For example, if the supported unit needs to facilitate access to a base or other location at a specific time and place then this information must be passed to the supported unit. If the supporting UN Inf Bn requires guides, this must be passed to the supported unit.
- If possible, the supported unit should rehearse plans for the reception of the supporting UN Inf Bn and for all other actions required of it.
- MPKI staff should provide advice on potential threats and work with planners to identify vulnerabilities and danger areas.
- The UN Inf Bn should institute proactive measures to ensure safety and security of UN personnel through routine operational activities, activating community liaison teams, key leader engagement, obtaining tactical information on the belligerents, pre-positioning of soldiers and robust posturing to deter any activities by belligerents.
- In the objective area, the UN Inf Bn must ensure that all movements are coordinated and centrally controlled.
- Based on identified threats and vulnerabilities, the UN Inf Bn must develop and rehearse detailed contingency plans.
- Create dedicated task-oriented tactical groups at each TOB and retain a central QRF at the Battalion HQ. The reserves and other various mobile tactical elements operating in the vicinity should maintain operational readiness for instantaneous action. They should be grouped with adequate mobility and operational capability, including enablers.
- Carry out training and rehearsals for precision effect and to avoid collateral damage.
- Plan for rapid mobility (surface or air) to access the location/area immediately. Mission-level support may be required if air mobility is required.
- Coordinate with relevant actors within and outside the Mission, such as local police/UN FPU in location and political affairs officers, to facilitate support.
- Where appropriate, effective liaison and political engagement of the belligerent leadership to prevent an incident is vital.
- Ensure adherence to guidelines on the Use of Force and ROE and take measures to prevent collateral damage or civilian casualties, as far as possible.
- A unit that requires support may have been in a perilous situation for a protracted period. The UN Inf Bn must consider the supported unit logistics and medical requirements.

2.7.5.4. Conduct of the Task

Depending on the kind of support required from the battalion, the following steps may be utilized for a generic scenario of supporting an extraction:

- Mobilize appropriate force level to the place of incident/action.

- Establish and adhere to clear immediate actions for all contingencies.
- Establish clear command, control and communication arrangements with the supported unit.
- Ensure a detailed briefing prior to the mission, including all the elements and support elements that are taking part in the operation. This information must be passed to the supported unit as close as possible to or in real time.
- Provide the supported unit with detailed information regarding timing, actions required of its personnel and what to expect from the UN Inf Bn, when, why, where and how.
- Coordinate and advise on planned response, maintaining continuous communication with the supported unit. The soldier or commander on the ground is always the best judge of self-defense.
- Isolate, contain and dominate the location, if needed.
- Support the extracting unit per the ROE.
- Conduct organized movement away from the extraction location.
- Ensure respect for human rights and international humanitarian law; avoid and in any event minimize collateral damage to civilian personnel and property and conduct damage assessment.
- Maintain records (photographs, videography, witnesses, etc.) and provide continuous reporting;

2.7.5.5. Organizational Considerations

Task organization for such operations will vary, given the range of possible actions required of the UN Inf Bn. The unit should be organized as required by the situation.

This operation may be joint and/or combined. As such, continuous liaison with other relevant actors will be required.

2.7.5.6. Support to Conduct the Task

The unit may need to request that mission-level assets (such as helicopters, UAS support, and CASEVAC capabilities) remain on standby. The needs of the supported unit must be central to support planning. For example, the supported unit may need urgent medical or logistics support (ammunition, food, water, batteries for radios, etc.)

The supporting unit should maintain a readily available stock of ammunition, water, food and emergency medical supplies when executing this task.

The UN Inf Bn will be required to self-sustain, within its MOU arrangements.

2.7.6. TASK 15 – Conduct Offensive Operations

2.7.6.1. Purpose

Attack is the most offensive type of operation carried out by a UN Inf Bn. It is an offensive operation that can be carried out to neutralize threat actors, to protect civilians, or to otherwise conduct mandated tasks. Attack is fully supported by the UN's right to use force in self defence, or in defence of the mandate.

Although traditional (Chapter 6) UN peacekeeping operations do not normally require an UN Inf Bn to carry out conventional attacks, new and increasingly violent extremist groups pose grave risk to UN forces and civilians. This threat means that UN operations need to plan for preemptive and offensive strategies to protect UN forces, personnel and facilities, local civilians and the mandate.

2.7.6.2. Desired End-State

The UN mandate is implemented, threat groups are appropriately controlled, civilians, other vulnerable groups, and UN personnel and facilities are protected.

2.7.6.3. Planning Considerations

The UN Inf Bn staff should conduct UN MDMP when planning such an operation. It is important to note that UN Inf Bns will probably be operating with other supporting units during such an operation. Therefore, continuous liaison with these units and combined planning is also required.

Operations may include hasty or deliberate attacks, and/or strikes by indirect fire systems or aircraft, including attack or armed aircraft.

- Attack, in a UN peacekeeping context, is carried out at a tactical level even though the decision making for such an operation may be taken at the tactical, operational or strategic level.
- Planning must incorporate all elements supporting the operation, including mission-level assets and other units.
- The UN Inf Bn may be required to operate alone, or as part of a wider effort. In this case, the UN Inf Bn Commander and staff must be prepared to support a large-scale operation.
- The UN MDMP be used to ensure detailed and coordinated planning for all phases of the operation.
- The UN Inf Bn must consider the effects that its operations will have on vulnerable groups and develop contingency plans to mitigate the impact of its operations.
- POC planning must include the following: the mitigation of damage to civilian property and life; preparation for IDP movement; and creation of humanitarian corridors.
- Liaison with humanitarian actors will be required to ensure support to affected civilian population groups.
- UN ROEs must inform planning throughout.
- UN Mission-level assets may be required. These assets could include the deployment of UAS or attack helicopters. The operators of these systems must be included in planning.
- The use of UAS for monitoring the target and information acquisition before commencement of the actions on the objective should be considered.
- Operations must be MPKI-informed.
- CASEVAC planning must adhere to the 10-1-2 goal or have a mitigation plan. Where possible, helicopter landing sites on the axis of advance should be identified. Alternate routes should be designated for CASEVAC. *Consideration should also be given to the treatment of civilian and adversary casualties in line with international humanitarian law.*
- Detailed orders must be prepared and given to commanders and troops at all levels.
- A communications plan is vital. This plan must have redundancy built in and must ensure command and control down to section level. The type of operating environment must be considered as some communications means will not be effective in urban or forested/inaccessible areas.
- Recognition systems should be in place to prevent incidents of 'friendly fire', including from the air.
- The following principles should inform planning: speed; surprise; flexibility; concentration of force; maximum use of fire and unity of command.
- Attack should be supported by a fire plan, incorporating the use of available direct and indirect fire assets. Mission-level support may be required.
- When creating an indirect or direct fire plan, every effort must be made to avoid collateral damage or damage to protected sites. Mission leadership must be informed of the fire plan and the UN Inf Bn should seek guidance.
- A reserve with the capability to influence the battle must be maintained and included in all planning.
- Operational and communications security must be maintained.
- No plan survives first contact and, as such, contingency plans should be prepared for the operation.
- Logistics should be planned in detail and should include contingencies. Generally, the unit should be self-sustained, carrying extra ammunition, radio batteries, alternate means of communication, GPS, food and water.
- Resupply planning must be considered, including the requirement to conduct resupply under fire.
- A reinforcement plan must be in place. This will require significant liaison with supporting units and a plan for the passage of lines.

2.7.6.4. Conduct

The preparation and conduct of attack can be divided into three stages:

- **Preparation stage.** UN Inf Bns should be prepared to conduct offensive operations. However, some UN Inf Bn may not be organized and equipped (per the SUR and CONOPS) to undertake attack operations. Leadership can overcome the mindset of troops operating in the UN environment who may think that they are trained to conduct people-friendly and less violent operations like patrolling. Mandates and ROE may also be at times restrictive or vague, without any clear task to conduct such operations. Notwithstanding, a UN Inf Bn, especially when operating under Chapter Seven of the UN Charter, should be prepared to conduct attack operations. *Mental preparation*, clear direction from mission leadership and adequate legal provisions to be able to conduct attack operations are the first steps in preparation.
- Gaining all available information about the terrain, operating environment and expected actions of the armed groups is the first step when preparing for attack.
- Rehearsal is vital to achieving the desired operational effect, as well as mitigating possible negative consequences such as an escalation of conflict or adversary retribution against vulnerable civilians.
- **Assault Stage.** This stage includes: Move to the AO, establish a firebase, close with the armed groups and capture or eliminate them. Good battle craft, fire discipline, effective fire support to keep the adversary suppressed while closing in and decentralization of command to give more freedom to the junior leaders are the prerequisites for success in the assault stage. There should be adequate reserves at each stage of assault.
- UN operations should follow the principal of Law of Land Warfare. However, once the mission leadership has decided to undertake offensive operations, the use of deadly force at the tactical level is highly likely
- The same should be clearly communicated to the attacking UN troops to change their mindset from peacekeeping to battle.
- When maneuvering the force, the commander strives to retain freedom of action while protecting the force. Although a detailed plan to defeat the threatening armed group may exist, the commander continually seeks any opportunity to attack to defeat, destroy or reduce the threatening armed group's firepower or shatter its cohesion and will to fight.
- The commander avoids rigid adherence to a plan that may no longer be appropriate to the current OE. The difference between success and failure in the attack often depends on the commander's ability to make the plan fit existing circumstances rather than trying to make circumstances fit the plan.
- **Reorganization Stage.** Once the objective has been achieved, the reorganization stage includes exploitation, replenishment, regaining command and control, casualty evacuation and appropriate handling of prisoners.

2.7.6.5. Organizational Considerations

Once a UN Inf Bn commander determines the scheme of maneuver, the commander task organizes the unit to have enough firepower to accomplish the mission. The commander normally organizes the force into a security force, a main body and a reserve. The commander should complete any changes in task organization in time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached and supporting elements.

Security Forces. Under normal circumstances, a commander organizes a dedicated security force to protect vulnerable flanks. In a UN peacekeeping environment, consideration should be given to the provision of security to its lines of communications and resupply, to humanitarian escape routes and to vulnerable parts of the population.

Main Body. The commander organizes the main body into combined arms formations to conduct the decisive operation and necessary shaping operations. The commander aims the decisive operation toward the decisive point which can consist of the immediate and decisive destruction of the threatening armed group.

The commander may need to designate a unit or units to conduct shaping operations to create windows of opportunity for executing the decisive operation. The commander allocates the unit or units assigned to conduct shaping operations with the minimal firepower necessary to accomplish their missions since overwhelming fire power cannot be employed everywhere.

Reserves. The commander uses the reserve to exploit success, defeat armed group counterattacks or restore momentum to a stalled attack. Once committed, the reserve's actions normally become or reinforce the echelon's decisive operation and the commander makes every effort to reconstitute another reserve from units made available by the revised situation. Often a commander's most difficult and important decision concerns the time, place, and circumstances for committing the reserve.

When the situation is relatively clear and capabilities of a threatening armed group are known to be limited, the reserve may consist of a small element of the UN Inf Bn. When the situation is vague, the reserve may initially contain the majority of the commander's firepower.

In an attack, the commander generally locates the reserve to the rear of the unit, placing the decisive operation in a location that provides maximum protection from hostile observation and fire. However, the reserve must be able to move quickly to areas where it is needed in different contingencies. This is most likely to occur if the threatening armed group has ability to conduct a strong counterattack.

The commander prioritizes the positioning of the reserve to reinforce the success of the decisive operation first, then to counter the worst-case threat of an armed group counterattack.

2.7.6.6. Support to Conduct the Task

In an attack, the commander tries to position sustainment units to best support the offensive action. From these locations, support teams can sustain the attacking force and provide priority of support to the units conducting the decisive operation. As the attacking force advances, sustainment units and capabilities may have to displace forward to shorten supply lines, using displacement techniques designed to ensure uninterrupted support to maneuver units. The size of the force a commander devotes to protect the support area depends on the threat of armed groups to the sustainment units.

2.7.7. TASK 16 – Assure Protection of Civilians (POC)

Based on the language used by the Security Council in POC mandates, the physical protection of civilians in United Nations peacekeeping can be defined as 'all necessary action, up to and including the use of force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government to protect its civilians.'

It is important to understand that POC is neither a military-specific task, nor the primary responsibility of the UN Military Component. Indeed, in most cases, the primary responsibility for POC resides with the Host Government. However, when the host government is either unable or unwilling to assure POC, UN peacekeepers are authorized to act independently to protect civilians, irrespective of the source of threat. It is therefore incumbent on the UN Inf Bn Commander and Staff to plan accordingly. This task is complicated when the source of the threat is government troops, or persons who are difficult to identify due to a lack of uniforms, gender or age.

2.7.7.1. Purpose. Reflecting the rising importance of POC, most UN peacekeeping missions are mandated to protect civilians. Although POC mandates have existed for fifteen years, field missions and TCCs continue to seek guidance on its implementation.

2.7.7.2. Desired End-State. The UN Inf Bn successfully protects civilians in its AOR by employing dialogue, engagement and coordination, by providing physical protection whenever and in whatever necessary, and through the establishment of a protective environment and the facilitation of humanitarian activity, in conjunction with UN mission and non-mission partners.

2.7.7.3. Planning Considerations.

The battalion staff should remember that POC requires a whole of mission approach to planning and execution. This requires extensive coordination and prior planning. POC and contingency planning requires extensive engagement well before threats to the civilian population manifest.

Facilitate Engagement and Dialogue

- Facilitate meetings with all non-mission POC interlocutors, such as NGOs, local and international organizations and host nation security forces to exchange information pertinent to POC tasks.
- Influence local host nation security forces to intervene to protect civilians.
- Facilitate meetings with UN mission POC interlocutors. This will facilitate a coordinated 'whole of mission' approach to planning and preparation.
- Deploy engagement team patrols with the express purpose of interacting with perpetrators and potential perpetrators to encourage conflict resolution and dialogue.
- Deploy engagement team patrols with the express purpose of meeting vulnerable communities, specifically seeking to engage with key leaders. To address protection needs of women and girls, a gender-sensitive approach must also ensure that contingents deployed to areas of operations where Conflict Related Sexual Violence (CRSV) is taking place are encouraged to deploy female military personnel who can enhance the reach to women and girls to ascertain threats, risks and vulnerabilities and respond accordingly.

Plan to Provide Physical Protection (Static or Mobile)

The unit conducts a detailed POC assessment and continuously monitors POC-related factors including:

- The location of vulnerable groups;
- An evaluation of the operating environment of vulnerable groups;
- The identification of key leaders of vulnerable groups;
- The identification of key (UN and non-UN) POC interlocutors;
- Identification of armed threats to vulnerable groups;
- Identification of environmental threats to vulnerable groups;
- The development of an early warning system (this must have observable indicators) to identify imminent threats to vulnerable groups;
- The development of POC-related Information Requirements to enable early warning and improve situational awareness;
- Specific POC tasks are allocated to subordinate units;
- Joint contingency planning for POC tasks;
- The rehearsal of potential POC tasks;
- Maintains a QRF for POC tasks.
- The unit includes POC-related information requirements in its Information Acquisition Plan (IAP).

2.7.7.4. Establish a Protective Environment and Facilitate Humanitarian Assistance

- Based on its POC assessment, its ongoing information acquisition, and its indicator and warning system, the unit adopts a credible and proactive position, posture and profile, to deter threat actor action against civilians.
- Establish a proactive patrol plan in areas with vulnerable population groups.
- The unit is prepared to conduct evacuation of the civilian population, if necessary.
- The unit informs higher HQ of any increased threat to civilians in its AOR, thereby facilitating a whole of mission response.
- When preventative measures fail, the unit must respond swiftly and decisively, within ROE, to all threats to the civilian population.

- If civilians are under threat of physical violence, a robust response is required. This can include the following: a show of force (as deterrence); Force inter-positioning between (armed) actors and civilians; taking direct military action against armed actors with clear hostile intent to harm civilians.
- POC tasks are not only carried out in the face of a hostile actor. POC also involves the delivery of humanitarian assistance to communities in need. Accordingly, the UN Inf Bn needs to provide convoy escorts to humanitarian actors in line with mission SOPs.
- It is also incumbent on the UN Inf Bn to establish security conditions that will facilitate the work of humanitarian actors. To establish such conditions the UN Inf Bn must conduct operations *beyond* those directly requested by humanitarian actors. The establishment of OP and CP, and frequent, proactive patrolling along supply routes are examples of the types of operations that a battalion will need to engage in to create such secure conditions.

2.7.7.5. Organizational Considerations

POC is not assured through the conduct of a single operation or task. Rather, it is the product of multiple operations, encompassing many of the tasks outlined above, executed over a long period of time. UN Inf Bn staff, particularly in missions with a POC mandate, should plan POC operations.

2.7.7.6. Support to Conduct the Task

A UN Inf Bn cannot conduct POC without significant mission-level support and engagement. In a multidimensional mission, this requires a coordinated response, incorporating Security Sector Reform, including engagement on impunity, the promotion and protection of Human Rights, political engagement at the national-level, and the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

Chapter Conclusion

To execute its UN operations, UN Inf Bns deployed to operate under a Chapter VI or VII mandate in a multinational environment should have the required core functions as outlined in the first portion of this chapter. To successfully accomplish operations, a UN Inf Bn can expect to perform multiple tasks either concurrently or sequentially. Accordingly, every deploying UN Inf Bn must plan, train and organize to excel in each core function and task.

CHAPTER 3



ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT

Introduction

To function effectively in a complex and multidimensional mission environment, a UN Inf Bn needs to have multifaceted operational capability, resourced by the correct combination of specialized personnel and equipment. The UN Inf Bn is configured with a specific focus on integrated employment in accordance with peacekeeping mission requirements. Building on conventional infantry capabilities, the UN Inf Bn is trained and deployed to execute a wide range of peacekeeping tasks.

In the peacekeeping context, “capability” is defined as the ability and readiness to deliver against a reasonable standard. It encompasses the combination of capacities (personnel and equipment), preparedness (organization, process and training) and logistics sustainment required to achieve the mission and implement the mandate.

3.1. Purpose

The purpose of this chapter is to lay down a model organizational structure and equipment profile for a UN Inf Bn, adaptable and modifiable to specific mission requirements. It will provide guidance and assistance to all stakeholders in planning, structuring, equipping and employing the UN Inf Bn.

3.2. Role of an Inf Bn

The primary role of a UN Inf Bn is to restore and/or maintain a safe, stable and secure environment in the battalion AOR, which is defined on the basis of capability and operational objectives. The UN Inf Bn must ensure POC, as well as freedom of movement for UN personnel, and security of property, facilities and installations throughout its AOR. The battalion must also be capable of planning and executing all peacekeeping tasks outlined in Chapter Two of this manual, and the tasks outlined in the SUR.

3.3. Organizational Profile

3.3.1. General. The UN Inf Bn organization is designed as a modular structure with independent operational and sustainment capability, ensuring that it can perform multifaceted tasks unique to the peacekeeping operating environment.

3.3.2. Features. The UN Inf Bn will generally be deployed in three to four independent and self-sustaining operating bases, capable of undertaking proactive and robust mobile and/or static operations in all types of terrain and weather conditions. The core tactical capabilities of the UN Inf Bn include:

- Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR).
- Integrated operational planning.
- Direct fire support, including anti-tank and Heavy Machine Gun (HMG).
- Indirect fire support capability, augmented by mobile platforms, down to platoon level. Indirect fire support should incorporate both 81mm (Support Company) and 60mm (Inf Coy weapons platoon).
- Engagement.
- Credible, protected mobility down to platoon level.
- The capacity to mobilize all operational elements using protected, organic transport assets.
- Counter IED.
- Self-sustained logistics support structure.
- Able to exercise secure command and control down to section level via reliable means of communications.

3.3.3. UN Inf Bn Organizational Structure. The structure of the UN Inf Bn will largely depend on the terrain and task for which it is employed. The required structure and capabilities of the UN Inf Bn will be specified in mission planning guidelines and elaborated further in the SUR and the MOU. The unit can occupy a Bn base and maintain 3 TOBs, each with the ability to deploy 2 reinforced platoons simultaneously. It can operate in a ground mobility AO of up to 5,000 sq/km, and an air-mobile AO of up to 20,000 sq/km (situation dependent). There are three general organizational structures/types of UN Inf Bn:

- UN Light Inf Bn. This is a light Inf Bn comprised of three Inf Coys with approximately 622 personnel (Figure 7).
- UN Motorized Inf Bn. This is a motorized Inf Bn comprised of four motorized Coys (wheeled) with approximately 872 personnel (Figure 8).
- UN Mechanized Inf Bn. This is a mechanized Inf Bn comprised of three mechanized Inf Coys (wheeled) and one mechanized Inf Coy (tracked) with approximately 872 personnel (Figure 9).

Any of these may be used in the role of a **Standard, QRF or Reserve UN Inf Bn**.




Figure 8. UN Light Infantry Battalion Organization – base model




Figure 9. UN Motorized Infantry Battalion Organization – base model




Figure 10. UN Mechanized Infantry Battalion Organization – base model

3.4. Battalion HQ. The SUR for a UN Inf Bn HQ normally describes a HQ comprised of sixty personnel, divided into two groups:

3.4.1. Command Group. The Battalion Commander assisted by the Second-in-Command/ Executive Officer (2IC/XO), Battalion Senior Warrant Officer and Senior NCO in exercising his/her operational and administrative command responsibility. The Battalion Command Group normally includes a Legal Officer (for managing legal affairs of the unit) and a Gender/Child Protection Officer as advisers.

3.4.2. Battalion HQ Staff. The Battalion Staff (described in the SUR) functions under the 2IC/XO. The Operations Officer, on behalf of the Bn 2IC, will coordinate functions of all other staff sections. The Bn HQ staff will be responsible for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, controlling and sustaining all operational and administrative responsibilities of the battalion as per SOPs of the unit and mission planning documents. Adequate representation of women in the staff is encouraged. Staff officers should be qualified in their respective fields and should be capable of taking on additional responsibilities as per Unit SOPs. In addition to national military staff responsibilities, some important UN functions in a PKO are listed below:

3.4.2.1. Personnel/Human Resources Staff Section (S1). The Personnel Staff Section comprises of the Personnel Officer/Adjutant and staff, including a Spiritual Adviser/Religious Teacher (RT), a unit Welfare Adviser, a Psychologist and an Internal Oversight Officer and staff (military police personnel). This section is responsible for personnel administration, welfare, morale, and for the maintenance of conduct and discipline.

3.4.2.2. Military Peacekeeping Intelligence Staff Section (S2). The S2 section at battalion level supports the Battalion Commander and staff with intelligence products. The S2 section is responsible for directing and coordinating the UN Inf Bn MPKI Cycle, incorporating direction, acquisition, analysis, and dissemination phases. A full description of this core capability is outlined in Chapter Two of this manual.

3.4.2.3. Operations Staff Section (S3). This section is normally comprised of an Operations Officer, Battalion Operations Centre staff, Liaison Officers and an Aviation Cell. The section plans and coordinates all operational activity within the AOR, carries out liaison, coordinates air movements and maintains the “Operations Centre” (with tracking and video-conferencing facility) in 24/7 operational readiness. It will

also coordinate employment of the QRF and Reserve. It is responsible for risk management, and for ensuring the overall safety and security of personnel, materials and information. The section will maintain liaison with neighboring contingents and with higher HQ to coordinate operational activity.

3.4.2.4. Logistics Staff Section (S4). At a minimum, the Logistics Staff Section comprises a Logistics Officer and a COE/Finance Officer. This section will coordinate all logistics support for the unit per MOU arrangements. It is responsible for stocking and replenishment of all supplies and stores, turnover of personnel and equipment, and equipment management. It ensures proper maintenance, serviceability and inspection of both UN-Owned Equipment (UNOE) and Contingent-Owned Equipment (COE) assigned to the unit. It is responsible for all financial transactions and accounting of the unit. The Logistics Officer will oversee the unit movement control (MOVCON) and will also act as the “Environmental Focal Point”.

3.4.2.5. Communications Staff Section (S5). This section will be staffed to ensure the provision and maintenance of multiple voice and data communications networks with higher HQ and subordinate elements, thereby facilitating command and control. It is also critical that this section ensures redundancy in communications arrangements.

3.4.2.6. CIMIC Staff Section (S9). At a minimum, the CIMIC Staff Section comprises an Engagement/Public Information Officer (Outreach and Media Focal Point) and a CIMIC Officer (Humanitarian and CIMIC Focal Point). It is responsible for undertaking appropriate outreach and engagement activities with key leaders and the local population, including women. It will coordinate its actions with other civilian mission components, such as Civil Affairs and Human Rights, and with Sector and Force Headquarters.

3.5. Support Company. Support Company is generally larger than the operational Inf Coys. Being specialist in nature, all ranks of the company should be qualified in their respective functional specializations. The suggested composition of Support Company is given below:

3.5.1. Company HQ. Responsible for providing combat service support to the battalion, thereby ensuring self-sustainment where necessary and appropriate, and coordinating the provision of UN mission support as outlined in the MOU.

3.5.2. Mortar Platoon. The platoon is equipped with Infantry mortars capable of providing indirect fire support and illumination cover to the battalion TOBs. Based on the operational requirements and commander’s appreciation, the mortar platoon may either be deployed centrally or with the TOBs. The platoon operates under the Operations Staff Officer. At least 25 percent of Officers and WOs should be trained as Mortar Fire Controllers.

3.5.3. Engineer Platoon. The Engineer Platoon operates under the Operations Staff Section. It provides and coordinates field engineering support to all TOBs and OPs, provides and maintains water supply and waste water treatment systems, sets up solid waste (including hazardous) segregation areas, manages and provides electricity (static and generator based, including containment basins), maintenance of accommodation and allied infrastructure, provides EOD capability, emergency mine, IED and UXO clearance, and provides engineering assistance to CIMIC/welfare activities as part of engagement. The Engineer Officer will also act as “Engineer Adviser” to the Battalion Commander.

3.5.4. Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Platoon.

The ISR platoon has a specially trained Reconnaissance Section, which can also act as a Surveillance Section with a tactical Unmanned Aerial System (UAS). The Surveillance Section also coordinates the employment of other sensors, including ground surveillance radar. The S2 MPKI section coordinates the ISR platoon activities, being the tasking authority for these acquisition assets.

3.5.5. Logistics Platoon. This platoon operates under the Support Company. It comprises of Logistics Section, Signal Section, Transport Section and a Field Workshop. It provides sustainment and maintenance cover to the battalion and its subordinate units.

3.5.5.1. Logistics Section. It coordinates provision and stockage of all categories of supplies, general stores, ordnance stores, ammunition, rations, and hygiene and sanitation stores.

3.5.5.2. Signals Section. This section operates under the Communications Staff Section. It is responsible for establishing and maintaining unit and mission communication network as per SOPs, handling the IED mobile jammers and for communications monitoring at battalion level.

3.5.5.3. Transport Platoon. Operates under the Operations and Logistics Staff Sections and provides technical assistance, recovery capabilities, and qualified, specialist drivers to support essential services. It also monitors the maintenance and repair of vehicles attached with the ICGs.

3.5.5.4. Field Workshop. The Field Workshop is responsible for providing repair and recovery cover to the battalion, per the MOU. It also coordinates the maintenance and repair of all small arms and equipment. It will also provide Mobile Repair Teams as required.

Note: All personnel of the Transport Section and Field Workshop should be qualified drivers (Dual Trade).

3.5.5.5. Medical Section. The Battalion Level I hospital organization is based on the COE Manual specifications and must have the capacity to deploy two Forward Medical Teams if required. For TOBs that are deployed away from the Level I hospital, particularly those that cannot meet the 10-1-2 goal in all weather conditions, additional paramedics/nurses may be included in accordance with the MOU and operational requirements. The hospital functions under the Personnel Staff Section. It provides immediate life-saving medical support at the battalion level, and coordinates surface and air evacuation of casualties.

At a minimum, it comprises two medical officers, six paramedics, three support staff (laboratory technician, dispenser and medical clerk) and an ambulance driver. The medical staff should have at least one female medic and attendant. The Level I hospital may also be required to provide medical assistance to civilian personnel in the AOR. Depending on operational requirements, geographic separation and points of deployments, a UN Inf Bn may be grouped with an additional Level 1 medical facility.

3.6. Engagement Platoon (EP)

3.6.1. Mission. The mission of the EP is to enhance the situational awareness of the battalion by mapping the demography of the AO in order to identify vulnerable areas and at-risk populations.

3.6.2. Organization. An EP is to be established in each Inf Bn. EPs are optional in specialist Inf Bns, such as a QRF or Special Forces unit, as these are designed for offensive actions rather than engagement.

- The command and control structure of the EP includes an Officer in Charge, along with a 2IC. The OIC should at least be of the rank of Captain, while a Senior NCO is recommended for the 2IC post. At least one of these personnel shall be a woman.
- The EPs shall have a minimum of 50 per cent women personnel. TCCs may choose to establish teams with more than 50 per cent women.
- The section will operate as teams, containing four personnel per team. Battalions with three companies will have four ETs in the Engagement Section. Battalions with four companies will have five ETs. The number of engagement teams accompanying a patrol will depend on the task and situation on ground. However, it is recommended that there should be a minimum of two women per patrol.
- The teams can be made up of men and women from any branch of the military and any rank however, teams must have the appropriate rank structure to establish a C2 hierarchy.
- The EP is embedded within the Combat Support Company. ETs are normally attached to Inf Coys to participate in patrolling. ETs are normally under the tactical control of the receiving Coy for the period of their attachment.

3.6.2.1: Engagement Platoon Organization.




Figure 11. Engagement Platoon organization – base model

3.6.3. Tasks

EP tasks include but are not limited to the those listed in paragraph 2.3.3.5. Additionally, the EP should conduct gender perspective-inclusive Village Assessments, as outlined in Annex F, to improve situational awareness.

3.6.4. Analysis and Reporting. The ET provides all relevant engagement information for inclusion in the standard reporting used by the Inf Coy during the period of their attachment. The EP OIC should provide a weekly update, and ad hoc reports when immediate action is required through their chain of command to the appropriate section (G2, G3, G5, Force/Sector Military Gender Adviser and Women’s Protection Advisers). The reports include, but are not be limited to, information and analysis to identify risk, vulnerabilities and potential threats to the local population.

- Pertinent EP reports should be shared through channels with Women’s Protection Advisers and the Senior Protection of Civilians Adviser. These personnel are normally located at the Sector or Force-level.
- When relevant, gender considerations can be included in Protection of Civilians plans, policies, analysis and reports. The ET reports should be shared through channels with the JOCs and the JMAC.

3.7. Technology

High technology, state-of-the-art equipment can help the UN Inf Bn to accomplish its mission. Technology, such as UAVs and communications may be included the SUR of the UN Inf Bn. Details of some of the equipment that can augment peacekeeping operation performance are at Annex E.

3.8. UN Inf Battalion Key Personnel Roles and Responsibilities

3.8.1. Battalion Commander (BC)

The Battalion Commander is responsible for everything the UN Inf Bn does or fails to do, including the conduct and discipline of his/her personnel. Some of his/her critical responsibilities are listed below:

- Lawfully exercise authority over the battalion.
- Direct, guide planning, and provide intent for each operation.
- Ensure the UN MDMP is incorporated all Bn staff functions.
- Ensure operations are MPKI-led.
- Decide on the UN Inf Bn Course of Action for operations.
- Ensure that operational risk is identified and managed.
- Ensure the UN Inf Bn can deploy, adhering to the eight core capabilities in this manual.
- Ensure the UN Inf Bn can conduct all tasks required by the SUR, Chapter Two of this manual, and all other mandated tasks.
- Ensure that the unit has adequate resources and equipment to enable it to complete its tasks.

- Ensure that gender is mainstreamed and operationalized throughout the tasks of the battalion.
- Provide timely, relevant and substantive information and reports to higher HQ Staff and Operations Centers.
- Be responsible for the conduct and discipline of all personnel under his/her command.
- Ensure continuity of operations with her/his replacement through written handover notes, an end-of-assignment report, organizational learning and improvement through the identification of lessons and good practices.

3.8.2. Battalion Executive Officer (XO) / Second in Command (2IC)

The battalion XO/2IC exercises the duties of chief of staff and coordinates staff work, operations and logistics. The Battalion XO/2IC's primary duties include:

- Exercise command in the absence of the Battalion Commander.
- Transmit the commander's decisions and coordinate task execution with the staff and subordinate units.
- Act as the COS for the UN MDMP.
- Integrate and synchronize staff activity to optimize command and control of battalion operations.
- Directly supervise the battalion's main command post operations center.
- Oversee the synchronization of information management within the battalion.
- Act as the Human Rights Focal Point in the battalion.
- Be responsible for developing and overseeing the implementation of UN Inf Bn SOPs.
- Ensure that personnel are aware of and understand UN policy and guidance, particularly police/guidance relating to SEA, Human Rights and POC.
- Monitor and coordinate public information and media management in the Battalion AOR.
- Closely monitor administrative and logistics issues within the Battalion.
- Be responsible for welfare and training.
- Be responsible for unit security including safety and security of personnel, material and information.
- Act as the Battalion custodian of best practices and lessons learned.
- Execute any other duties as directed by the commander.

3.8.3. Legal Officer

- Sensitize all ranks on the legal framework of peacekeeping operations.
- Ensure UN policy and guidance, including that pertaining to ROE, human rights, SEA, gender issues and host country law are understood and adhered to.
- Provide legal advice to the Battalion Commander in accordance with UNHQ Office of Legal Affairs policy and Mission SOPs.

3.8.4. Gender and Protection Focal Point (FP)

Each Unit should have a trained Military Gender and Protection Focal Point. This is to ensure the participation of women and girls in Early Warning Mechanisms and Protection of Civilians working groups.

The FP is responsible for coordinating and guiding implementation of Security Council (SC) Mandates on Women Peace and Security in the work of the Inf Bn, including the Protection of Civilians, CRSV and Child Protection. The FP will work to support the operational integration of gender and protection, and coordinate with the Military Gender and Protection Adviser at Force HQ, the Sector Military Gender and Protection Adviser, the Engagement Platoon and the local civilian Gender, POC, Child Protection and CRSV teams. The FHQ Military Gender and Protection Adviser will liaise with the civilian Gender Adviser to the mission. The FP's responsibilities include:

- Advise the Battalion Commander on all issues related to protecting the civilian population.

- Provide advice on gender-sensitive strategies and appropriate responses to support women's protection from various threats including from sexual violence.
- Provide advice on gender-sensitive strategies and appropriate responses to support the protection needs of men, women, boys and girls.
- Identify vulnerabilities specific to women and children in the local community.
- Provide training on the gender perspective and protection strategies related to the POC, Child Protection and CRSV.
- Provide inputs for reporting on threats and violations related to the POC, Child Protection and CRSV.
- Engage in the UN MDMP as required.
- Develop and oversee the implementation of specific SOPs on the required response for all protection pillars including the handover of child soldiers captured in operations, or those who have surrendered to the peace operations force. Other SOP topics for development and implementation include detention of child soldiers, conflict-related sexual abuse, human trafficking and slavery by armed groups and DDR responses for men, women, boys and girls.
- Reporting on POC matters in line with FC Directives.

Note: At the UN Inf Bn level, the responsibility of "Gender and Child Protection" will be performed by a single officer under the supervision of XO/2IC. Accepted terms for Gender are attached at Annex G.

3.8.5. National Investigation Officer (NIO)

3.8.5.1. Context – Conduct of Investigations by TCCs

- It is important that investigations into allegations of possible misconduct are thorough and conducted in a timely manner with sensitivity to any potential victims. Investigations can be carried out by the UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), or investigative entities in the mission including the Special Investigation Unit (SIU), Military Police, UNPOL and ad-hoc panels. Conduct and Discipline Teams (CDTs) do not conduct investigations.
- Members of military contingents deployed in UN operations remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of their national government.
- The responsibility for investigating an allegation of misconduct and taking subsequent disciplinary action rests with the TCC, in accordance with the revised model MOU endorsed by the General Assembly in 2007. Some TCCs opt to investigate allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse in collaboration with OIOS. If a TCC does not opt to investigate allegations involving its personnel, the UN will conduct its own administrative investigation into the matter.
- On receipt of information about possible serious misconduct, as defined by the MOU involving one or more members of a military contingent, the UN will refer the matter to the Permanent Mission of the country in question, requesting the Government appoint a **National Investigation Officer (NIO)** to investigate the allegation(s).
- Since July 2016, TCCs are required to include national investigation officers in their contingents to ensure that investigations start in a timely manner. In matters involving misconduct (not amounting to serious misconduct), the matter would normally be referred to the Contingent Commander for investigation.
- The TCC involved must report back to the UN on the outcome of the investigation and on any actions taken.
- UN investigative entities are required to complete investigations into allegations of SEA within six months, subject to extenuating circumstances. TCCs have also been asked to complete their investigations within this time frame. In matters deemed particularly urgent, TCCs are requested to complete investigations within 90 days, which may also be done by UN investigative entities in similar circumstances.

3.8.5.2. NIO. In line with the above-mentioned procedure, every TCC must designate an NIO to investigate allegations of serious misconduct including SEA.

Chapter Conclusion

Peacekeeping today encompasses a far more diverse range of missions and mandated tasks, incorporating traditional peacekeeping tasks such as the monitoring of ceasefire lines, conventional military tasks such as peace enforcement, and other perhaps more complex tasks such POC and facilitating Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR).

The UN Inf Bn is the primary tool to execute these tasks and mission objectives. It is therefore important that the UN Inf Bn is organized, resourced and trained to deliver optimal operational outcomes in a variety of operating environments, many of which are now high-threat.

CHAPTER 4



SUPPORT FOR THE UN INFANTRY BATTALION

Introduction

Sustainment operations in UN peacekeeping is a shared responsibility between military units and the Missions they are deployed to support. The extent to which military units plan and integrate their logistics operations within the Mission directly impacts success in the field. Understanding how and where shared sustainment responsibilities intersect will ensure the success of UN Inf Bns. This chapter provides an overview of the mission support concept, planning considerations, CASEVAC and logistics planning considerations.

4.1. UN Support to a UN Inf Bn

The DOS at UN Headquarters provides dedicated support to TCCs in the areas of financial reimbursements, logistics support services, communications and information technology, human resources and general administration through each mission's support division. Directors and Chiefs of Mission Support and are charged with the provision of supplies and services for contingent forces deployed in their respective Missions. Such services and supplies provided by the Mission include: minor engineering; Level 2 medical and CASEVAC support; in-country ground transport; air transportation; fuel and rations.

4.2. Equipment and Personnel Deployed to the Mission

The majority of UN Inf Bns deploy to their missions under a "dry lease" reimbursement in which the TCC deploys personnel and equipment to the Mission area. Responsibility to maintain deployed equipment rests solely with the TCC. A "wet lease" program is a reimbursement scheme in which a TCC assumes responsibility for maintaining UN-owned equipment (UNOE). Wet-lease arrangements are more common for specialized support units, such as airfield support units and aero-medical evacuation teams (AMET) where UNOE is issued to deploying units. The number of troops, type and quantities of contingent-owned equipment (COE) authorized for deployment to the Mission area is codified in the COE portion of the memorandum of understanding (MOU) and is negotiated between the TCC, the Mission and UN Secretariat before the unit's deployment. Equipment reimbursement rates are governed by the COE Manual which is updated every three years with endorsement by the UN General Assembly.

4.3. National Support Element (NSE)

In some situations, a TCC may elect to deploy additional personnel as part of a national support element (NSE) at its own expense and with prior approval from the UN. The NSE includes personnel and equipment in addition to the COE MOU, and/or as described in the SUR for the specific field Mission. TCCs are not reimbursed for NSE troops, rotations and self-sustainment costs. NSE strength is limited to 10% of the unit's MOU strength and cannot exceed 50 personnel, regardless of unit size and composition. For legal purposes, these personnel are considered as part of the contingent. However, NSE personnel are not authorized to participate in tactical operations, such as patrolling. Essentially, the NSE can serve in a support role, enabling commanders to fully employ its forces towards infantry tasks. TCCs typically deploy NSE for the following support roles:

- Facilitation of communication between the unit and its home country.
- Management of national personnel matters.
- Provision of national postal support.
- Provision of national finance / paymaster support.
- Management of maintenance and national supply chain actions.
- Management of internal movement control operations.

- Organization of national visits approved by UN HQ to the mission area.
- Establishment of liaison with Mission support offices to manage national rotations.

4.4. Mission Support Concept

The UN peacekeeping logistics support concept relies on the integration of UN-owned, contracted and military contingent-provided resources. All mission support and service functions are considered common to the UN and shared between Mission entities. Resources are offered on a uniform and equitable basis, depending on mission priorities, irrespective of whether the organization providing the goods and service is military, UN civilian or contractor. Delivering common support goods and services is primarily the responsibility of the DMS/ CMS, who liaises with all components and segments of the Mission. UN Inf Bns are responsible for monitoring and reporting their supply consumption, forecasting and reporting tactical logistics requirements to the various Mission support activities.

Supplies and services provided in the Mission area include:

- Distribution of major commodities such as fuel, water and rations.
- Construction and management of accommodation.
- Movement Control (MOVCON) planning and scheduling for unit personnel, equipment and commodities.
- Medical, environmental health and if specified, dental services.
- Civil engineering projects.
- Geographical Information System (GIS) services (i.e., maps).
- Ground, air and surface transportation services.
- Installation and operation of communications and IT services.

4.5. Coordination with Mission Stakeholders for Sustainment Operations

Inf Bn logistics officers must be able to effectively communicate and manage relationships with Mission stakeholders to effectively advocate for their Battalion's logistics requirements. Active participation in sustainment working group meetings and planning sessions is essential. Upon arrival in the Mission area, Battalion Logistics Officers should establish effective working relationships with the following Mission Support entities:

- Mission Support Center
- Mission MOVCON
- Regional Administrative Officer
- Mission COE Office
- Mission Transportation Office
- Mission Fuel and Rations Departments
- Mission Supply Office
- UN-Contracted Commodity Service Providers
- Police Component Logistics Officers
- Sector and/or Force Headquarters G4/U4 (Logistics) and G8/U8 (Engineer) Staff Officers

4.6. UN Inf Bn and Company Logistics Requirements

The UN Inf Bn is expected to meet its self-sustainment in accordance with the TCC's COE MOU and COE Manual. This includes deployment of essential personnel to support internal unit logistics and administrative functions.

Immediately upon arrival in the Mission area, Battalion Logistics Officers must work with Sector/Force G4/U4 staff, and Mission commodity and service providers to determine reporting requirements and request procedures for fuel, rations, water, movement control and medical support.

UN Inf Bns are usually composed of three to four self-sufficient Infantry Companies capable of operating independently to execute mission essential tasks, roles and responsibilities as per the Mission's mandate. Each company must:

- Possess an independent logistics capability to include food, water, accommodation, hygiene and sanitation, mobility, repair and recovery, medical support, welfare and waste management.
- Adequate support to accomplish unit operations through timely, effective, and enduring provision, stocking and replenishment.

4.7. UN Inf Bn Support Considerations

All battalions must possess an expeditionary mindset with a capability to task-organize its components to operate from temporary bases for up to 30 days. Company-sized operating bases are commonly the smallest permanent camp size for field operations. However, some situations may require establishment of platoon-sized bases to stage infantry operations. Such operations require close planning and coordination with Sector, Force Headquarters and the Mission's Support Center to ensure continuous delivery of essential commodities.

4.8. Logistics Planning Factors

4.8.1. Initial Provisioning and Stock Levels

On an exceptional basis, Missions may require units to arrive fully stocked and self-sustained for water, rations, and packaged petroleum products, until such time the Mission is able to deliver essential services and commodities. These cases are the exception and will be coordinated in advance of COE MOU negotiations and deployment.

Minimum stockage requirements for deployment include:

Serial	Category	Battalion Level	Company level	TOB level	Remarks
A	Ammunition	In accordance with the ammunition guidelines, ammunition specifications, along with stock levels will be indicated in SURs and MOUs			Or as specified by field missions / DOS
B	Ration (Dry and Tinned)	7 days	7 days	7 days	
C	Drinking Water	minimum 7 Days bottled water at mission/Battalion/Company level		As per SOP	
D	Bulk Water	Minimum 3 days at TOB level		As per SOP	
E	Medicines	03 months	01 month		
F	Petroleum, Oil and Lubricants (POL)	As per guidelines			
G	Spares/expendable	03 months	01 month		
H	General stores	03 months	01 month		

Note: The timing, figures and tactical groupings are recommendations. Stock types and levels vary between field missions.

4.8.2. Water

Most units will be required to deploy water purification equipment to produce drinking and bulk water within 14 days of arrival in the mission area. Missions are responsible for providing a bulk water source, either through supply point distribution point or direct delivery. The provision of bottled drinking water is only to be an interim bridging solution until the deployed unit can produce its own potable water.

Contingents are responsible for the transportation of raw and treated water according to the equipment authorized in the COE MOU (e.g., water truck and bulk storage containers). Upon installation of the water purification units, contingents are responsible for testing and certifying that the purified water meets the World Health Organization (WHO) standards and is fit for human consumption.

4.8.3. Rations

The UN will arrange for a commercial contract for the supply of fresh, frozen, chilled and dry rations, and for catering operations at contingent bases, except where contingents are to provide their own catering under the terms of their MOU. The TCC must be prepared to order the initial supply of fresh, frozen, chilled and dry rations through the Mission's commodity manager so that delivery may be arranged to coincide with the main deployment.

Prior to deployment, Commanders will appoint a Unit Rations Officer, responsible coordinating for the Battalion's requirements. For new TCC deployments, Commanders are advised to ensure these officers deploy to the Mission as part of the Advance Party to establish supply support prior to arrival of the Battalion. The Unit Rations Officer will be responsible for requesting and accounting for unit rations through an automated system provided by the Mission.

4.8.4. Bulk and Packaged Petroleum Products

Mission HQ will arrange a commercial contract for the supply, storage and delivery of bulk POL for vehicles, aircraft, and other fuel using equipment such as generators and heaters.

Storage and internal distribution (within the unit) is a battalion responsibility. Mission Support Division will advise units on relevant regulations and procedures concerning fuel storage and issue. Commander's will be responsible for appointing a Battalion Petroleum Officer to electronically request and account for fuel usage.

The Mission, through its contracted vendor, will provide the following bulk and packaged petroleum products to deployed units:

- Diesel
- High Octane fuel
- Engine Oil
- Grease
- Power Steering Fluid
- Gear Oil
- Coolant
- Hydraulic Oil
- Electrolyte
- Brake Fluid
- Distilled Water
- Windshield Washing Fluid

Upon arrival in the Mission area, units will appoint primary and alternate petroleum officers to account for and requisition petroleum products.

4.8.5. Power Generation

Contingents are generally required to provide their own major power generators (>20 KVA and above) to meet their main power generating requirements and will be reimbursed separately for those generators of major equipment at the rate laid down in the COE Manual, as amended. Contingents are also generally required to be self-sustained in the category of Electrical in accordance with the COE Manual, to provide decentralized power for small sub-unit locations and to provide a redundant emergency backup if the main power supply is interrupted. Contingents are reimbursed for providing this self-sustainment capability at the rate laid down in the COE Manual. The UN will provide fuel for generators. The common operating voltage and frequency for field missions are 220-volt 50Hz. Generators up to 36kVA are normally in single phase configuration, while the larger sets - 36kVA and above - are configured for three-phase (380volt/50Hz).

4.8.6. Medical and CASEVAC/MEDVAC Support

The health and well-being of members of UN peacekeeping operations depend on planning, coordination, execution, monitoring and professional supervision of excellent medical care in the field. UN peacekeeping operations are characterized by unique features that impact fundamentally on the provision of medical support. These include:

- Political complexity and dynamic nature of peacekeeping operations.
- Geographic, demographic, cultural and linguistic variations within mission areas.
- Specific prevailing epidemiological and disease patterns.
- Multi-national participation in peacekeeping operations with varying national standards of training, operational procedures, equipment and supplies.

4.8.6.1. Medical Timeline

Medical research proves that the risk of death or permanent disability is significantly reduced if people are treated as soon as possible after the onset of a life-threatening injury or illness. Based on this evidence, it is of utmost importance that appropriate life, limb and eyesight saving procedures are provided as quickly as possible. The UN follows a 10-1-2 goal for CASEVAC operations. This model requires application of immediate lifesaving measures at point of injury within ten (10) minutes; evacuation from the site within one (1) hour; and delivery to the next level of care and/or damage control surgery within two (2) hours. The ability of unit personnel to perform tactical combat casualty care is paramount to saving lives. Field medical care is a critical and perishable skill and should be practiced and rehearsed throughout a unit's deployment.

4.8.6.2. CASEVAC

CASEVAC is defined as the primary evacuation of any casualty from the point of injury (POI) to the closest appropriate medical facility, utilizing the most appropriate means of transportation. The conduct of CASEVAC is a complex chain of events involving coordination, command and control, security, transportation and military, police and civilian medical facilities. For any CASEVAC operation to achieve its purpose, it is imperative that Missions establish an integrated approach with the capability of responding to CASEVAC within the 10-1-2 goal on a 24/7 basis across the entire AO. When that goal may not be met, a risk assessment is conducted to mitigate risks, where possible.

4.8.6.3. Aero-Medical Evacuation Team (AMET)

CASEVACs are ideally supported by Aero-Medical Evacuation Teams (AMET) which are integrated as part of an aviation crew for Mission aircraft. AMETs are commonly comprised of two physicians and four nurses/paramedics to support 24-7 CASEVAC.

4.8.6.4. MEDEVAC.

Medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) is a fundamental component of medical support, which involves the transport of the sick or injured to complete the entire continuum of medical treatment and rehabilitation. In developing a MEDEVAC plan, it is important to note travel distances; evacuation times by land, rotary

and fixed-wing platforms; availability of suitable evacuation routes, landing zones and air-fields; evacuation by night and in severe weather conditions; requirements for cross-border flight clearance and the activation system.

4.8.6.5. Threats to Peacekeepers

From 2013-2017, mobile convoys, convoy escorts, patrols and quick reaction forces have the highest number of fatalities in peacekeeping missions. Other fatalities were consequence of direct and indirect attacks on UN camps, team sites and positions. For the latter, fatality numbers reflect both UN peacekeepers defending perimeters as well as peacekeepers who died in the camp during such attacks. The primary causes for military fatalities remain small arms fire, a combination of improvised explosive devices (IED) and vehicle born improvised explosive devices (VBIED), indirect fire (e.g., mortars and rockets) and land mines.

Lessons learned from these incidents demand improvements in first-line tactical medical capacity and ground-air communications with CASEVAC teams. UN Inf Bns conducting extended operations over long distances should take these factors into account for risk mitigation.

Chapter Conclusion

UN Inf Bn sustainment is a shared responsibility between the TCC and the Mission. TCCs are obliged to maintain their equipment and personnel in a high state of readiness; whereas the Mission is charged with providing the supplies and services consumed by deployed units. UN Inf Bn Commanders and Logistics Officers should possess a thorough understanding of the Mission's support concept and how the services and supplies are coordinated.

Establishing productive relationships with other Mission stakeholders is essential for synchronizing sustainment delivery for tactical operations. A Battalion logistics officer's success largely hinges on knowledge of the unit and its operations with an ability to plan, forecast and coordinate resupply and services to support units in the field.

CHAPTER 5



TRAINING

Introduction

Most military casualties in UN Field Missions result from inadequate training and failure to observe established standards. TCCs, Commanders and supervisors have an obligation to ensure their personnel and units are properly trained before and during deployment.

This chapter is intended to assist Infantry commanders and planners in their efforts to prepare contingent personnel for UN peacekeeping operations (PKO). It is a national responsibility to ensure that troops are adequately trained in individual and collective military skills before and during deployment in UN PKOs. Central to a TCC's responsibilities in this regard is ensuring that personnel are not simply trained in those skills required of a regular Inf Bn; it is assumed that TCCs will train their Inf Bns in regular tasks. However, TCCs must train their personnel to operate as a UN Inf Bn in the specific UN operating environment to which they will deploy and to UN standards. This means that TCCs must re-orientate the operational capabilities of an Inf Bn, within the parameters set by the UN, so that it can operate in a peacekeeping environment.

The UNHQ is always available to offer TCCs assistance and guidance on relevant training requirements and policy documents. This chapter should be read in conjunction with the UN DPO Operational Readiness Assurance policy. Training should be focused on preparing their Inf Bns to complete the tasks outlined in Chapter Two of this manual and, when a TCC has been asked to contribute personnel for a specific mission, on the tasks outlined in the SUR and in the mission mandate.

5.1. Performance Improvement Cycle

The UN policy: Operational Readiness Assurance (ORA) and guidelines provide directions for strengthening the operational readiness of military units deployed in UN peacekeeping operations.

The ORA performance improvement cycle is divided into four distinct phases: Shaping, Preparation, Delivery and Learning.

5.1.1. Shaping Phase

This is the phase begins well before a military unit is designated for UN peacekeeping operations. Shaping is conducted by TCCs and involves in-depth training and preparation of a unit in the conventional military role. This phase includes basic individual and collective military skills training to ensure that a unit can perform as a UN Inf Bn. This foundational training must ensure that the Inf Bn is prepared to operate in all kinds of conventional operations including, but not limited to, defence, attack, and operations in an asymmetric environment. Peacekeeping competencies are then added to prepare this unit for deployment on UN peacekeeping operations.

5.1.1.1. Personnel

The preparation of personnel (officers, non-commissioned officer, and troops) implies preparing the mindset, knowledge, physical capability and skills of troops deploying to UN peacekeeping missions. Four processes are critical for the preparation of personnel:

- **Train and Sustain.** TCCs are required to train and sustain unit proficiency. UN-specific capabilities are then overlaid on these national capabilities to ensure that the unit can operate in a UN peacekeeping environment.

- **Educate and Train on UN Doctrine.** TCCs need to prepare their personnel for UN deployment by instilling the proper peacekeeping mindset and understanding. The UNHQ will support TCCs by providing reference documents and guidance for individual and unit training and education on relevant peacekeeping topics.
- **Career Management.** Unit commanders assigned to UN peacekeeping operations need to be career-managed to ensure that they can fulfill the demands placed upon them. They should be equipped with the necessary military and peacekeeping skills, knowledge and experience to match their rank.
- **Guidance, Policy and Doctrine.** The UN has many doctrinal documents on a range of issues, including Sexual Exploitation Awareness (SEA), Gender, Human Rights, and the Protection of Civilians (POC). Inf Bns must train to operate within these parameters. National Infantry units must re-orientate their military skills and capabilities in accordance with these training guidelines. UN Inf Bns may have their training and equipment validated during Pre-Deployment Visits (PDVs) and will be evaluated by Sector or Force Commanders during deployment.

5.1.2. Preparation Phase

Pre-deployment training usually takes place 3-6 months before deployment to a UN mission. In this phase, peacekeeping competencies are added to the basic skills which were established during the 'Shaping' phase. Training on basic military skills should also continue to maintain and improve basic individual and collective capabilities.

During the preparation phase, TCCs must augment conventional Inf Bn skills with specialized UN-specific military skills. It is a TCC responsibility to train its Inf Bns to execute all its mandated tasks, in addition to *all* tasks outlined in this manual. Training during this phase should reflect the operational requirements of the mission, and the unique operating environment to which the Inf Bn will deploy.

5.1.2.1. Personnel and Equipment

Units scheduled for deployment must be fit for UN purpose. If not already completed, personnel screening procedures and unit certification will also take place during this phase.

TCCs will ensure that equipment is ready as per the SUR and COE manual, and that all personnel are trained in equipment use. This is best achieved by ensuring that all personnel and units are equipped during training with the equipment that will be used on deployment.

5.1.2.3. Doctrine and Policy

The deploying Inf Bn must have access to current standards and doctrine for the specific peacekeeping mission. To ensure optimal preparation, new UN Inf Bns can coordinate through their governments should request the mission and function-specific documents from the Force and from UNHQ, as outlined in the DPO Operational Readiness Assurance policy. Rotating units will already have access to this information. This will improve and inform *mission-specific* training. TCCs should structure training around the reference documentation, particularly for force protection, POC, and human rights training. Much of the required UN doctrine can be accessed through the UN website at:

<https://research.un.org/en/peacekeeping-community>
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/policy-and-guidance>

5.1.2.4. Certification

TCCs are required to formally evaluate and certify the readiness of their Inf Bns prior to deployment and through each rotation. The TCC certifies that its personnel and units are operationally ready to deploy and implement all mandated tasks. Evaluation and Certification must take place at least 6 weeks prior to deployment to allow enough time for any shortfalls to be remedied.

The UN Inf BN will further be evaluated once the unit is deployed. Guidance on unit evaluation will be found in Chapter Six of this manual.

5.1.3. Delivery Phase

This phase of the Performance Improvement Cycle relates to the delivery of mandated tasks while assigned to the Mission. Force Commanders have primary responsibility for operational delivery. After arriving in the Mission area, personnel and units receive Mission-specific in-Mission training based on programs developed by FHQ and delivered by the In-Mission Training Center (IMTC).

5.1.4. Learning Phase

This phase of the Performance Improvement Cycle relates to the learning process. Lessons learned must be identified and recorded by the UN Inf Bn. Lessons learned should cover all domains related to personnel, organization, training, equipment, doctrine and policy. The purpose is to enhance future training of following rotations, and to assist other TCCs.

5.2. Characteristics of Peacekeeping Training

There are fundamental training requirements that should be observed when preparing to deploy to a peacekeeping mission:

- Training should be conducted progressively. For example, to achieve overall UN Inf Bn skills, training should commence with individual skills, before moving on to the more complex collective tasks the unit will need to act as a UN Inf Bn. The framework collective skills are outlined in Chapter Two of this manual, and a comprehensive list of individual and collective military skills can be sought from UNHQ.
- Collective training should be focused on the tasks contained in this manual, complemented by UN and Mission-specific tasks. Such tasks will be drawn from the SUR and from the mission mandate.
- Training should be realistic and practical exercises must be central to training efforts. Every effort must be made to replicate in-Mission conditions and situations that the unit might face. For example, if it is identified that there is an IED threat, then counter--ED training should be prioritized. Similarly, if there is a threat to civilians or if there is a POC mandate then POC training should be to the fore. Guidance on such training can be drawn from both UNHQ and from the Mission.
- Training should be scenario-based. This will allow the TCC to recreate conditions on the ground which the UN Inf Bn is likely to face.
- TCCs should train for the full spectrum of tasks required by the mission mandate, including non-conventional tasks that may be unfamiliar to their personnel. These training tasks should include POC challenges, Human Rights violations, situations involving CRSV, and convoy escorts. The mission should be contacted for advice on the development of appropriate exercise scenarios.
- All training should exercise troops in mission ROEs. This should involve training scenarios that test the troops' knowledge of when it is and when it is not appropriate to use force.
- Training should ensure that forces are interoperable with other UN forces and entities once deployed. For example, training for interoperability should include language training, and the use of interpreters.
- Training should also prepare the Inf Bn for interaction with different mission elements, mission partners and other actors present in the area of operations should also be considered, including enablers such as air, riverine and maritime assets.
- TCCs are also responsible for ensuring that their personnel are aware of and understand UN policy and doctrine on a variety of issues, including but not limited to SEA, Gender, CRSV, Human Rights, and the POC. It is the responsibility of the TCC to source a comprehensive list of these documents from UNHQ.

It is appropriate for TCCs to train their personnel through a series of lectures, practical demonstrations, and scenario-based exercises.

CHAPTER 6



EVALUATION

Introduction

UN Inf Bns execute mandated tasks in highly challenging and complex environments. The operational readiness of a UN Inf Bn encompasses the merging of conventional capabilities and UN peacekeeping standards, guidelines, practices and processes. In short, it is necessary that a deploying unit transitions from operating and organizing as a regular Inf Battalion, referencing national doctrine, to operating and organizing as a UN Inf Bn, referencing this manual and other UN policy and guidelines. The planning and operational considerations outlined in Chapter Two of this manual are central to this process and should guide TCC pre-deployment training and preparation.

Reference to the specific tasks outlined in Chapter Two, and to the task, condition and standard checklist at Annex H of this manual will ensure optimal troop performance during military skill validations during PDVs and subsequent in-mission unit performance evaluations. It is important to note that these tasks and standards are designed to complement, rather than replace, existing UN policy and guidelines on evaluation.

6.1. Purpose

This chapter is designed to enhance UN Inf Bn evaluation methodology by building awareness of the conduct of military skill validations during PDVs and in-theatre evaluations. Adherence to this chapter's guidelines should ensure:

- The standardization of operational approaches, thereby enhancing UN Inf Bn interoperability;
- UN Inf Bns can execute a variety of mission-mandated operations to a common standard;
- Complex and important UN operational tasks such as the POC are fully aligned with UN policy;

It is important to note that this chapter aligns with the UN ORA policy and Operational Readiness Preparation Guidelines, which outline a framework, including timelines for the evaluation and self-certification of Infantry units provided by TCCs in accordance with SURs, the COE Manual, and other UN Military Unit Manuals (UNMIM).

6.2. Types of Evaluation

The UN has three different phases of evaluation.

6.2.1. Operational Readiness Assurance. As outlined in the UN ORA policy, TCCs are requested to formally evaluate their own military contributions, including through successive rotations, and are encouraged to certify that personnel and units are operationally ready 'in all respects' to deploy and implement mandated tasks. The evaluation can, in some cases, be supported by a team from UNHQ, comprising of representatives from DPO (OMA and ITS) DOS, and representation from Force Headquarters, normally during the PDV and other visits.

TCC ORA is designed to ensure that deploying units can perform as a UN Inf Bn. Unless there is a PDV, during which a UNHQ team will validate TCC pre-deployment preparation, deploying units will be evaluated by the TCC until they are deployed in-theater. Thereafter, in-theater military unit performance evaluations will be based on the checklists attached at Annex H.

It is in the interests of TCCs to ensure that the *training* of their UN Inf Bn is based on the operational guidance contained in Chapter Two of this manual, and that their *evaluation process* adheres to the check list in Annex H. Failure to prepare in this manner may result in less than positive in-theater evaluations.

TCCs should evaluate their units/personnel for certification at least six weeks prior to deployment to allow time for any shortfalls to be remedied. TCC certification covers operational preparation, conduct and discipline, and all other standards outlined in relevant UN policy and guidelines.

6.2.2. Pre-Deployment Visits. DPO-organized PDVs offer independent readiness validation prior to a contingent's deployment to the Mission area. Pre-deployment assessment by the TCC and DPO will include validation of the contingent's ability to:

- Ensure the timely assembly, grouping, and equipping of the UN Inf Bn in accordance with the SUR and MOU;
- Conduct Mission-specific, task-oriented, individual and collective training evaluations/validations based on the checklists outlined in Annex H;
- Identify and report on shortcomings, thereby facilitating timely corrective action.

It is worth noting that on completion of a PDV a full report will be prepared for the attention of USG DPO. This report will list any and all shortcomings together with a list of suggested corrective actions. All identified corrective actions are recorded and will be used to inform subsequent evaluations. The PDV report may influence strategic-level decisions on whether a TCC should continue to provide the UN Inf Bn for deployment to a UN mission. Positive validations are more likely if TCCs train to the standards outlined in Annex H.

6.2.3. Unit Performance Evaluation. Formal evaluations of each UN Inf Bn will be conducted in the mission area. These evaluations will encompass some of the tasks laid out in this manual, depending on the SUR. The evaluations will be conducted on the order of the Force Commander and will be carried out by the Force Commander's evaluation team, which will also use the TCS as outlined in Annex H.

The military unit performance evaluation report may inform Force or UNHQ-level decision making as to the future participation of a TCC in UN missions.

6.2.4. The Evaluation Process

TCCs are responsible for their own ORA process and should follow the ORA policy and the ORP guidelines. However, to help prepare for in-theater evaluation, or for PDVs, TCCs should consider the following:

- Conducting their ORA exercise at least 6 weeks prior to deployment, thereby facilitating required corrective action;
- Deploying units should have access to all COE that they will require to be operationally effective in the mission area;
- Deploying units should have access to an appropriate training area. This should be large enough to exercise the entire unit;
- Exercises should be designed to reflect the unique challenges of mission operating environment;
- TCCs should add UN skills to their own doctrine by ensuring training aligns to Chapter Two of this manual;
- TCCs must ensure that self-evaluation aligns with the sub-task check list attached at Annex H. It is important to remember that these are the checklists that UNHQ and mission personnel will use to evaluate deploying personnel during PDVs and in-theater military unit performance evaluations.
- TCCs should only design and evaluate the ability of the unit to react to mission specific scenarios/incidents. There should be a focus on standard battle drills such as reaction to ambush, contact, IEDs, UXOs, and CASEVAC.

6.2.5. Preparation for Evaluation

The evaluation of units during PDVs and in-theater evaluation will proceed as follows:

- An appropriate, mission-specific scenario will be chosen for the evaluation exercise. During PDVs this will be the responsibility of the TCC, and during deployment this will generally be the responsibility of the FHQ evaluation team. However, in mission evaluations, particularly those in high-tempo environments can also involve observing troops during routine operations;
- A series of tasks, outlined in Annex H, will be chosen for completion. These tasks are designed to evaluate and validate the unit's ability to conduct operations to a UN standard. Tasks will be both individual and collective;
- During PDVs, *all* individual and a *selection* of collective tasks will be evaluated. The selection of collective tasks will be informed by the contents of the SUR and the mission operating environment. In-theater, not less than two individual and five collective tasks will be evaluated;
- All evaluations will involve UN personnel using the checklist attached at Annex H. To achieve a positive standard (satisfactory or excellent), units will have to complete all compulsory (highlighted in bold) sub-tasks, and a specified number of other sub-tasks;
- Units failing to achieve a positive standard will receive a grade of unsatisfactory or will be informed that additional training is required.

6.3. Changes to the Tasks, Conditions, and Standards

The TCS outlined in Annex H to this manual are likely to change in line with changes to mission mandates and to operating environments. Changes will be managed as follows:

- Significant changes to Chapter Two will result in a new manual being issued;
- Changes to Annex H will result in the issue of a new Annex which will be appended to this manual;
- Changes to TCS for PDVs or for in-theater military unit performance evaluation will be issued directly to the TCC being evaluated.

1. TABLE OF PERSONNEL OF GENERIC LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION

SERIAL	NOMENCLATURE	BHQ	SUPPORT COMPANY	MECHANIZED COMPANY TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL	REMARKS
1	Officers	19	12	21	52	
2	Warrant Officers	08	11	3	22	
3	NCOs	27	59	117	203	
4	Privates	06	56	279	341	
5	Grand Total	60	138	420 (140 x 3)	618	

2. TABLE OF PERSONNEL OF GENERIC MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION

SERIAL	NOMENCLATURE	BHQ	SUPPORT COMPANY	MECHANIZED COMPANY TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL	REMARKS
1	Officers	20	12	32	64	
2	Warrant Officers	10	14	12	36	
3	NCOs	30	70	196	296	
4	Privates	10	66	400	476	
5	Grand Total	70	162	640	872	

3. TABLE OF PERSONNEL OF GENERIC MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION

SERIAL	NOMENCLATURE	BHQ	SUPPORT COMPANY	MECHANIZED COMPANY TOTAL	GRAND TOTAL	REMARKS
1	Officers	20	12	32	64	
2	Warrant Officers	10	14	12	36	
3	NCOs	30	70	196	296	
4	Privates	10	66	400	476	
5	Grand Total	70	162	640 (160 x 4)	872	

UN Inf Bn GENERIC PERSONNEL TABLE

Annex A
(Refers to Chapter 1,
Section 1.10.1)

1. TABLE OF EQUIPMENT OF GENERIC LIGHT INFANTRY BATTALION

Item	BH Q	Coy 1	Coy 2	Coy 3	Support coy	Total	Remarks
Combat Vehicle – Armoured Personnel Carrier (wheeled)							
Command post	1	1	1	1	0	4	
Ambulance rescue	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Recovery	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Reconnaissance vehicles							
Wheeled	-	-	-	-	5	5	For Recce Platoon
Support vehicles (military pattern)							
Ambulance	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Jeep (4x4) with military radio	5	6	6	6	6	29	
Truck, crane (up to 10 tons)	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Truck, maintenance medium	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, recovery (up to 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, recovery (more than 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Truck, refrigerator (up to 20 e feet)	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, tanker (up to 5,000 l)	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, utility/cargo (up to 1.5 tons)	3	9	9	9	3	33	
Truck, utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 tons)	2	3	3	3	6	17	
Truck, utility/cargo (more than 5 tons and up to 10 tons)	2	5	5	5	6	23	
Truck, water (up to 5,000 l)	-	1	1	1	1	4	
Truck, water (more than 5,000 and up to 10,000 l)	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck Pallet Loading	-	-	-	-	2	2	

UN Inf Bn GENERIC EQUIPMENT TABLE

Annex B
Table 1
(Refers to Chapter 1,
Section 1.10.1)

Item	BH Q	Coy 1	Coy 2	Coy 3	Support coy	Total	Remarks
Trailers							
Light cargo single axle	2	2	2	2	2	10	
Medium cargo multi-axle	1	1	1	1	1	5	
Fuel trailer (up to 5,000 ltrs)	1	1	1	1	1	5	
Water trailer (up to 5,000 ltrs)	2	2	2	2	2	10	
Flatbed (up to 20 tons)	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Engineering vehicles							
Industrial Tractor Light.)	-	-	-	-	-	1	It should have a loader and backhoe. JCB type
Truck sewage	-	-	-	-	-	2	
Engineering equipment							
Water treatment plant (ROWPU or equivalent), equipment, tanks and bladders, up to 2,000 ltrs per hour, storage up to 5,000 ltrs	-	-	-	-	-	3	Sufficient spare parts and consumable chemicals should be provisioned for water treatment for two bases
Force protection surveillance equipment							
Day and night cameras (set of 5)	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Inside base surveillance dome camera (360° + thermal view)	-	-	-	-	-	3	
Ground surveillance radar	-	-	-	-	-	3	1 per each TOB and HQ
Logistics equipment							
Fuel storage, 5,001-10,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	4	1 per each TOB and HQ
Water storage, 5,000-7,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	-	Capacity to store 84.5 liters per person for 7 days.

Item	BH Q	Coy 1	Coy 2	Coy 3	Support coy	Total	Remarks
Water storage, 7,001-10,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	-	Capacity to store 84.5 liters per person for 7 days.
Material Handling Equipment							
Forklift, rough terrain (more than 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Forklift, rough terrain (up to 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	1	
Armaments							
Anti-tank grenade launcher (40 mm)	-	3	3	3		9	
Crew-served machine guns (up to 10 mm)	-	9	9	9	3	30	
Crew-served machine guns (above 10 mm)	-	1	1	1		3	
Sniper rifle (sniper weapons system kit) (up to 10mm)	-	1	1	1	1	4	
Mortars (61-82 mm)	-	-	-	-	-	6	In mortar platoon
Mortars 60 mm	-	3	3	3		9	
Unmanned aerial systems							
Miniature UAS (up to 2 kg and 200 feet)	-	1	1	1		3	One complete system, one ground control stations and spare parts
C-UAS System	-	-	-	-	-	-	As required
Observation and Positioning Equipment							
Binoculars	5	22	22	22	12	83	
Night vision Devices	2	22	22	22	10	78	
Night vision Devices	1	1	1	1	1	5	Tripod mounted
GPS	3	16	16	16	3	54	
GPS vehicle mounted	6	7	7	7	15	42	1 per each combat vehicle, recce vehicle and ambulance
Communication Equipment							

Item	BH Q	Coy 1	Coy 2	Coy 3	Support coy	Total	Remarks
VHF Radios	8	20	20	20	22	90	
HF Radios	6	5	5	5	8	29	
Ground-air base station transceivers AM/FM	1	1	1	1	1	5	
Helicopter Landing Site Kits	0	1	1	1	1	4	
EOD Equipment							
Mobile electronic countermeasure (jammer) against remotely activated improvised explosive devices	-	2	2	2	-	8	
Metal Detector	-	1	1	1	-	3	
Electrical - Generators stationary and mobile							
Capacity to produce 2.5 KVA per head plus 100% back up.	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Riot control equipment							
Full kit set (with gas mask) (set of 10)	-	3	3	3	-	9	
Teargas launcher (set of 4)	-	1	1	1	-	3	
Loudspeakers (set of 3)	-	1	1	1	-	3	
Signal pistol (set of 3)	-	1	1	1	-	3	
Handheld searchlights (set of 6)	-	1	1	1	-	3	
Handheld metal detectors (set of 6)	-	1	1	1	-	3	
Taser (advanced pistol) (set of 1)	-	1	1	1	-	3	
Search lights with generators	-	1	1	1	-	3	
Public address system (set)	-	1	1	1	-	3	

2. TABLE OF EQUIPMENT OF GENERIC MOTORIZED INFANTRY BATTALION

Item	BHQ	Coy 1	Coy 2	Coy 3	Coy 4	Support coy	Total	Remarks
Combat Vehicle – Armoured Personnel Carrier (wheeled)								
Command post	1	1	1	1	1	0	5	
Ambulance rescue	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Recovery	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Reconnaissance vehicles								
Wheeled	-	-	-	-	-	6	6	For Recce Platoon
Support vehicles (military pattern)								
Ambulance	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Jeep (4x4) with military radio	5	6	6	6	6	6	35	Including for EP
Truck, crane (up to 10 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Truck, maintenance medium	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, recovery (up to 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, recovery (more than 5 tons)	-	1	1	1	1	1	5	
Truck, refrigerator (up to 20 e feet)	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	
Truck, tanker (up to 5,000 l)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 tons)	2	4	4	4	4	6	24	
Truck, utility/cargo (more than 5 tons and up to 10 tons)	2	5	5	5	5	8	30	
Truck, water (up to 5,000 l)	-	1	1	1	1	1	5	
Truck, water (more than 5,000 and up to 10,000 l)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck Pallet Loading	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	Must have the integral self-loading and unloading capability
Trailers								
Light cargo single axle	2	2	2	2	2	2	12	
Medium cargo multi-axle	2	2	2	2	2	2	12	
Fuel trailer (up to 5,000 ltrs)	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	

Item	BHQ	Coy 1	Coy 2	Coy 3	Coy 4	Support coy	Total	Remarks
Water trailer (up to 5,000 ltrs)	2	2	2	2	2	2	12	
Flatbed (up to 20 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Engineering vehicles								
Industrial Tractor Light.)	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	It should have a loader and backhoe. JCB type
Truck sewage	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	
Engineering equipment								
Water treatment plant (ROWPU or equivalent), equipment, tanks and bladders, up to 2,000 ltrs per hour, storage up to 5,000 ltrs	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	Sufficient spare parts and consumable chemicals should be provisioned for water treatment for two bases
Force protection surveillance equipment								
Day and night cameras (set of 5)	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	To integrate with Base Defense Operations Center's CCTV network. 1 per each TOB and HQ
Inside base surveillance dome camera (360° + thermal view)	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	To integrate with Base Defense Operations Center's CCTV network. 1 per each TOB and HQ
Ground surveillance radar	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	1 per each TOB and HQ
Logistics equipment								
Fuel storage, 5,001-10,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	1 per each TOB and HQ
Water storage, 5,000-7,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Capacity to store 84.5 liters per person for 7 days.
Water storage, 7,001-10,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Capacity to store 84.5 liters per person for 7 days.
Material Handling Equipment								
Forklift, rough terrain (more than 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Forklift, rough terrain (up to 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	

Item	BHQ	Coy 1	Coy 2	Coy 3	Coy 4	Support coy	Total	Remarks
Armaments								
Anti-tank grenade launcher (40 mm)	-	3	3	3	3	-	12	
Crew-served machine guns (up to 10 mm)	-	9	9	9	9	3	39	
Crew-served machine guns (above 10 mm)	-	2	2	2	2	-	8	
Sniper rifle (sniper weapons system kit) (up to 10mm)	-	2	2	2	2	1	9	
Mortars (61-82 mm)	-					6	6	In mortar platoon
Mortars 60 mm	-	3	3	3	3	-	12	
Unmanned aerial systems								
Miniature UAS (up to 2 kg and 200 feet)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	One complete system, one ground control stations and spare parts
C-UAS System	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	As required
Observation and Positioning Equipment								
Binoculars	5	22	22	22	22	12	105	
Night vision Devices	2	22	22	22	22	10	100	
Night vision Devices	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	Tripod mounted
GPS	3	16	16	16	16	3	70	
GPS vehicle mounted	6	8	8	8	8	16	54	1 per each combat vehicle, recce vehicle and ambulance
Communication Equipment								
VHF Radios	8	20	20	20	20	22	110	
HF Radios	6	6	6	6	6	8	38	
Ground-air base station transceivers AM/FM	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	
Helicopter Landing Site Kits	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	
EOD Equipment								

Item	BHQ	Coy 1	Coy 2	Coy 3	Coy 4	Support coy	Total	Remarks
Mobile electronic countermeasure (jammer) against remotely activated improvised explosive devices	-	2	2	2	2	-	8	
Metal Detector	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Electrical - Generators stationary and mobile								
Capacity to produce 2.5 KVA per head plus 100% back up.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Riot control equipment								
Full kit set (with gas mask) (set of 10)	-	3	3	3	3	-	12	
Teargas launcher (set of 4)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Loudspeakers (set of 3)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Signal pistol (set of 3)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Handheld searchlights (set of 6)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Handheld metal detectors (set of 6)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Taser (advanced pistol) (set of 1)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Search lights with generators	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Public address system (set)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	

3. TABLE OF EQUIPMENT OF GENERIC MECHANIZED INFANTRY BATTALION

Item	Unit						Total Amount	Remarks
	BHQ	Mechanized Coy 1	Mechanized Coy 2	Mechanized Coy 3	Mechanized Coy 4 (tracked)	Support coy		
Combat Vehicle – Armoured Personnel Carrier (wheeled)								
Infantry carrier — armed	-	12	12	12	12*	3	51	<u>All APCs should be mine protected type</u> ; at least minimum one mechanized company (14 APCs including a command post and ambulance) must be with mine protected APCs; 12 APCs per Mechanized Coy and 3 for Support Coy; * Tracked
Command post	2	1	1	1	1*	-	6	1 per Battalion HQ and Mech Company, mine protected as above. * Tracked
Ambulance rescue		1	1	1	1*	1	5	all mine protected. * Tracked
Recovery	-	1	1	1	1*	1	5	1 per base, TBD during MoU, mine protected as above
Reconnaissance vehicles								
Wheeled	-	-	-	-	-	4-6	4 to 6	For Recce Platoon
Support vehicles (military pattern)								
Ambulance	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Jeep (4x4) with military radio	5	1	1	1	1	6	15	Including for EP
Truck, crane (up to 10 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Truck, maintenance medium	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	
Truck, recovery (up to 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	

Item	Unit						Total Amount	Remarks
	BHQ	Mechanized Coy 1	Mechanized Coy 2	Mechanized Coy 3	Mechanized Coy 4 (tracked)	Support Coy		
Truck, recovery (more than 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, refrigerator (up to 20 e feet)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, tanker (up to 5,000 l)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck, tractor (up to 40 tons tow)	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	
Truck, utility/cargo (2.5 to 5 tons)	2	2	2	2	2	6	16	
Truck, utility/cargo (more than 5 tons and up to 10 tons)	1	1	1	1	1	5	10	
Truck, water (up to 5,000 l)	-	1	1	1	1	1	5	
Truck, water (more than 5,000 and up to 10,000 l)	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Truck Pallet Loading	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	Must have the integral self-loading and unloading capability
Trailers								
Light cargo single axle	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Medium cargo multi-axle	-	-	-	-	-	2	2	
Lowbed (20–40tons)	-	-	-	-	-	4		
Engineering vehicles								
Industrial Tractor Light.)	-	-	-	-	-	3	1	It should have a loader and backhoe. JCB type
Truck sewage	-	-	-	-	-	3	3	
Engineering equipment								
Water treatment plant (ROWPU or equivalent), equipment, tanks and	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	Sufficient spare parts and consumable chemicals should be provisioned for water treatment for two bases

Item	Unit						Total Amount	Remarks
	BHQ	Mechanized Coy 1	Mechanized Coy 2	Mechanized Coy 3	Mechanized Coy 4 (tracked)	Support coy		
bladders, up to 2,000 ltrs per hour, storage up to 5,000 ltrs								
Force protection surveillance equipment								
Day and night cameras (set of 5)	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	To integrate with Base Defense Operations Center's CCTV network. 1 per each TOB and HQ
Inside base surveillance dome camera (360° + thermal view)	-	-	-	-	-	5	5	To integrate with Base Defense Operations Center's CCTV network. 1 per each TOB and HQ
Ground surveillance radar	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	1 per each TOB and HQ
Logistics equipment								
Fuel storage, 5,001-10,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	4	4	1 per each TOB and HQ
Water storage, 5,000-7,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Capacity to store 84.5 liters per person for 7 days.
Water storage, 7,001-10,000 liters	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	Capacity to store 84.5 liters per person for 7 days.
Material Handling Equipment								
Forklift, rough terrain (more than 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Forklift, rough terrain (up to 5 tons)	-	-	-	-	-	1	1	
Armaments								
Anti-tank grenade launcher (40 mm)	-	3	3	3	3	-	12	2 per mechanized/motorized/recce platoon
Crew-served machine guns (up to 10 mm)	-	9	9	9	9	3	39	3 per mechanized/motorized/recce platoon
Crew-served machine guns (above 10 mm)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	Command post and all infantry carrier APCs will be fitted with a heavy

Item	Unit						Total Amount	Remarks
	BHQ	Mechanized Coy 1	Mechanized Coy 2	Mechanized Coy 3	Mechanized Coy 4 (tracked)	Support Coy		
								machine gun. Additional 2 per support and recce platoon
Sniper rifle (sniper weapons system kit) (up to 10mm)	-	1	1	1	1	1	5	
Mortars (61-82 mm)	-	-	-	-	-	-	6	In mortar platoon
Unmanned aerial systems								
Miniature UAS (up to 2 kg and 200 feet)	-	1	1	1	1		4	One complete system, one ground control stations and spare parts
C-UAS System	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	As required
Observation and Positioning Equipment								
Binoculars	5	22	22	22	22	12	105	
Night vision Devices	2	22	22	22	22	10	100	
Night vision Devices	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	Tripod mounted
GPS	3	16	16	16	16	3	70	
GPS vehicle mounted	7	15	15	15	15	14	81	1 per each combat vehicle, recce vehicle and ambulance
Communication Equipment								
VHF Radios	8	20	20	20	20	22	110	VHF Radios
HF Radios	6	5	5	5	5	8	34	HF Radios
Ground-air base station transceivers AM/FM	1	1	1	1	1	1	6	Ground-air base station transceivers AM/FM
Helicopter Landing Site Kits	0	1	1	1	1	1	5	
EOD Equipment								

Item	Unit						Total Amount	Remarks
	BHQ	Mechanized Coy 1	Mechanized Coy 2	Mechanized Coy 3	Mechanized Coy 4 (tracked)	Support Coy		
Mobile electronic countermeasure (jammer) against remotely activated improvised explosive devices	-	2	2	2	2	-	8	
Metal Detector	-	2	2	2	2	4	12	
Electrical - Generators stationary and mobile								
Capacity to produce 2.5 KVA per head plus 100% back up.	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
Riot control equipment								
Full kit set (with gas mask) (set of 10)	-	3	3	3	3	-	12	
Teargas launcher (set of 4)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Loudspeakers (set of 3)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Signal pistol (set of 3)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Handheld searchlights (set of 6)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Handheld metal detectors (set of 6)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Taser (advanced pistol) (set of 1)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Search lights with generators	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	
Public address system (set)	-	1	1	1	1	-	4	

FORCE PROTECTION (FP)

General Description. FP includes the measures necessary to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities equipment, material, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational efficacy, thereby contributing to the mission success. FP incorporates physical security measures to assure the protection of a base or a convoy, and other measures taken to protect personnel and facilities from hazards such as disease, fire, and other environmental issues.

FP measures need to balance the requirement to execute operations in high threat environments, while recognizing the need to keep UN Inf Bn personnel safe from harm. While the UN Inf Bn staff should always seek to maximize FP, risk is an inherent part of military operations. At times, the UN Inf Bn will have to accept that not all risk can be mitigated, and not all threats can be protected against. Being a deployed UN Inf Bn in UN PKO means identifying, mitigating and, where appropriate or necessary, accepting risk.

Providing FP for a UN Inf Bn is straight forward. Fundamentally it requires the MPKI section, working together with UN Inf Bn staff and support sections to identify the full range of threats to the UN Inf Bn across the full range of operational activities. These threats are then planned for through the imposition of mitigation measures and contingency plans. For example, an IED threat can be mitigated through the employment of UAS before a convoy drives down a route to conduct an operation, through information acquisition and intelligence production, by deploying C-IED personnel, and by using Mine Resistance Vehicles (MRVs). Such a FP approach requires work during the pre-deployment phase, where the TCC must provide its troops with the appropriate FP assets; during deployment, where threats must be identified and planned for/mitigated; and post-deployment, where lessons must be identified, learned and incorporated into future national planning processes.

Planning Considerations at the National Level.

- Ensure the UN Inf Bn is manned and equipped in line with the SUR. This must include providing the UN Inf Bn with protected mobility appropriate to the mission area.
- Liaison with the mission through UNHQ so that emerging trends and threats are identified.
- Develop policy, procedures and TTPs to address emerging and already extant trends and threats.
- Deliver national training on risk mitigation and FP, in line with UN policy and guidance.
- Ensuring that all UN Inf Bn personnel are trained in line with best practice.
- Adhering to the training and evaluation standards outlined in this manual.
- Ensuring that the UN Inf Bn has the eight core capabilities outlined in this manual.

Planning Considerations at the Tactical Level.

- The MPKI Section should be consulted to ascertain intelligence products on all relevant threats, and the likelihood of the threat.
- The Engineering Section should be consulted to ascertain what improvements need to be made to the FP of Operating Bases to defend against threats.
- Incorporate C-IED personnel in planning operations, as required.
- OPs, and patrols, including indirect and direct fire support, personnel and equipment.
- The UN Inf Bn commander must prioritize resources to ensure that the threats that have the highest impact are mitigated first. All high impact threats must be planned for.
- Use of technology, such as UAS and radio jammers (electronic counter measures) on all operations (see Annex E).
- All considerations in Chapter Two of this manual pertaining to the defence of an Operating Base and the conduct of all other operations. **The ultimate responsibility for keeping the perimeter in good repair and free of vegetation falls to the UN Inf Bn Commander.**

In addition to mission force protection, a UN Inf Bn may be tasked to provide protection to civilian facilities and/or local infrastructure. In such cases, normal area or point security operations should suffice. Such infrastructure and assets to be protected include but are not limited to the following:

- UN System entities outside the mission, other International Organizations, Regional Organizations, NGOs working for the protection and benefit of the local population.
- Local Government HQ, civilian agencies, hospitals, power generation facilities, water works, communication centers, logistics dump, river/seaports, air fields and bases and other sensitive offices/installations which have a direct bearing in essential services and good governance.
- Judicial institutions, police institutions, and correction institutions, which have a central role in restoring and maintaining the rule of law.
- Religious sites, structures of cultural/historic value, hospitals and schools or areas that provide daily subsistence and livelihood to the local people and protect vulnerable key leaders.
- Protect critical roads, bridges and defiles to maintain freedom of movement in a chosen area.

HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE OPERATIONS

TECHNICAL CONSIDERATIONS

These pertain to the technical aspect of the operation of a day or night helicopter-landing zone (HLZ). These are the responsibility of the site leader. The minimum landing space requirements and minimum distance between helicopters on the ground depend on many factors. If the aviation unit SOP fails to spell out these requirements, the aviation unit commander works with the site leader. The final decision about minimum landing requirements rests with the aviation unit commander. In selecting helicopter-landing sites from maps, aerial photographs, and actual ground or aerial reconnaissance, the site leader considers the following factors (Figure XX).

NUMBER AND TYPE(S) OF HELICOPTERS

To land many helicopters at the same time, the commander can provide another landing site(s) nearby or he can have the helicopters land at the same site, but in successive lifts. A larger site might also be required for cargo aircraft with external loads as compared to several utility aircraft. The required size of the site is determined by the size and number of aircraft that will be required to land at a given time. A landing point, or touchdown point (TDP), is the specific point on the ground for a specific aircraft. The size of the landing point is determined by the aviation unit commander and is based on—

- Pilot or unit proficiency.
- Size and type of aircraft.
- Atmospheric conditions.
- Visibility (day/night).
- Type of mission (insertion, extraction, resupply, sling-load drop-off, forward area arming and refuel point [FAARP], and so forth).




Figure 12. Landing point sizes

Standard landing point uses, sizes and types of aircraft are listed in Table aa.

In a landing site, site leaders measure the minimum distances between landing points, from center to center. When aircraft sizes vary, site leaders separate landing points by the most generous measure, allowing 100 meters for size 5; 125 meters for size 6; 150 meters for size 7, measured center to center on the landing points.

The aviation unit commander, during coordination, might have authorized site leaders to reduce the TDP by one size. Reducing TDP is a last-resort means to make an HLZ suitable to accomplish the mission. TDP sizes are reduced in a deliberate manner after careful consideration of all factors. If mixed aircraft types will use the TDP, the size should be reduced for utility (lighter) aircraft before slingload aircraft.

Landing Point	Minimum Diameter of Landing Point	Type of Helicopter/Operation
Size 1	80 ft (25 m)	Light observation helicopters such as the OH-6 and OH-58D.
Size 2	125 ft (35 m)	Light utility and attack helicopters such as the UH-1H, H-65, AH-1W and AS350.
Size 3	160 ft (50 m)	Medium utility and attack helicopters such as the UH-60, H-2, AH-64, HU-15, MI-8 and MI-17.
Size 4	265 ft (80 m)	Cargo helicopters such as the CH-47, H-3 and CH-53, or with prior coordination
Size 5	328 ft (100 m)	Slingload helicopters and aircraft of an unknown origin.
Size 6	410 ft (125 m)	Slingload long-line operations.
Size 7	492 ft (1,505 m)	Slingload operations with night vision goggles (NVG).

Table 1. Landing point uses

SURFACE CONDITIONS

Site leaders choose landing sites that have firm surfaces; are free of dust, sand, and debris that might create problems when disturbed by rotor wash; and are cleared of obstacles.

Choose a Hard Surface

Site leaders choose a landing point with a hard surface to support the weight of the aircraft to prevent helicopters from becoming mired, creating excessive dust, or blowing snow. The surface of the landing point must allow a fully-loaded helicopter to land, restart, and leave again, all without sinking into the ground. If the surface does not meet these conditions, an advisory must be given, and the aircraft must either terminate at a hover or touch down while under power. If the mission is one that requires the aircraft to firmly land, such as an FAARP or unload an internal load, a new site must be selected.

Clear to Ground Level

Site leaders must clear the entire landing point of any loose material that the rotors could blow up. The term is "cleared to ground level." Unless a fire risk exists, they need not clear grass less than 0.3 meter (1 foot) high, as long as the field is level. They can cut down on dust by wetting down dry dirt. They can reduce snow to reveal hazards, and then pack it down firm, which will also reduce the amount blowing around. Rotor wash stirs up any loose dirt, sand (brownout), or snow (whiteout). This can obscure the ground and other aircraft, especially at night. If a site must be used with obscuring conditions, site leaders note these conditions and provide advisories and radio guidance as required. Site leaders also remove any debris from landing points because airborne debris could damage the rotor blades or turbine engine(s).

Clear Around Obstacles

Ground troops (typically a company or platoon) must do everything they can to improve landing point surfaces, so aircraft can land. In general, an obstacle is a stump, rock, hole, or other object, 18 inches or larger, that might damage the aircraft or impede aircraft landing. No obstacles can be in a TDP in which an aircraft is going to land. Note, however, that even if site leaders cannot clear ground obstructions, they can perform some helicopter operations without the helicopter landing. They must still clear and mark the area just as they would if the helicopter were going to land. Helicopters are given an advisory and hover above the ground obstructions that prevent them from landing.

Ground Slope

Site leaders choose landing sites with relatively level ground. For the helicopter to land safely, the slope should not exceed 7 degrees (Figure 4-3, page 4-6). Whenever possible, pilots should land upslope rather than downslope. All helicopters can land where ground slope measures 7 degrees or less and no advisory is required. When the slope exceeds 7 degrees, observation and utility helicopters that utilize skids for landing must terminate at a hover to load or off-load personnel or supplies. When the slope measures between 7 and 15 degrees, large utility and cargo helicopters that use wheels for landing are issued an advisory, and they land upslope. When the slope exceeds 15 degrees, all helicopters must be issued an advisory and terminate at a hover to load or off-load personnel or supplies.

Note: To determine slope in percentage or degrees, express all measurements in either feet or meters, but not both. If the map sheet expresses elevation in meters, multiply by three to convert into feet. If the map sheet expresses elevation in feet, divide by three to convert to meters.

CAUTION:
Never land an aircraft facing downslope, if possible.




Figure 13. Determination of ground slope.

Approach and Departure Directions

Ideally, to land or take off, especially at night, the helicopter pilot generally chooses the approach or departure path facing into the wind, over the lowest obstacle, and along the long axis of the site. The departure heading must be within 45 degrees left or right of land heading.

Prevailing Wind

Always attempt to land a helicopter facing into the wind. Wind direction within 45 degrees left or right of land heading is considered a head wind. Depending on the helicopter's capabilities, if only one direction offers a good approach, or to make the most of available landing area, the pilot might be able to land with a crosswind of 0 to 9 knots or a tailwind of 0 to 5 knots. When wind speeds exceed 9 knots, the pilot must land into the wind. The same considerations apply to departures from landing sites. Except when the crosswind velocity exceeds 9 knots during a landing, the prevailing wind requires less attention than it does on the approach and departure routes. The wind affects smaller aircraft more than larger, more powerful ones.

Approach and Departure Obstacle Ratio

For HLZs that are bordered on the approach and departure ends by tall obstacles such as trees, power lines, or steep mountains, planners figure on an obstacle ratio of 10 to 1. That is, if a helicopter must approach or depart directly over a 10-foot tall tree, then the landing point must have 100 feet of horizontal clearance. If they have coordinated with the aviation unit commander, qualified site leaders might have the authority to reduce the obstacle ratio to no less than 5 to 1. Reducing obstacle ratio is a last-resort means to make an HLZ suitable to accomplish the mission, second only to reduction of TDP size. Obstacle ratios are reduced in a deliberate manner after careful consideration of all factors, and only to the minimal reduction possible. The obstacle ratio should first be reduced over the route that the helicopters will be the lightest. For example, if the mission of the aviation unit is an insertion, they will be loaded on the approach and will require the most power to ingress and land, needing the longest glide path possible. After the unloading of troops and equipment, the aircraft will be lighter and will be able to use a shorter departure route. In this case, the site leader would reduce the obstacle ratio on the departure end and maintain a 10 to 1 or greater ratio on the approach end (Figure qq).




Figure 14. Maximum angle of approach (daylight).

Night Approach

Within the night approach and exit path, the maximum obstruction angle should not exceed 4 degrees measured from the center of the landing point to a distance of 3,000 meters (9,843 feet, Figure rr). The maximum obstacle height at 3,000 meters is 210 meters (689 feet). The field-expedient formula is that for every meter of vertical obstacle, you must have 14 meters from the center of the landing point to the obstacle. That is, a landing point must be 280 meters from a 20-meter tree if the helicopter must approach or exit directly over the tree. Another night operation planning consideration is the helicopter approach and exit path area and the maximum obstacle height within that area. These criteria apply to both the approach path to the landing point as well as the exit path from the landing point. First, we must define the area that is the approach and exit path.




Figure 15. Maximum angle of approach (night).

Approach and Exit Path

The approach and exit path is a 16-degree (277 mils) sector or arc extending outward and is measured from the center of the landing point (Figure ss). The "V"-shaped approach and exit path is shown by the dashed and dotted line in the illustration. The 4-degree maximum obstruction angle applies to the entire area within the approach and exit path (both the dark and light shaded area) measured from the landing point center to 3,000 meters.




Figure 16. Approach and exit path.

Night Operations

During night operations, as the pilot gets closer to the landing point, he needs a wider area for a safe approach than just the 16-degree sector. Therefore, the minimum width of the approach and exit path, illustrated by the darker shaded area, must be equal to or wider than the width of the landing point that must be cleared to a maximum height of 2 feet (Figure oo). The length of the minimum width area, dimension X, will vary depending on the size of the landing point (Table bb). Follow along as we use a UH-60 Blackhawk as an example to help clarify the night approach and exit path criteria. Table aa identified the UH-60 Blackhawk as a size 3 helicopter. Next, you must determine the landing point area that must be free from obstructions and grass cut to maximum height of 2 feet. Table bb shows 50 meters as the area needed for a size 3 landing point. Therefore, the minimum width of the night approach and exit path is 50 m. The minimum width distance intersects the 16-degree V-shaped arc (night approach and exit path) 180 meters from the center of the landing point. In other words, the night maximum obstruction angle applies to the complete approach and exit path; both the rectangular-shaped wedge (dark shaded area of the diagram) as well as the 16-degree "V"-shaped arc (light shaded area and dotted line).

Landing Point Size	Width of Landing Point (Meters)	Dimension X (Meters)
1	25	90
2	35	125
3	50	180
4	80	285
5	100	355
6	125	444
7	150	533

Table 2. Length of minimum width area.

Note: The aviation unit commander makes the final decision on minimum landing requirements. He bases his decision on the effects of air density, slope, and surface conditions. He explains these requirements verbally during early mission planning.

Along the Long Axis

Allows the pilot a better opportunity to identify the TDP and obstacles, select the best flight path, and prevent overflying the TDP. It also allows the site leader to maximize the space available in the site.

Density Altitude

Altitude, temperature, and humidity determine the density altitude. As each of these conditions increase, aircraft lift capabilities decrease. Planners should try to remember that as the density altitude increases, the size of the LZ also increases. This will also be a consideration for the aviation unit commander when determining the authority for Site leaders to reduce TDP size or obstacle ratio.

Loads

When fully loaded, most helicopters can neither climb nor descend vertically. They need a larger area and better approach or departure routes than when they carry lighter loads. Other load considerations are—

- Internal or external load.
- Equipment or personnel.
- Insertion or extraction mission.
- Weight.

Obstacles

These include any obstruction that might interfere with aircraft operation on the ground. Landing zones should have no tall trees, power lines, or similar obstructions on the landing site. Site leaders must remove or reduce any obstacles within the landing site. This includes any rocks, stumps, holes, and thick grass or brush that might hinder safe landing over 0.45 meters (18 inches). Obstacles that cannot be removed or reduced must be marked (preferably in red) and an advisory given to the pilots. Marking will be done as follows:

- If the obstacle is on the approach route, both the near and far sides of the obstacle will be marked.
- If the obstacle is on the departure route, only the near side of the obstacle will be marked.
- If the obstacle protrudes into the LZ, but not on the flight route, the near side of the obstacle will be marked.
- Large obstacles on the flight route and on the LZ will be marked on all sides of the obstacle. At a minimum, one light is required on each of the four sides.

Alternate Sites

Armed group action, unfavorable terrain, or changes in the tactical or logistical situation can require alternate landing sites. The ground unit commander usually selects these to support the tactical plan. He (or his representative) decides when to use them based on the recommendations of the aviation unit commander and the site leader on the site. The commander uses the fastest means to get instructions for using alternate sites to the site leaders. Neither site leader nor aviation unit commanders can shift to an alternate LZ(s) unless the supported ground unit commander has delegated that authority to them.

HIGH-TECHNOLOGY EQUIPMENT

Purpose. The UN Inf Bn SUR may include high-technology and other equipment that enhance operational efficiency of military peacekeepers in PKOs. Reimbursement rates for this new technology and/or special case equipment is determined in accordance with the COE Manual. It is possible to adjust the SUR and MOU to incorporate new technology/capabilities when a commander believes this can enhance mission accomplishment, but the process is often slow. Technology to consider includes, but is not limited to:

Helmet Cameras

- **Purpose.** To facilitate real time recording of information at the site of operations.
- **Specifications.** High-Definition, Light-Weight, Built-in Battery Pack, 5 hours and beyond recording capacity, Quick to Start, Easy to Mount.

Tactical UAV

- **Purpose.** Facilitates the real time monitoring of operations and relays critical information in support of peacekeeping operations, thereby supporting the UN Military Decision-Making Process (MDMP). Used for force protection tasks to detect the presence of armed groups or to support counter-IED efforts.
- **Specifications.** Class I Micro and Mini UAS, Vertical Take Off and Landing (VTOL), hand-held, compact, automatic flight control, direct relay of video stream to unit on the ground, light weight, day and night sensors.

Ground Surveillance Radar

- **Purpose.** To provide early-warning of threat to Operating Bases and Force Protection.
- **Specifications.** Locate and identify personnel and vehicle movements, minimum 2000 meters range, man-portable and with an alternate power source.

Electronic Tracker

- **Purpose.** To track and monitor personnel, vehicle and helicopter movements based on a digital map located in the Battalion Operations Centre.
- **Specifications.** Real-time tracking of GPS, Satellite Monitoring, Digital Map Display, Process 300 entities.

Mine Protected Vehicle (MPV)

- **Purpose.** Provide protection from mines, Unexploded Ordnance (UXO) and IEDs.
- **Specifications.** Protection from Mine/UXO/IED Blast, Ballistic Protection, High Protected Mobility, 4x4 Configurations, Turret Weapon Mountable.

Bulletproof Vehicle

- **Purpose.** For escort duties, faster protected (Ballistic) mobility, Deterrence Value, Close Support.
- **Specifications.** Ballistic Protection, Protected Mobility, 4x4 Configurations, Turret and Sideways Weapon Mountable.

Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles (MRAPV)

- **Purpose.** Provide protection from IEDs, mines and UXOs.
- **Specifications.** Protection from mines, IEDs and strong protection from small arms fire during ambushes.

Chemical and Biological Protective Equipment

- **Purpose.** Provide protection from chemical and biological infested conflict environment.
- **Specifications.** Gas Masks, Canisters, Gloves, Detection Kits, De-contamination means and Suits.

Annex F

(Refers to Chapter
3 Section 3.6)

GENDER INCLUSIVE VILLAGE ASSESSMENT

Sector:			Village:			Coordinates:		
Coy/ Platoon:			Name of Assessor:			DTG:		
Road Access in Summer	Car Y/N	4WD Y/N	Heavy Truck Y/N		Road Access in Winter	Car Y/N	4WD Y/N	Heavy Truck Y/N
Current population			Work Age Men	Work Age Women	Boys	Girls	Elderly Men	Elderly Women
		Locals						
		Returnee						
		IDPs						
Refugees								
Number of IDPs	From Sector	From Village	What is preventing their return?					
Return Constraints: transport; damaged house; house occupied; village empty; general insecurity; sexual and gender-based violence; kidnap of boys, girls, women or men; violence and killing of men, women, boys or girls; fear of other ethnic groups; access of food and basis needs; healthcare; education; water; electricity; other (please state)								
Community leaders present:			Community Liaison Assistant		Mayor		Women's Organisation	
		Name:						
		Tel:						
	Imam/Priest		Teacher		Health Worker		NGO	
Name:								
Tel:								
	Other		Other		Other		Other	
Name:								
Tel:								
Hum. Aid Storage/Dist.	Who is responsible for distribution				Local Warehouse/Storage Facility?			
	NGO	Mayor	Mosque/ Church	National Mil/Gov	Y/N	Type:	Size:	
Distribution Hub	Does this village store Humanitarian Aid for other locations?			If yes, which villages receive assistance from this village?				
	Y/N							
Electricity		Working	Yes/No/On and Off		If on and off, how many working hours per day?			
Communication		Fixed phones	Mobile phones	Radio	Television	Public Address	Printed	Posters
Yes/No								
How many homes								
How many men								
How many women								

Water & Sanitation	% of houses using	Distance	Current status		Perceived Water			
					Quality		Quantity	
			Working/Damaged		Good/Bad		Enough/Not Enough	
Wells								
Springs								
Piped								
Health	Daily consults	Working?	Number of personnel			Distance to	Drugs/ Equipment	Water/ Hygiene
			Doctor	Nurse	Medic			
Hospital								
Clinic								
Transport								
Education	School Functioning	Y/N	Distance to	Number of:				
	Equipped	Y/N		Classrooms	Teachers	Boys	Girls	
Equipment required:								
Recent incidents of Humanitarian Law Abuse:								
Types of incidents can include: CRSV, kidnap, attack on village, attack on individual in or out of village. Please provide additional details if available								
Date								
Location of incident								
Number of civilians involved								
Sex and age of each victim								
Number of aggressors involved								
Sex and age of aggressors								
Identity of aggressors								
Where are aggressors located								
Damaged houses	Total number of houses in the village		Cat 1	Cat 2	Cat 3	Cat 4	Cat 5	
Category 1: no incidental damage. Category 2: broken windows and door hinges or locks and roof tile; cut-off from water or electricity; can be repaired. Category 3: up to 30% roof damaged; light shell or bullet impact to walls; partial fire damage; can be repaired. Category 4: over 30% damage; severe fire damage; needs new floor, doors and windows destroyed; piping and wiring destroyed. Category 5: destroyed; needs reconstruction; cannot be repaired.								

GENDER TERMS

Child refers to a human being below the age of 18 years.

Conflict-Related Sexual Violence refers to rape, sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, forced abortion, enforced sterilization, forced marriage and any other form of sexual violence of comparable gravity perpetrated against women, men, girls or boys that is directly or indirectly linked (temporally, geographically or causally) to a conflict. This link with conflict may be evident in the profile of the perpetrator (often affiliated with a State or non-State armed group), the profile of the victim (who is frequently a member of a persecuted political, ethnic or religious minority), the climate of impunity (which is generally associated with State collapse), cross-border consequences (such as displacement or trafficking in persons) and/or violations of the terms of a ceasefire agreement.

Gender refers to the roles, behaviors, activities, and attributes that a given society at a given time considers appropriate for men and women. In addition to the social attributes and opportunities associated with being male and female and the relationships between women and men and girls and boys, gender also refers to the relations between women and those between men. These attributes, opportunities and relationships are socially constructed and are learned through socialization processes. They are context/ time-specific and changeable. Gender determines what is expected, allowed and valued in a woman or a man in a given context. In most societies there are differences and inequalities between women and men in responsibilities assigned, activities undertaken, access to and control over resources, as well as decision-making opportunities. Gender is part of the broader socio-cultural context, as are other important criteria for socio-cultural analysis including class, race, poverty level, ethnic group, sexual orientation, age, etc.

Gender Analysis is a critical examination of how differences in gender roles, activities, needs, opportunities and rights/entitlements affect men, women, girls and boys in certain situation or contexts. Gender analysis examines the relationships between females and males and their access to and control of resources and the constraints they face relative to each other. A gender analysis should be integrated into all sector assessments or situational analyses to ensure that gender-based injustices and inequalities are not exacerbated by interventions, and that where possible, greater equality and justice in gender relations are promoted.

Gender Focal Points are change agents whose role is one of advocating for increased attention to and integration of gender into their department or unit. A gender focal point is not to serve as a substitute for a full-time institutional gender specialist. Basic functions include: coordinating the organization/office/program gender mainstreaming strategy; contributing gender information and technical support for inclusion of gender issues; supporting capacity development on gender equality within the organization; knowledge management; and coordination on interagency initiatives.

Gender Mainstreaming: refers to a process of assessing the implications for women and men of any planned action, including legislation, policies or programs, in any area and at all levels. It is a strategy for making women's as well as men's concerns and experiences an integral dimension in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of policies and programs in all political, economic and social spheres, such that inequality between men and women is not perpetuated.

Gender Norms are ideas about how men and women should be and act. We internalize and learn these "rules" early in life. This sets-up a life-cycle of gender socialization and stereotyping. Put another way, gender norms are the standards and expectations to which gender identity generally conforms, within a range that defines a society, culture and community at that point in time.

Gender Parity is another term for equal representation of women and men in a given area, for example, gender parity in organizational leadership. Working toward gender parity (equal representation) is a key part of achieving gender equality, and one of the twin strategies, alongside gender mainstreaming.

Gender Perspective is a way of seeing or analyzing the impact of gender on people's opportunities, social roles and interactions. This way of seeing is what enables one to carry out gender analysis and subsequently to mainstream a gender perspective into any proposed program, policy or organization.

Participation: Effective participation implies that women and men have the potential to articulate their needs and interests, and take responsibilities for example in Early Warning Mechanisms, protection strategies or Quick Impact Projects.

Sex refers to the biological characteristics, which define humans as female or male. These sets of biological characteristics are not mutually exclusive as there are individuals who possess both, but these characteristics tend to differentiate humans as males and females. Sex is usually constant whilst gender roles can change over time and in different social contexts.

Sex and Age Disaggregated Data: For a gender analysis, all data should be separated by sex in order to allow differential impacts on men and women to be measured. Sex disaggregated data is quantitative statistical information on differences and inequalities between women, men, girls and boys.

UN Inf Bn Tasks, Conditions and Standards¹**TASK: Command and Control**

TASK DESCRIPTION: The way the Battalion Commander and commanders at all levels lead, direct, and control their staff and subordinate units.

TASK CONDITIONS: Assessed throughout all operational phases from planning through to execution for all operational tasks.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does Not Meet Standard
Leadership The Battalion Commander or OIC of a subordinate unit exercises effective command and control of all subordinate and attached elements through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Sound and timely decision making. • Offers clear direction and guidance to subordinates. • Communicates in an effective manner. • Seeks responsibility and is willing to take the initiative. • Takes responsibility for own actions. • Ensures unity of command by establishing clear responsibilities and tasks for subordinate units. • Ensuring assigned tasks are understood, supervised, and accomplished (conducts back-briefs and operational rehearsals). • The employment of subordinate units/ elements in accordance with their capabilities. • Keeping unit members informed of situational developments. • Ensuring the welfare of all unit members. • Ensuring ROEs are understood and applied correctly by all unit personnel. • Personal presence and example during the preparation and conduct of operations. 		
Planning Plans developed by the unit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are based on a comprehensive analysis of the operating environment (AOE). • Are developed jointly with other mission and non-mission elements where necessary. • Are sufficiently flexible to respond to unanticipated events. • Use the element of surprise, whenever possible. • Are based on a clear main effort. • Establish a support concept for the own force. • Incorporate limitations regarding the use of force. • Are rehearsed. • The unit develops and rehearses contingency plans. • The unit maintains reserves for quick response (on all levels). 		
Direction & Guidance/ Orders All orders <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are clear and concise. 		

¹ Ratings of Excellent, Satisfactory, Needs Improvement, and Unsatisfactory will be awarded to units.

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Are provided timely through a fast and reliable means of communications. • Are based on developed plans and/or situation developments. • Follow the outline in Tab-1 of Annex H, when a full Operations Order is required, of Annex H when a Fragmentary order will suffice. 		
All personnel are aware of the commander's intent to a level two-up from their own unit.		
Monitor The commanding officer and his staff continuously monitor and assessing the situation and progress made, adjusting the scheme of maneuver, as required.		
Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) The unit has standard operating procedures (SOP) to harmonize staff work and standardize the reaction and reporting to situations. All subordinate commanders/staff officers clearly understand their roles and responsibilities and react to the situation (hostile/ non-hostile) in accordance with the SOP.		
Communication There are at least 2 independent means of communications between all command levels;		
There is continuous, timely and accurate passage of information between subordinate units and HQ;		

TASK: Conduct a Patrol

TASK DESCRIPTION: A patrol is a tactical move through a series of waypoints to an objective area. It can be conducted for a variety of purposes, including: denying threat actors freedom of action, to dominate terrain, to confirm or observe a ceasefire, to gather information, to conduct reconnaissance, to establish links between units, to provide security to the local population, and to show a UN presence.

TASK CONDITIONS: The unit is tasked to carry out a platoon-sized patrol from one point to another in a scenario that matches in-theater conditions.

STANDARDS	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare The unit commander issues an order to subordinated unit commanders tasked with the conduct of the patrol(s) which considers threats in the operational environment including information on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent and significant activity in the area of the patrol. • New information pertaining to the area of the patrol, including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. • Detailed terrain brief. • Detailed brief on human terrain. • Detailed brief on information terrain. • Detailed information on specific threat actor(s). • Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action against UN patrol. 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Information Requirements (IR). 		
<p>The commanding officer or OIC of the unit conducting the patrol carries out a map reconnaissance and identifies the patrol route. At this point he/she should identify:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Way points; Planned Halts; Vulnerable points; Obstacles (consider engineering attachments). 		
<p>If possible, a route reconnaissance is carried out.</p>		
<p>The patrol leader issues an order in line with the FRAGO attached at Annex H which includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Patrol-specific task organization, including an advance guard, flank security, rear guard and command elements. Leader locations within the patrol. Patrol route (to include a navigation plan with rendezvous points, vulnerable points, reporting lines/ points, key terrain features, possible communications blackspots). March order. Responsibilities (at halts, in case of vehicle breakdown). Behavior under threat/ contact (incl. IED/ UXO, obstacles). Rehearsals conducted for behavior under threat. Observation responsibilities. Casualty evacuation responsibilities. Liaison and engagement requirements and responsibilities. Information Requirements whilst on patrol. Reporting procedures. 		
<p>The commanding officer considers following attachments to the patrol:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Interpreters (mandatory). Host Nation representatives. EOD Team. C-IED Team. Engineering attachments for mobility. Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAS)/ISR support. Engagement Team, including females (mandatory). 		
<p>A sustainment plan is in place and the patrol can fully self-sustain for the duration of the operation.</p>		
<p>The patrol members prepare themselves and their personal equipment and rehearses immediate actions supervised by the commanding officer.</p>		
<p>Engineer assets, if available, are located near the front of the patrol to respond quickly to obstacles or for IED/UXO disposal.</p>		
<p>Conduct The patrol maintains all-round security and observation throughout the conduct of the task.</p>		
<p>The patrol avoids unnecessary stops. If required, freedom of movement is enforced.</p>		
<p>Vehicle overwatch positions are established to provide fire support to dismounted troops.</p>		
<p>Village entry points are controlled when engagement is conducted in urbanized areas.</p>		
<p>The commanding officer exercises C2 during the patrol. He/she</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Adjusts formation and distances based on threat level or incidents. Maintains communication with patrol elements during the move. Provides regular movement updates 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Receives and provides situation updates to patrol elements. • Reports situational developments to higher HQs. • Reacts quickly to situation developments. • Provides clear tasking to patrol elements. 		
After Action A full patrol report on return to base, including responses to IRs and a route report is provided and a debriefing is conducted by the patrol commander.		
Collected information is analyzed by the S2 cell to complement the situational awareness of the unit.		

TASK: Treat and Evacuate Casualties

TASK DESCRIPTION: CASEVAC is the primary evacuation of any casualty from the point of injury (POI) to the closest appropriate medical facility, utilizing the most appropriate means of transportation. It is imperative that a UN Inf Bn casualty is in receipt of lifesaving measures preventing the loss of life, limb and/or eyesight in line with the 10-1-2 goal.

TASK CONDITIONS: This task encompasses all actions that a UN Inf Bn takes on one of its personnel becoming a casualty, commencing with buddy first aid, moving to Advanced Lifesaving Support and/or Damage Control Resuscitation (DCR), and onward movement to a Level Two medical facility. The UN Inf Bn must be able to achieve this in all operational circumstances, during all operations.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT meet Standard
On receipt of a casualty, the soldier is stabilized, adhering to the standard of treatment outlined in the buddy first aid individual TCS.		
A 9-line casualty evacuation request is processed through UN Inf Bn HQ to FHQ.		
The UN Inf Bn secures the area, thereby ensuring the safety and security of the CASEVAC to advanced treatment centers, including evacuation to Level 1 and 2 medical facilities.		
The UN Inf Bn has a credible plan in place to move a casualty to a Level 1 Facility.		
The UN Inf Bn has rehearsed the plan to move a casualty to a Level 1 facility. This move can occur by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Road, or • Air. 		
The UN Inf Bn achieves Advanced Life Saving Support and Damage control resuscitation within one hour. This support comes in the form of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An aeromedical evacuation team, or • Treatment at the UN Inf Bn Level 1 facility 		
The UN Inf Bn has a credible plan in place to assure movement of the casualty to a Level 2 medical facility		
The UN Inf Bn has rehearsed the plan to move a casualty from a Level 1 facility to a Level 2 facility. This move can occur by: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Road, or • Air. 		

The UN has coordinated with FHQ to assure movement of the casualty to a Level 2 medical facility		
The casualty is moved to a Level 2 medical facility within 2 hours, thereby achieving: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Damage Control Surgery • Post-operative surgery • High dependency care 		

TASK: Convoy Escort/ Tactical Move

TASK DESCRIPTION: Convoy operations are conducted to escort a column of vehicles, often non-military, in a secure manner from a designated start point to an intended destination. A tactical move of the unit to a destination is conducted based on the same principles/ standards.

TASK CONDITIONS: The unit is tasked to escort a convoy of vehicles in an operating environment.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare The OIC of the convoy liaises with the S2 cell and receives the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent and significant activity in the area of the convoy • New information pertaining to the area of the convoy, including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. • Detailed Terrain brief • Potential vulnerabilities during the escort task • Detailed brief on human terrain • Likely communication black spots on the route • Detailed information on specific threat actor(s) • Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action against UN convoy; 		
The commanding officer or OIC of the conducting unit carries out a map reconnaissance and identifies the march route. At this point he/she should identify: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Way points; • Planned Halts; • Vulnerable points; • Obstacles (consider engineering attachments). • The effect of the weather on movement. • The convoy route depending on type of vehicles being escorted, considering also their ability to move through terrain, their level of force protection. • Alternative routes. 		
If possible, a route reconnaissance is carried out.		
The convoy commander issues a Warning Order (WnGO) to initiate logistic and operational preparation for the task (including timelines) and time and location of the order.		
The commanding officer develops and issues a full set of orders in the FRAGO format at Annex H, which must also include the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Consideration given to interpreters. • Escort-specific task organization. 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Convoy route (to include a navigation plan with rendezvous points, vulnerable points, reporting lines/ points, key terrain features, possible communications blackspots). • Alternative routes. • March order. • Reaction to threats (ambush, contact, IED/ UXOs, obstacles, etc.). • Actions in case of vehicle breakdown. • Command and control measures. • Distances between vehicles and convoy elements. • Liaison/ cooperation requirements (e.g. adjacent units, local authorities/ security forces, IOs/NGOs, etc.) • Call signs and radio networks in the convoy and with unit HQs. 		
Attachments, including those to be escorted are present at orders or are otherwise briefed.		
<p>The commanding officer considers following attachments to the convoy:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Interpreters. • Host Nation representatives. • EOD Team. • C-IED Team. • Engineering attachments for mobility. • Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAS)/ISR support. • Engagement Team, including females. 		
Convoy personnel prepare themselves and their equipment and rehearse immediate actions supervised by the commanding officer.		
Engineer/ EOD assets, if available, are located near the front of the convoy to respond quickly to obstacles or for IED/UXO disposal.		
A sustainment plan is in place and the convoy escort is fully self-sustaining for the duration of the operation.		
<p>Conduct</p> <p>The unit is organized based on the threat level and includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Advance guard (providing the safety of the route and able to identify trouble in advance of the column. The element may be required to reconnoiter detours and secure halt positions). • Close protection group (the unit commander may be located in this group). • Rear guard. 		
An all-round security is always maintained during the execution of the task.		
At halts an overwatch element is providing security for the convoy.		
The convoy avoids unnecessary stops. If required, freedom of movement is enforced.		
<p>The commanding officer exercises C2 during the execution of the task. He/she</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Adjusts formation and distances based on threat level or incidents. • Maintains communication with convoy elements during the move. • Provides regular movement updates • Receives and provides situation updates to convoy elements. • Reports situational developments to higher HQs. • Reacts quickly to situation developments. • Provides clear tasking to convoy elements. 		
During halts, vehicles are checked regarding potential maintenance issues.		

The advance guard reconnoiters the convoy route for threats such as ambush or obstacles and provides the convoy commander with warning before arrival of the convoy and avoid halts.		
The close protection group provides immediate security for the vehicle column with escort vehicles positioned either in the column or on the flanks.		
Escort personnel demonstrate the application of convoy specific tactics, techniques and procedures and mission specific ROEs on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Halts (planned and unplanned). • Vehicle breakdown. • Hostile contact (front, flanks, rear). • IED/ UXO. • Obstacles. • Casualty. 		
Information collected during the convoy is shared with adjacent units for situational awareness.		
After Action A full report on return to base and a route report is provided and a debriefing is conducted by the convoy commander.		
Collected information is analyzed by the S2 cell to complement the situational awareness of the unit.		

TASK: Establish/ Conduct a Checkpoint (CP)

TASK DESCRIPTION: The establishment and operation of CPs are a high-frequency task for a UN Inf Bn, particularly when they must establish area security during operations. A CP is a point used as a means of controlling movement in support of UN operations. A CP is a manned and self-contained position deployed on a road or track to observe/check, inspect/search personnel or vehicles and control movement into and out of a designated area. A CP can be either permanent or temporary. A CP is usually manned by platoon-sized (or less) formations.

TASK CONDITIONS: The unit is tasked to deploy to and operate a CP.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare The unit commander issues an order to subordinated unit commanders tasked with the conduct of the checkpoint operations which considers threats in the operational environment including information on <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent and significant activity in the area of the checkpoint. • New information pertaining to the area of the checkpoint including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. • Detailed terrain brief. • Detailed brief on human terrain. • Detailed brief on information terrain. • Detailed information on specific threat actor(s). • Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action against UN CP. • Information Requirements. 		
The commanding officer or OIC of the unit conducting the checkpoint carries out a (map) reconnaissance and identifies the route and location for the CP.		

<p>The officer in command issues the CP preparation and establishment order in line with the FRAGO outlined in Annex H. The order should also include CP-specific information such as:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • CP-specific Task organization for the unit, including a search team, local security, overwatch, reserve etc. • Search and control procedures, including for women and children; • Consideration given to interpreters. • CP-specific security arrangements. • Rules of Engagement. • Specialist equipment required. • Inclusion of UN Police and/or local police and civil administration officials. • Material & equipment required. 		
<p>Establishment</p> <p>The commanding officer reconnoiters the area ensuring that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The CP is positioned where the traffic cannot turn back, leave the road or bypass the CP without being observed. • The CP has the necessary space to safely execute its task. • There is natural cover. • There are no covered approaches to the CP. • The CP is not overlooked. • The CP is placed on or close to key terrain (Cross roads etc). • The CP has good observation of the surrounding area and clear fields of fire. 		
<p>The unit provides security during the establishment of the CP, ideally using hasty defense positions.</p>		
<p>The CP is established with</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An armored vehicle is positioned in an overwatch position. • Obstacles are placed on the road to slow direct traffic into the search area. The obstacles slow/restrict/stop/ prevent forced entry by vehicles and pedestrians. • Anti-ram barriers to protect the CP from VBIED and other threats. • Marked signs in local language(s) visible to vehicle drivers and pedestrians. • Search and parking areas are designated that provide protection for CP personnel from potential threats (explosion, etc.). • An early warning system is established around the perimeter of the CP. • Defensive positions are designated for all CP personnel in case of attack. • A communication and reporting system with other CPs and OPs in the area, neighboring units, local authorities and the unit HQs. • A reserve and/or QRF is established. • Interpreters and female soldiers are present at the CP to question or search women/children. 		
<p>UN Police and/or local police and civil administration officials are present at the CP. If not, coordination has been conducted (minimum requirement).</p>		
<p>A sustainment plan is in place.</p>		
<p>Conduct</p> <p>CP personnel performs a detailed search of vehicles including trucks and busses while maintaining security for the searching personnel.</p>		
<p>CP personnel performs a detailed body search of people (male/female) while maintaining security for the searching personnel.</p>		

CP personnel records all searches and captured material.		
CP personnel applies to detention procedures IAW mission standards, in particular with regard to deadlines to hand over the detainees to local authorities.		
CP personnel recognizes local documents (IDs) carried by soldiers, civilian persons granting access to the local area.		
CP personnel counters any intent of either avoiding personal/vehicle searches or bypassing the CP by correct application of the mission specific ROEs.		
CP personnel display respect local customs/traditions, know some phrases in the local language and accomplish the task in a friendly but professional manner.		
Critical information is provided immediately to higher HQs.		
After Action		
A detailed report back-brief is provided by the CP commander to his unit commander after the accomplishment of the task.		
Collected information is analyzed by the S2 cell to complement the situational awareness of the unit.		

TASK: Conduct a Cordon & Search (C&S)

TASK DESCRIPTION: The primary purpose of a Cordon & Search (C&S) is to isolate a location to search the area for armed groups or material of evidentiary and/or peacekeeping-intelligence value. *Site exploitation* is a series of activities to recognize, collect, process, preserve, and analyze information, personnel, and/or materiel found during the conduct of C&S operations.

TASK CONDITIONS: C&S operation may be conducted at battalion, company or platoon level depending upon the size of the objective and the respective threat level and will likely be a combined and joint operation.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare The Battalion staff conducts a full UN MDMP. During the process specific emphasize is put on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recent and significant activity in the area of C&S. New information pertaining to the area of the C&S, including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. Detailed Terrain brief. Potential vulnerabilities during the execution of the task. Detailed brief on human terrain. Likely communication black spots. Detailed information on specific threat actor(s). Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action. Operational Security considerations esp. in regard to the need for liaison/cooperation with other actors (local authorities/ security forces, other non-unit elements). 		
The commanding officer issues the C&S order, which must incorporate all aspects of the OPORD (Tab-1 of Annex H) outlined in this manual. Specific consideration is given to <ul style="list-style-type: none"> The potential reaction of the civilian population. The potential interference by militia or regular armed forces. 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The requirement for Operational Security during planning and conduct (surprise). • Specific task organization. • ROEs. • Minimization of collateral damage and inconvenience for the civilian population. • Detention procedures. • Covered approach routes that allow for concealed and swift approach to the objective area. • Early isolation of the objective area. • Timeliness conduct of the operation. • Legitimacy (involvement of local authorities, detention procedures, chain of evidence, ROEs). 		
<p>The commanding officer has requested the following support for the C&S operation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • UN military/UNPOL, including female elements • Local police personnel • Military Police • Civilian and military interpreters • CIMIC officers • MPKI officers • Local population coordination element • Firefighting team • Engagement Platoon members • EOD team • Working dog team • Medical team 		
<p>Clear responsibilities and tasks are developed for:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Outer Cordon security; • Inner Cordon security; • Conduct of the Search; • Command and Control; • Support (firefighting, engagement, CIMIC, medical); • Reserve. 		
<p>Conduct</p> <p>The reaction force establishes an outer cordon perimeter and covers routes leading into the area to prevent outside interference or reinforcement</p>		
<p>The security element establishes an inner cordon around the objective and</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Controls entry or exit from the objective area through observation or its physical presence. • Supports and assists the search teams with close-in security. • Takes over custody of detainees or evidence. • Assists in the disposal of explosives. • Supports exploiting sites discovered by search teams. 		
<p>The reserve force, positioned at a centralized location, reinforces either the inner or outer cordon, or reacts to problems such as a civil disturbance.</p>		
<p>Once the inner cordon is established, the local population is informed (with assistance of local police and/or translators) that:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Buildings are about to be searched. • Occupants within the target buildings will be asked to gather at a central location to facilitate the search. • The head of households are requested to accompany the search parties to prevent accusations of theft and/or looting against UN soldiers. 		

• All occupants of houses that will not be searched are requested to remain indoors.		
The commander consults with and includes prominent personnel from local community during the search.		
Search teams, including female searchers (if appropriate and available) are assigned with objectives and work methodically, with due consideration to potential security threats (e.g., trip wires).		
Specialist attachments are employed such as local police, Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) personnel, translators, dog teams, etc.		
The civilian population, government personnel, and other organization's personnel area are treated respectfully and with cognition of local customs, but firmly (if necessary)		
Any suspicious/apprehended/detained persons are transported to the appropriate transfer point and handed over to respective local authorities.		
Any material confiscated/captures is recorded in line with UN rules, and a chain of evidence is maintained. Consequently, material and records are handed over to legal authorities.		
The commanding officers maintains effective communication and reporting with all parties during the operation.		
After Action A full report on return to base is prepared		
A joint debriefing is conducted with all participants of the C&S operation.		
Collected information is analyzed by PKMI staff.		

TASK: Base Defence

TASK DESCRIPTION: The unit is tasked to prepare a perimeter defense to provide the UN Inf Bn with a secure location from which to launch operations. A perimeter defense is a method of establishing protection in all directions. By design, this defensive measure has a secure inner area with most of the combat power located on the perimeter. The commander successfully holds key or decisive terrain, while denying access to threat groups. This includes countering threat group reconnaissance efforts, protection from indirect fire attack and fending off attacks. A well-executed defense compliments establishment of operational bases.

TASK CONDITIONS: This will vary according to the operating environment but should generally comprise of a threat scenario encompassing both non-compliant armed groups, terrorist actors with asymmetric capabilities, and a vulnerable local population.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare A full Analysis of the Operating Environment (AOE) is conducted. This must include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent and significant activity in the area of the operating base • New information pertaining to the area of the intended operating base, including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. • Detailed terrain brief including cover and concealment, avenues of approach, Key and Vital Terrain features, weather/visibility/temperature/first & last light/moon phases. • Detailed brief on human terrain including local key leaders. • Detailed brief on Information terrain including communication blackspots, media and messaging of local actors. 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detailed information on specific threat actor(s) including strength/capabilities/ intentions/TTPs. • Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action. 		
<p>The Commanding Officer conducts the steps to plan Engagement Areas (EAs):</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Identifies probable hostile avenues of approach. • Determines probable hostile scheme of maneuver. • Determines kill zones. • Plans the integration of obstacles. • Determines weapons systems emplacement. • Plans and integrates indirect fires. 		
<p>A defense plan is developed which includes</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Covered and concealed avenues are denied to threat groups. • Local key terrain is dominated. • Surveillance area established. • Obstacles to deter or canalize the threat actors attack. • A secure perimeter. • A reserve has been designated. • Overwhelming combat power is employed on targeted engagement areas. • All available weapons systems integrated. • Direct and indirect fire plans. • Forward observation posts. • Reconnaissance and security patrols. • Control of all vulnerable approaches to the base (roads, waterways, piers) established. • Main gate and alternate gates. • Plans for CASEVAC and resupply. • Clear responsibilities and tasking. • A flexible plan for execution. 		
<p>Establishment of a secure perimeter that provides protection</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Against vehicle/human intrusion. • Against view from snipers, fire, mines. • Against IED detonation. 		
<p>Priorities for the protection and defense of the base include:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 360-degree security with interlocking fields of fire while maximizing use of cover and concealment. • An appropriate area outside the perimeter for stand-off established and secured by FP troops. • OPs on the perimeter with overlapping observation areas. • Construction of entry/ exit control points (based on the principles of a checkpoint). • Fields of fire cleared. • Range cards at firing positions. • Crew-serve weapons emplacement and integration of overlapping sectors of fire. • Covered primary firing positions for soldiers; • Bunkers prepared; • Establishment of mortar positions and lines of final protective fires (FPF). • An early warning system covering the whole base. • Emplacement of early warning devices. • Development of a duty roster system for all subordinated units and elements 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Continued improvement of fighting and survivability positions. Placement of obstacles to impede hostile advance. Establishment of internal and external wire communications. Employment of available technology such as ISR; Establishment of alternate firing positions; Designation of points for secured resupply and CASEVAC. 		
<p>The Base Commander issues the order for the defense to all elements in the base. The order covers the details of the defense plan with special attention to</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Assigning sectors of responsibility among all units in the base for which they are responsible for in the case of an attack. Regulations for the access to the base. Duty roster for camp protection. Assigning shelter locations for all personnel of the base. Protection of critical supply and sustainment areas (ammunition, water, food, POL, equipment, communications, electrical). 		
<p>For the base defense of “Super camps” the Force Commander is responsible to assign a base commander in coordination with civilian authorities to ensure unity of command in the case of an attack is maintained.</p>		
<p>If other elements (civilian, logistics, police) are co-located in the camp a joint operation center is setup with representation of all elements (liaison officers) to support the base commander.</p>		
<p>Conduct</p> <p>Defense plans are rehearsed regularly involving all elements based on assessed likely scenarios of hostile threat actors.</p>		
<p>Routine Activity:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Regular Perimeter Guard established. QRF and Reserve on call. Patrols deployed on irregular routes at varying times, by day and night. Indicators and early warning system are continuously monitored; Continuous analysis of the Operating Environment and maintenance of an accurate threat assessment; Contingency planning; 		
<p>A schedule for the maintenance of weapons and equipment following below criteria is established:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> No more than 33 percent of the machine guns and individual weapons are cleaned at the same time. No more than one antitank weapon in each company is cleaned at the same time. No more than one mortar in each section is out of action at the same time. No more than 33 percent of the equipment (for example, night vision devices (NVDs), chemical alarms, Communications systems) in each platoon are cleaned or serviced at the same time 		
<p>Access to the base is controlled by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Maintaining records of all people leaving or entering the base. Body search of visitors including search of females, locally employed personnel, clerical personnel and VIPs. Employment of technical and manual detection capabilities to mitigate threats from explosive devices, and weapons entering at access control points. 		
<p>Protection of the base by night is conducted by</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Establishing an illumination plan; Deployment of foot and mobile patrols for surrounding areas; 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Provision of Night Vision/Thermal Imaging Equipment issued to forward observation posts, patrols, perimeter guards and reserve forces. 		
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TASK: Establish/ Conduct an Observation Post (OP)

TASK DESCRIPTION: An Observation Post (OP) is a manned peacekeeping operations position established to monitor and observe a certain area, object or event. An OP can be permanent, temporary, static or mobile. Reports from OPs provide timely, accurate and relevant information to higher HQ and adjacent units. It facilitates increased security in the area of operations (AO) by demonstrating a vigilant and visible peacekeeper presence to all parties and populations in the area. Observing and reporting from OPs is a cornerstone peacekeeping operations task.

TASK CONDITIONS: The unit is tasked to deploy to and operate an OP.

Standards	Meets Standard	Doesn't Meet Standard
<p>Plan & Prepare</p> <p>The unit commander issues an order to subordinated unit commanders tasked with the conduct of the observation post which considers threats in the operational environment including information on</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Recent and significant activity in the area of the observation post. New information pertaining to the area of the observation post, including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. Detailed terrain brief. Detailed brief on human terrain. Detailed brief on information terrain. Detailed information on specific threat actor(s). Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action against the observation post. Information Requirements (IR). 		
<p>The commanding officer or OIC of the unit tasked with the establishing/ conducting an observation post carries out a map recce to identify potential OP locations.</p>		
<p>The commanding officer issues the order for the preparation, deployment and establishment of an observation post in line with the FRAGO attached at Annex H which includes:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Task organization for the establishment of the OP; Task organization for the conduct of the OP, including observation plan, local security, reserve; Attachments for the OP establishment period. For example, engineering assets may be required if the OP is being put in place for a long duration; March route to the OP March order Actions during the tactical move to the OP Actions on occupation, construction, and withdrawal; Conditions for withdrawal. Reporting guidelines; Challenge and password; When will the team be replaced? Specific logistics plan for the OP; Specific CASEVAC plan for the OP; 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Specialist equipment required. 		
Establishment The commanding officers reconnoiters the area ensuring that the OP: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Affords excellent observation of the target area; Has excellent fields of fire. Dominates key or decisive terrain; Has no obstacles to movement or observation; Uses any natural obstacles to protect the area against attack; Has no concealed routes an armed group could use to approach the OP; Has excellent communications with higher HQ; Operational requirements are not impacted by adverse weather factors; Meets environmental requirements. 		
The unit deploys tactically in accordance with patrolling guidelines.		
The unit establishes security prior to the occupation/ establishment of the OP ideally using hasty defense positions.		
OP equipment includes: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> A map. A range card (sketch of potential targets with direction and distance for periods of limited visibility). A compass. Communications equipment (wire or radio). An observation device (binoculars, NVD). Report formats (SOP). Personal equipment (weapons, seasonal uniform, flag jacket, helmet). Food and water. 		
At least two means of communications with higher HQs are available;		
Conduct OP personnel employ active and passive measures to protect themselves from detection and from fire including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Covered and concealed positions (if applicable). Active patrolling around the OP; Patrolling of dead ground between a group of OPs; There is an established observation plan for day, night and adverse weather conditions. 		
On occupation the OP personnel constantly work to ensure that: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> OP defenses are improved; There is protection from both direct and indirect fire; If appropriate, there is cover from view; Obstacles to UN movement and observation to the surrounding area are removed; Obstacles to threat group movement are reinforced and covered with fire; There are no covered Avenues of Approach to the TOB; Fields of UN fire are cleared; There are interlocking arcs of UN fire and observation; Key and decisive terrain is dominated and controlled; There is a patrol plan to cover areas of dead ground. 		
The OP is fully self-sustaining, or a logistic support plan is in place.		
The commanding officer establishes a duty roster to ensure the unit can perform continuous operations.		
OP personnel constantly scan their assigned area or sector to identify suspicious movement of vehicles or people and provide the unit with early warning of potential threats.		

OP personnel reports and records observed activities (if possible, audio-visual) and provides regular updates to its higher headquarters.		
Reports of the OP are assessed at higher HQs regarding time sensitivity and relevance. If required, (higher) unit commander initiates immediate action.		
After Action If replaced by another unit, the OP commander provides a detailed update to the incoming unit commander on all observations incl. locations and time, security arrangements, positions to the relieving commander.		
Collected information is analyzed by the S2 cell to complement the situational awareness of the unit.		

TASK: Establish/ Operate a Temporary Operating Base

TASK DESCRIPTION: A Temporary Operating Base (TOB) is a military position, which can be used as a secure location from which the UN Inf Bn projects combat power in support of operational goals and tactical objectives. The establishment and maintenance of a secure and functional base of operations for the battalion and its sub-units is an important responsibility of the Battalion Commander.

TASK CONDITIONS: The unit is tasked to deploy to and construct a TOB that is defensible, meets all operational and support requirements, with a sustainment plan to ensure it can be maintained for a period up to 30 days (depending on the situation). Accomplishment of this task is validated also in line with protection and defense of a base and convoy escort task.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare The commanding officer or OIC of the conducting unit carries out a map reconnaissance and identifies: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Potential locations of the TOB • March route to the TOB • Way points; • Vulnerable points; 		
The assigned commanding officer of the TOB liaises with the S2 cell and receives, as a minimum, the following information: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent and significant activity in the area of the operating base. • New information pertaining to the area of the intended operating base, including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. • Detailed terrain brief including cover and concealment, avenues of approach, KT features, weather/visibility/temperature/first &last light/moon phases. • Detailed brief on Human terrain including local key leaders. • Detailed brief on Information terrain including communication blackspots, media and messaging of local actors. • Detailed information on specific threat actor(s) including strength/capabilities/ intentions/TTPs • Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action against the TOB. 		
The assigned commanding officer of the TOB reconnoiters the march route and location of the TOB, if possible.		

The convoy commander issues a Warning Order (WARNORD) to initiate logistic and operational preparation for the task (including timelines) and time and location of the order.		
<p>The unit commander tasked to establish a TOB is</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • requesting • and provided with the appropriate combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) personnel/assets. 		
<p>A FRAGO, in line with Annex H, for the deployment to and establishment of the TOB is given to subordinate units, including to all attachments which must include the following</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Task organization for the move, including an advance guard, Close protection group, rear guard; • March route (to include a navigation plan with rendezvous points, vulnerable points, reporting lines/ points, key terrain features, possible communications blackspots); • March order; • Actions at halts and in case of vehicle breakdown; • Reaction to hostile threat (ambush, contact, IED/UXO, obstacles); • Actions when there is a casualty; • Actions at the TOB location; • Command and control measures; • Distances between vehicles and convoy elements; • Call signs and radio networks; 		
Conduct		
Unit deploys to the site following the principles of tactical movement/convoy escort.		
The unit advanced guard/ element reconnoiters the site prior to occupation.		
<p>The commanding officer or unit OIC determines that the TOB site is suitable and:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Meets basic operational requirements; • Mission can be accomplished from the site; • There are no covered Avenues of Approach to the TOB; • There are no obstacles that would hinder UN observation or movement; • Natural cover is used for protection; • Key and decisive terrain is dominated and controlled; • The side is not overlooked; • Access to the site is guaranteed in all weather conditions; • Meets environmental requirements (hygiene, sanitation, natural hazards); • Has adequate size for the unit to allow dispersion of personnel and vehicles; • Has access to a water source, if possible; • Complies with hygiene and health requirements. 		
On occupation, the unit provides its own security and establishes a work plan with a priority of work, commencing with force protection.		
<p>The TOB is self-sustaining for up to 30 days:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A resupply plan is in place (food and water); • The unit can maintain and run its vehicles; • The unit has sufficient arms and ammunition; • There is a credible, rehearsed CASEVAC plan (road and air); • A medical team is on site. 		
Detailed tasks for defensive operations are described in the Defensive Operations task.		

TASK: Conduct Relief in Place

Task Description: The purpose of relief in place is to relieve all or part of a unit in a designated Area of Responsibility (AOR) by an incoming force. It is an operation in which a mission or responsibility is handed over from one unit to another without disrupting operations.

TASK CONDITIONS: Relief can be executed as a component of a deliberate operation, rotation of forces, response to emergency operations such as catastrophic loss or otherwise when demands of an operation changes between units or headquarters.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT meet Standard
Plan & Prepare On receipt of an order for a relief in place, the unit commander commences and completes the UN MDMP		
The relieving unit receives current Military Peacekeeping Intelligence, operations, and sustainment information from the battalion being relieved, as well as from common higher headquarters, adjacent units and subordinate elements		
Warning Orders, OPORDs, and Situation updates are briefed to relevant personnel of both units as required.		
Conduct Commanders establish early liaison between the stationary and the relieving subordinate forces and identify measures to control the relief		
Control measures to mitigate risk of fratricide between friendly units are implemented. This is accomplished through identification of: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • boundaries, • positions, • checkpoints, • observation posts, • local villages/towns, • routes, • assembly areas, • Fire Support Coordination Measures (FSCM), • direct fire control measures (such as target reference points and engagement areas). 		
Prior to a deliberate relief , the unit being relieved provides the relieving unit with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • A full handover of the Area of Operations, incorporating all maps, all MPKI, operational briefings, sustainment information; • The unit will also facilitate a full reconnaissance of the AO by the relieving unit; • Where appropriate and necessary, a full logistics and administrative handover will be complete. In a hasty relief , commanders abbreviate the planning process and controls the execution using oral and fragmentary orders. The relieving unit receives: All Basic and current intelligence, operations, and sustainment information.		

Advance parties established by the relieving unit to conduct detailed coordination and preparations for the operation, down to the company level and possibly to the platoon level.		
A tactical command post of the relieving unit is co-located with the main headquarters of the unit being relieved.		
Relieving unit determines when it is ready to assume command.		
Both units provide for their own security whilst on the move.		
The unit being relieved provides camp security until it is relieved.		
In a deliberate relief in place, the relieved unit thins out over time.		
Higher HQ is informed of all developments.		

TASK: Support DDR

TASK DESCRIPTION: The Unit is tasked to plan, prepare and conduct to support operations in Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reinsertion/Reintegration (DDR) effort of ongoing overall Security Sector Reform (SSR) process in a post conflict situation of a country. The unit may be tasked to create a secure environment for the conduct of DDR program including support in Defense Sector Reform (DSR) with a limited role in providing training or handing over experience to host nation counterparts.

TASK CONDITIONS: The UN Inf Bn's support to DDR usually provides security (Security and escorts to movements, security of collected weapons and ammunition, security of disarmament and/or demobilization sites or cantonment areas, route security), provide support to civilian-led focused public information/sensitization campaigns, information acquisition (locations, strengths and intentions of former combatants, monitoring on armed groups, lessons learned and best practices, provision of military expertise) and logistic support.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare To support the operation, the unit conducts following activities to support Information gathering, reporting, dissemination and sensitization: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Information gathering on the locations, strengths and intentions of former combatants. • Support to public information and sensitization efforts. • Joint patrols/information gathering with civilian DDR staff. • Monitoring and reporting on armed groups. • Capturing, compiling and sharing lessons learned and good practices on DDR related activities. • Specialized weapon and ammunition expertise. • Provision of support with special expertise during the disarmament phase. 		
Conduct The Unit conducts following security operations: - <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides security and escorts to movements of those participating in the program (segregate former conflicting combatant groups/personnel). • Provide security, including security of weapons and ammunition that have been handed in or stored as part of a DDR program, and security of disarmament and/or demobilization sites or cantonment areas (whether semi-permanent or mobile). • Provide security to routes that former combatants will use • Create incentives and disincentive for former combatants to join or remain outside a program by constructive engagement and provide 		

support to civilian-led focused public information/sensitization campaigns.		
The unit keeps a reserve to deal with unforeseen events.		
The unit provides logistic/administrative support to the DDR staff and for the DDR process, if specially tasked.		

TASK: Civil Disturbance/ Riot Control

TASK DESCRIPTION: Local populations may undertake demonstrations in towns and villages to voice their concerns, project problems or protest issues that directly or indirectly affect them. Such gatherings, though mostly political and peaceful in nature, may turn violent leading to disturbances and riots. The target of such demonstrations may be the host government, socio-political or ethnic groups, or the peace mission itself. The desired end state for the battalion would be to help calm the situation and hand it over to law enforcement forces as soon as possible.

TASK CONDITIONS: The unit effectively controls a civil disturbance in line with ROEs. The civil disturbance operations can be planned (in support of local security forces) or reactive/ spontaneous (e.g. in front of the camp, during another type of operation).

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare For a planned operation, the commander immediately contacts elements on the ground to ascertain situational awareness and begins liaising with necessary interlocutors, including, as appropriate with: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Local commanders on the ground; • Host nation security forces; • UN Police; • Local key leaders. 		
On planned operations the commander and his staff conduct a full UN MDMP and develop a detailed operational order, per Tab-1 of Annex H to this document. The following civil disturbance-specific details are considered: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Size, type, motivation, and other characteristics of the crowd; • Key local leaders; • Locations of UN or host nation forces; • Detailed task organization, including location of command elements, crowd riot control personnel, security personnel, snipers (if appropriate), reserve, guard personnel (for prisoners); • March route to the location • March order to the location • Actions on weapons used from among the crowd; • Actions on casualties; • Actions on casualties in the crowd; • Detention procedures; • Procedures to communicate with the crowd; • Detailed ROE brief to troops; • Tactics and weapons needed (including non-lethal). • Rendezvous plan with UN police and/or host nation police. • Dispersal routes left open for the crowd; • Detailed communication procedures (urban area communications plan). 		
The unit conducts reconnaissance of likely routes for crowds and movement of own forces prior to the execution of the task.		

The unit personnel conducting the task is equipped with Riot Control equipment as per the specific SUR.		
Conduct The unit is prepared to intervene as soon as they arrive at the disturbance to avoid further deterioration of the situation.		
The commanding officer takes the following actions upon arrival: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Obtains latest information about the situation (e.g. from UN police, host nation police, civil authorities, or others); • Assesses the best direction to disperse the crowd; • Plans the method of handling various elements in the crowd, including how to separate non-violent from violent elements, and whether there is a deterrent value in arresting ring-leaders; • Establishes coordination with the local authorities (if no Joint HQ is established); • Where possible, warns and persuades without the use of force, particularly when community leaders are present; • Negotiates with key leaders, if appropriate. 		
Soldiers are positioned close to the anticipated disturbance, monitoring the situation and ready to intervene to provide protection of civilians, or prevent rioters from harming personnel, or damaging UN property.		
Care is taken to ensure the unit is not encircled.		
Adequate reserves are maintained.		
The reserve is prepared to reinforce, provide security and extricate UN personnel or host government personnel, civilians and officials to safety, if required.		
If non-unit elements are involved (e.g. local security forces, UN police) a joint HQ/ Command Post is set up to coordinate and control operations.		
Only minimum necessary force is used to disperse/redirect the crowd and non-lethal weapons are employed, if required.		
Crowd Control tactics, techniques and procedures (changes of distances, formations, use of catchers) employed are appropriate to the crowd behavior and the situation.		
Handheld, vehicle or helicopter-mounted public address systems are used to persuade on warn the crowd in the local language.		
Important events are recorded and registered in chronological order. All evidence including photography/videography from ground and air (helicopter/UAV) with digital cameras, video recorders, pocket tape recorders or cell phone recorders is recorded and registered for potential legal exploitation.		
The unit controls the crowd using crowd riot control-trained personnel equipped with all necessary material.		
After Action All recorded material is analyzed by S2 personnel and prepared to be handed over to local authorities. Public Information personnel is included in the analysis for potential exploitation of the information.		

TASK: Reinforcement

TASK DESCRIPTION: Reinforcement may take place for the reinforcement of a Operating Base (OB) within the battalion AOR, another unit of the same Battalion while conducting the task and/or the reinforcement of another contingent OB or military components. This task can also involve assistance to host security forces within the mission or even outside the mission AOR as part of Inter-Mission Cooperation.

TASK CONDITIONS: The unit conducts a company-sized reinforcement.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare On receipt of an order to conduct a reinforcement, the commander conducts a detailed map reconnaissance to ascertain: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • March route to supported unit; • Vulnerable points. 		
The commander seeks and receives a detailed brief from higher HQs, including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The current situation on the ground; • Threat actor update; • Reason for reinforcement; • Clear tasking and mission; • Clear AC2 details between reinforcing and reinforced measures. 		
Readiness: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The reinforcement unit (QRF, reserve) is on standby and not dispersed. • A timely warning order is issued to the reinforcement unit. • Sufficient resources (helicopters, vehicles, APCs, etc.) are available to the reinforcement unit for quick mobility. • The reinforcement unit has a reserve. • The reinforcement unit has a well-defined chain of command, control and communication. • The reinforcement unit is prepared and trained for likely contingencies and has rehearsed them. 		
The commander issues a full order in line with Annex A of this document. This order is also informed by the following considerations: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • How contact will be made and maintained with the unit to be reinforced; • How, where and when reinforcement will take place; • Entry procedures, if location of reinforcement is a base; • Specialist equipment required; • Logistics plan to support unit to be reinforced (food, water, fuel, ammunition, CASEVAC). 		
Conduct The higher HQs provides the reinforcement unit with ongoing situational awareness.		
The reinforcement unit conducts proper liaison, coordination and sharing of information with all appropriate organizations.		
The reinforcement unit is self-sufficient in terms of food, water, weapons and ammunition, logistics and transportation.		
The reinforcement unit conducts the operation rapidly.		
The reinforced unit conducts the smooth reception of the reinforcing unit through: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provision of guides. • Exchange of liaison officers. • Communication arrangements. • Link-up procedures. 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Movement and deployment in earmarked area(s). 		
The reinforcement unit reports arrival at its destination, provides a situation update, and reports planned activities (if applicable).		

TASK: Execute Withdrawal/Evacuate

TASK DESCRIPTION: The unit is tasked to support evacuation of UN personnel under an increased security threat in the mission area under overall mission plan. The unit is operating as per the plan of higher HQ and in coordination of all relevant UN entities.

TASK CONDITIONS: Due to a deteriorating security situation in the Mission, an evacuation of UN Personnel in affected locations or the evacuation of vulnerable civilians to safe-havens ensuring the protection and well-being of all is required. The evacuation occurs under hostile or permissive circumstances and may entail ground evacuation to a location several kilometers away, or it may be a complex endeavor using multiple modes of transportation to other countries.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does Not Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare The Commander plans the operation (as a part of overall mission plan) and considers the following: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The threat situation (see below). • Logistics support for evacuees. • Medical support for evacuees. • Joint planning and coordination with mission and non-mission entities. • Requesting mission-level supporting assets such as air assets and logistics support. • Maintaining a reserve force. 		
The unit commander considers threats in the operational environment including information on: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent and significant activity in the area of the evacuation and along the route to the evacuation area. • New information pertaining to the area of the evacuation, including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. • Detailed terrain brief. • Detailed brief on human terrain. • Detailed brief on information terrain. • Detailed information on specific threat actor(s). • Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action against UN operation. • Information Requirements (IR). 		
The Commander issues a full Operations Order, per Tab-1 of Annex H.		
The order must include planning for sustainment of both the UN Inf Bn and the evacuees, per mission orders.		
Conduct The evacuation force is deployed (including plans for dealing with a hostile situation), conducts operations to shape the environment and secures necessary sites.		
The unit secures the site and maintains security throughout.		
Evacuees are assembled, briefed, marshaled, and transported to a safe location.		

Evacuees receive medical treatment and essentials such as food or water.		
The evacuation force formally hands over responsibility for evacuees to a competent authority, per instructions from the UN mission.		
Plans for a reserve capacity for each stage of the operation, to include back-up transportation assets are in place.		
Coordination with other force elements in the area is conducted.		
In extreme situations, plans and capability to deal with following situations are in place: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Abandoning excess weapons, ammunitions and vehicles including APCs. • Destruction of excess ammunitions and explosives • Removing UN markings • Removing sensitive material. 		
Unit reports accomplishment evacuation and requests medical evacuation (if applicable) and transports casualties to collection point/ HLS (mission-specific).		

TASK: Support Extraction

TASK DESCRIPTION: The unit is tasked to support the extraction of military peacekeepers, UN personnel or civilians (personnel from international organizations, NGOs, host nationals, etc.) who are under imminent threat from an armed group while conducting a UN activity.

TASK CONDITIONS: The battalion is required to ensure rapid and spontaneous action from the nearest TOB or the military element operating in the vicinity of the supported element. The Extraction involves the mobilization of appropriate force to the place of incident/action, negotiation to resolve the issue or release, isolation, containment and domination of the incident location, physical extraction as per rules of engagement and directives on the use of force and conduct of organized move out from the location. The unit must extract the UN personnel safely from the area.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare		
The commanding officer carries out a quick assessment of the situation and map recce to conduct the extraction.		
The commanding officer mobilizes the (appropriate) unit to conduct the extraction. Note: depending on the situation the task could be performed by a QRF but might also require Company level intervention.		
Commanding officer considers the following in planning: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Coordination and communication mechanisms should be established with the supported unit. • All planning must be transmitted to the supported unit, particularly when such planning requires action on its part. • Contact to be maintained with supported unit to maintain situation awareness. • If possible, the supported unit should rehearse plans for the reception of the supporting UN Inf Bn and for all other actions required of it. • In the objective area the UN Inf Bn must ensure that all movements are coordinated and centrally controlled. • Based on identified threats and vulnerabilities, the UN Inf Bn must develop and rehearse detailed contingency plans to respond to various situations. 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Carry out training and rehearsals for precision effect and to avoid collateral damage. • Plan for rapid mobility (surface or air) to access the location/area immediately. Mission-level support may be required if air mobility is required. • Coordinate with relevant actors within and outside the Mission. • Often a unit that requires support will have been in a perilous situation for a protracted period, the UN Inf Bn must consider what the needs of a supported unit may be from a logistics and medical perspective. 		
<p>The unit commander issues an order to subordinated unit commanders tasked with the conduct of the extraction which considers threats in the operational environment including information on:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Recent and significant activity in the area of the extraction. • New information pertaining to the area of the extraction, including new peacekeeping intelligence reports. • Detailed terrain brief. • Detailed brief on human terrain. • Detailed brief on information terrain. • Detailed information on specific threat actor(s). • Threat actor(s) Most likely and Most dangerous Courses of Action against UN patrol. • Information Requirements (IR). 		
Commander issues detailed order in line with Annex H.		
Conduct The tasked unit conducts a tactical movement to the incident location.		
The higher HQs provides the unit with situational awareness by constantly analyzing operational and peacekeeping-intelligence information during the move.		
Unit maintains communication with Higher HQs and receives advice from the supported unit on response, if required.		
Upon arrival the unit isolates, contains and dominates the location where the extraction is conducted.		
The unit maintains communication with Higher HQs and receives advice on response, if required.		
Conduct organized movement out from the location.		
The unit conducts engagement and negotiation with adversaries (situation dependent).		
Depending on the outcome of the engagement and negotiation the unit is requesting/receiving (fire) support as per Rules of Engagement (situation dependent) if required.		
During the extraction the unit <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensures respect for human rights and international humanitarian law. • Ensures adherence with the Rules of Engagement ROEs). • Provides protection to the threatened personnel. • Avoids and in any event minimizes collateral damages (civilian personnel and property). • Provides medical treatment to extracted personnel. 		
The unit maintains records (photographs, videography, witnesses, etc.) and continuous reporting until extraction is completed.		
The unit conducts a tactical move from the incident location to the next protect UN installation.		

TASK: Conduct Offensive Operations

TASK DESCRIPTION: The unit is tasked to conduct a coordinated attack to neutralize threat actors, to protect civilians or to otherwise uphold the mandate. Attack in a UN peacekeeping context will be carried out at a tactical level even though the decision making to carry out such an operation may be taken at an operational or tactical level.

TASK CONDITIONS: Operations may include hasty or deliberate attacks, supported by direct and indirect fire, including air support. Operations may take place in any type or operational environment, targeting a threat group with skill sets ranging from conventional to asymmetric.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
Plan & Prepare Map reconnaissance conducted.		
Full Analysis of the Operating Environment completed and disseminated to mission planners including: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Detailed physical terrain assessment, including key and decisive terrain, areas of cover and concealment, vulnerable locations, avenues of approach and movement corridors, obstacles to movement. Detailed human and information terrain assessment. Detailed threat actor evaluation including capabilities and intent. Threat actor likely and most dangerous course of action. Vulnerability assessment for civilians in the area. Information Requirements. 		
A full UN-MDMP is completed.		
All elements supporting the operation, including mission-level assets and other units are involved in the planning process.		
Commander incorporates measures to mitigate damage to civilian property and life.		
The Commander plans within the parameters of UN ROEs, International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights Law, and mission mandate.		
Full Order issued for offensive operation, per Orders format at Tab-1 of Annex H		
The commander plans for: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> Civilian displacement and casualties; Threat actor casualties and detention procedures; 		
The commander normally organizes the force into a security force, a main body, and a reserve, all supported by combat support (integrated fire plan) and service support elements.		
The commander completes any changes in task organization in time to allow units to conduct rehearsals with their attached and supporting elements.		
The security force protects the vulnerable flanks, lines of communication, humanitarian escape routes and to vulnerable parts of the population.		
The main body is organized into combined arms formations to conduct the decisive operation and necessary shaping operations.		
The reserve is sufficiently strong and tasked to exploit success, defeat threatening armed group counterattacks or to restore momentum to a stalled attack.		

The commander requests and receives necessary combat and combat services support including: engineers, CIED teams, air and artillery support, ISR support.		
The commander establishes coordinating instructions, including timings and control measures.		
The unit conducts rehearsals.		
The commander has an integrated direct and indirect fire support plan, including air power, if applicable.		
The commander creates contingency plans as required.		
The unit co-ordinates with flanking units		
The unit has reliable communications (at least two types) with subordinate and higher HQs.		
The unit has a viable CASEVAC plan that will meet the 10-1-2 goal and rehearses it.		
The unit has a viable resupply plan but can self-sustain for the expected duration of the operation.		
The unit maintains speed and surprise.		
The commander gains and maintains the initiative by demonstrating flexibility.		
Command and control is exercised through commanders at all levels.		
Commanders at all levels adjust formation and tactical approach as the situation changes.		
The unit concentrates its firepower and overwhelms the threat actor.		
The unit maintains momentum by rapidly following up attacks to prevent adversary's recovery and adjust (maintain initiative).		
As the attacking force advances, sustainment units and capabilities are placed forward to shorten supply lines, using displacement techniques designed to ensure uninterrupted support to maneuver units.		
The unit consolidates around the objective area and is prepared to exploit gains.		
The unit consolidates its position to repel counter attacks.		
The unit reorganizes and prepares for follow-on tasks.		
Unit Commander reports accomplishment of the task to higher HQ.		

TASK: Assure Protection of Civilians

TASK DESCRIPTION: This task incorporates contingency planning, mission planning, and execution of POC-related tasks.

TASK CONDITIONS: POC Considerations are central to all UN peacekeeping operations and are incorporated in all mission planning and execution.

Standards	Meets Standard	Does NOT Meet Standard
<p><u>Prevention & Engagement</u></p> <p>The unit conducts a detailed POC assessment and continuously monitors POC related factors including:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The location of vulnerable groups; • An evaluation of the operating environment of vulnerable groups; • The identification of key leaders of vulnerable groups; • The identification of key (UN and non-UN) POC interlocutors; • Identification of armed threats to vulnerable groups; • Identification of environmental threats to vulnerable groups; 		

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The development of an early warning system (this must have observable indicators) to identify imminent threats to vulnerable groups; • The development of POC-related Information Requirements to enable early warning and improve situational awareness; • Specific POC tasks are allocated to subordinate units; • Joint planning for POC tasks; • The rehearsal of potential POC tasks; • Maintains a QRF for POC tasks. 		
The unit includes POC-related information requirements in its Information Acquisition Plan (IAP);		
The unit conducts meetings with communities, including separate meetings with women, youth and different ethnic and religious groups. Whenever possible, this is carried out by Engagement Platoon members, ideally with community liaison assistants present.		
The unit conducts patrols (joint, if possible) that involve direct engagement with the local population, civil authorities, and/or other relevant actors in its area of operations, while ensuring that the engagement does not expose civilians to risk.		
<u>Pre-emption</u> Processes are established for information sharing and coordination on POC threats with local and international organizations (where appropriate).		
The unit informs higher headquarters and/or civilian counterparts of any indications of increased threat to civilians (including information that could inform civilian-led approaches/actions);		
The unit adopts a credible deterrent posture in potential POC threat areas through proactive operations, including but not limited to: Patrolling. The establishment of Checkpoint and Observation Posts. Conoy Escorts.		
The unit develops and rehearses contingency plans to respond to threats to civilians (including through table top and other exercises).		
<u>Response & Access</u> The unit responds quickly, proactively and appropriately (within the ROE) to credible imminent threat of violence against civilians. The unit establishes a secure protective environment for humanitarian actors. The unit responds to requests for assistance from humanitarian actors, within ROE and capabilities. The unit prioritizes requests for humanitarian assistance (convoy escorts) during times of increased threat to civilians or humanitarian actors.		
The unit is prepared to conduct evacuation operations.		
The unit rehearses evacuation operations.		
A Quick Reaction Force/Reserve is maintained to react quickly on emerging POC related threats.		

Operation Order Format Validation

STANDARD	Standard Achieved	Standard NOT achieved
<p>Situation:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • An overview of the ground in general and detail, highlighting key and vital terrain, obstacles, difficult/very difficult terrain, vulnerable locations, movement corridors and avenues of approach. Subordinates must be told what this means for threat actors and UN Forces. • An overview of the Human Terrain, highlighting the location of vulnerable population groups, the location of threat group support bases, ethnic and tribal locations, areas that are pro/anti-UN, and areas of different religious groups. Subordinates must be told what this means for threat actors and UN Forces; • An overview of the Information Terrain, highlighting communications infrastructure, known or possible communications blackspots, and what this means for threat actors and UN Forces. • An Evaluation of Weather and its impact on the operating environment. • Threat Group: Composition, estimated strengths, identification, disposition, current location, movement anticipated, capabilities, and assessment of intentions • A threat group Most Likely and Most Dangerous Course of Action. These COAs must be feasible, acceptable, complete, exclusive, and suitable (FACES); • Friendly Forces: Information concerning friendly forces other than those covered by the Operation Order which should directly affect the action of subordinate commanders. These forces include those not attached or organic to the command of the contemplated operation, but whose presence on a flank or other adjacent area is of interest. Include information on such forces that subordinate commanders need to know in order to accomplish their tasks. This includes the mission of the higher unit, and should include the higher commander's intent and/or concept of the operation, one level up; • Attachments and Detachments. Units attached to or detached from the issuing formation/unit, together with the times they are effective may be listed here, in an annex, or both. • The impact of the weather on UN and non-UN actors; 		
<p>Mission. (Who, what, when, where, why). A clear, concise statement of the task(s) to be accomplished by the commander and its purpose</p>		
<p>Concept of Operations/ Execution:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear Commander's intent; Accurately convey to subordinates the commander's intent • Concept of Operations; Describe, in brief, how the commander visualizes the execution of the operation from start to completion. The Commander's Intent is a concise expression of the purpose of the operation which describes the desired end state. It should be understood two echelons down and helps his subordinates focus on what has to be accomplished in order to achieve success so that mission accomplishment is possible in the time available and in the absence of additional communications or further instructions. This paragraph should set forth the phases of the operation (if phased); schemes of maneuver for major subordinate task elements that 		

<p>describe precisely what the commander expects to be done; general plans for the employment of supporting fires and weapons.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clear tasks for each sub unit; Tasks/Missions to Maneuver Units. Subsequent subparagraphs assign specific tasks to each element of the command charged with the execution of tactical duties, and give details of coordination and the task organization/groupings if not included under "Task Organization" or in an annex • Tasks/Missions to Combat Support Units. Use these subparagraphs only as necessary. List CS units in subparagraphs in the same order as they appear in the task organization. Use CS subparagraphs to list only those specific tasks that CS units much accomplish and that are not specified or implied elsewhere • Coordinating Instructions. Instructions applicable to two or more elements of the task organization. Typically, such instructions might include boundaries, objective, lines of departure, other coordination & reporting lines, time and direction of the operation, and other specifics needed to coordinate the activities of different subordinate elements, and clear timings. • For the tactical levels, reaction to standard incidents expected during the conduct of the operation (contact, ambush, IED, Casualty, halt) must be mentioned here. Other information is also included, such as reporting instructions, anticipated timings of execution, and when the order becomes effective for planning and/or execution. 		
<p>Logistics:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support Concept. Include enough information to make clear the basic concept for logistics support. • Materiel and Services. List materiel and services for supply, maintenance, transportation, and construction, and allocation of labor for logistics purposes. • Medical Evacuation and Hospitalization. List plans and policies for CASEVAC of military, civilian personnel. • Personnel. List unit strengths, replacements, and personnel policies and procedures, including those pertaining to civilians and detainees. • Civil-Military Cooperation. Describe control of civil population, refugees, and other relevant civil affairs matters. • Miscellaneous. 		
<p>Command and Signals:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Command. Clearly state all command relationships. Include current and planned command post locations, and alternate command posts with their times of activation and deactivation (if required) • Communications. Give information about pertinent communications networks, including call signs, and frequencies; operating procedures; recognition and identification procedures; 		

Fragmentary Order Format Validation

STANDARD	Standard Achieved	Standard NOT achieved
Situation. This must include any changes to the situation outlined in the OPORD. For example, mission-specific details relating to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The physical terrain; • The information terrain; • The human terrain; • Specific or new information relating to threat actors in the operating area and their most likely and most dangerous course of action, relative to the UN plan, should also be mentioned. • Changes to or update to Friendly Forces' capability and intent. 		
Mission. Covers who, what, when, where, why and how. A clear, concise statement of the task(s) to be accomplished by the commander and its purpose		
Concept of Operations. Must include any additional detail not already included in the OPORD. At a minimum this will include: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Intent; • scheme of maneuver; • end state. 		
Execution: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Tasks/Missions to Subordinate Units. (Mandatory) • Tasks/Mission to Combat support units (as required) • Coordinating Instructions. (Mandatory) Detailed timings; • Detailed Immediate Actions (At a minimum: Halts, breakdown, contact, ambush, IED, Casualty) 		
Admin and Logistics (Specific to each new mission)		
Command and Signals (Specific to each new mission)		

ABBREVIATIONS

A4P	Action for Peacekeeping
AAR	After Action Report
AC2	Authority, Command and Control
ACOA	Actor Course of Action
AE	Actor Evaluation
AGL	Automatic Grenade Launchers
AM	Acquisition Manager
AMET	Aero-Medical Evacuation Team
AOE	Analysis of the Operating Environment
AO	Area of Operations
AOR	Area of Responsibility
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
APII	Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Interest
APIR	Area of Peacekeeping Intelligence Responsibility
BDA	Battle Damage Assessments
BFV	Battle Field Vehicle
Bn	Battalion
BOC	Battalion Operations Centre
BZ	Buffer Zone
C&S	Cordon & Search
CASEVAC	Casualty Evacuation
CC	Critical Capabilities
9CCIR	Commander's Critical Information Requirement
CCP	casualty collection point
CDT	Conduct and Discipline Teams
CFL	Ceasefire Line
CIMIC	Civil-Military Coordination
CIU	Criminal Intelligence Unit
CLAs	Community Liaison Assistants
CMOS	Current Military Operations Service
CNR	Combat Net Radio
COA	Course of Action
COC	Company Operations Centre
COE	Contingent Owned Equipment
COG	Centre of Gravity
COIST	Company Intelligence Support Team
COMD	Commander
COMINT	Communications Intelligence
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COS	Chief of Staff
COY	Company
CP	Checkpoint

CPP	Community Protection Plan
CPTM	Core Pre-deployment Training Modules
CPX	command post exercise
CR	Critical Requirements
CRSV	Conflict-Related Sexual Violence
CSS	Combat service support
CV	Critical Vulnerabilities
DCS	Damage Control Resuscitation
DCS	Damage Control Surgery
DDR	Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
DFC	Deputy Force Commander
DFP	Detention Focal Point
DFS	Department of Field Support
DMS/CMS	Director/Chief of Mission Support
DMZ	Demilitarized Zone
DMZ	De-militarized Zone
DOS	Department of Operational Support
DPO	Department of Peace Operations
DSRSG	(Deputy) Special Representative of the Secretary-General
DSS	Department of Safety and Security
DTG	Date Time Group
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EMP	Electro-Magnetic Pulse
EO	Event Overlay
EOD	Explosive Ordnance Disposal
EP	Engagement Platoon
ET	Engagement Team
EWS	Electronic warfare Support
FC	Force Commander
FHQ	Force Headquarters
FOL	Fuel, Oil and Lubricants
FPF	Final Protective Fires
FPU	Formed Police Unit
FRAGO	Fragmentary Order
FSCM	Fire Support Coordination Measures
FTX	field training exercise
G2	Sector level intelligence
GA	General Awareness
GEO	Geographic
GEOINT	Geographic Intelligence
GIS	Geographic Information System
GSR	Ground Surveillance Radars
HCT	Humanitarian Country Team
HIPPO	High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations
HLZ	Helicopter Landing Zone
HN	Host Nation
HOM	Head of Mission

HOMC	Head of Military Component
HOPC	Head of Police Component
HQ	Headquarters
HRDDP	Human Rights Due Diligence Policy
HRP	Humanitarian Country Team
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I&W	Indicators & Warnings
IAP	Intelligence Acquisition Plan
ICG	Infantry Company Group
IDP	Internally Displaced People
IE	Intelligence Estimate
IED	Improvised Explosive Device
IHI	Items of High Importance
IM	Infantry Mortars
IM	Information Management
IMC	Inter-Mission Cooperation
IMINT	Imagery Intelligence
IMTC	In-Mission Training Centre
Inf Bn	Infantry Battalion
INTREP	Intelligence Report
INTSUM	Intelligence Summary
IO	Information Operations
IO	International Organizations
IOTs	Integrated Operations Teams
IPO	Individual Police Officers
IR	Information Requirements
IR	Infra-Red
IRM	Information Requirements Management/Manager
ISF	Integrated Strategic Framework
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance
JMAC	Joint Mission Analyses Centre
JMSC	Joint Mission Support Centre
JOC	Joint Operations Centre
JPT	Joint Protection Team
KT	Key Terrain
LFX	live firing exercise
LN(s)	Local National(s)
LoC	Lines of Communications
LRRP	Long Range Recce Patrol
MC	Military Component
MDCOA	Most Dangerous Course of Action
MEDEVAC	Medical Evacuation
MET	Mission Essential Tasks
MICS	Mission Intelligence Co-ordination Structure
MLCOA	Most Likely Course of Action
MLO	Military Liaison Officer

MLT	Mission Leadership Team
MMG	Medium Machine Guns
MOC	Military Operations Centre
MOE	Measurements of Effectiveness
MOVCON	Movement Control
MP	Military Police
MPKI	Military Peacekeeping Intelligence
MSN	Mission
NAI	Named Area of Interest
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
NSE	National Support Element
NTM	Notice to Move
NVD	Night vision devices
OE	Operating Environment
OEE	Operating Environment Evaluation
OIC	Officer in Charge
OLA	Office of Legal Affairs
OMA	Office of Military Affairs
OO	Office of Operations
OP	Observation Post
OPCON	Operational Control
OPORDER	Operations Order
ORBAT	Order of Battle
PDT	Pre-deployment Training
PDV	pre-deployment visits
PET	Physical Efficiency Test
PICTINTSUM	Picture Intelligence Summary
PIR	Priority Information Requirement
PKTI	Peacekeeping Training Institute
PI	Platoon
PMESII - PT	Political, Military, Economic, Cultural (Religious, Social, Historical), Infrastructure, Information, Physical, Time
POB	Permanent Operating Base
POC	Police Operations Centre
POC	Protection of civilians
POI	Point of impact
POI	Point of injury
POL	Police
POO	Point of Origen
PPE	Personal Protective Equipment
PPP	presence, posture and profile
QIP	Quick Impact Project
QRF	Quick Reaction Force
QRT	Quick Reaction Team
RC / HC	Resident – Humanitarian Coordinator
RC-IED	Remote Controlled Improvised Explosive Device
RD	Rapid Deployment
Recce	Reconnaissance

RES	Reserve
RET	Range Efficiency Test
RFI	Request for Information
RO	Regional Organization
ROMB	Receipt of Mission Brief
S2	Battalion level intelligence
SA	Situational Awareness
SAR	Synthetic Aperture Radar
SEA	Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
SF	Special Forces
SFR	Statement of Force Requirements
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SHQ	Sector Headquarters
SI	Situation Integration
SIE	Short Intelligence Estimate
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIOC	Security information Operations Centre
SITMAP	Situation Map
SITREP	Situation Report
SLT	Senior Leadership Team
SO	Staff Officer
SOFA	Status of Forces Agreement
SOI	Standard Operating Instructions
SOMA	Status of Mission Agreement
SOP	Standard Operating Procedures
SOPs	Standard Operating Procedures
SPOTREP	Spot Reports
SRSG	Senior Representative of the Secretary General
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SSR/DDR	Sector Security Reform/Demobilization, and Reinsertion
STM	Standardized Training Module
STRATCOM	Strategic Communications
SU	Situational Understanding
SUR	Statement of Unit Requirements
T/PCC	Troop / Police Contributing Countries
TACOM	Tactical Command
TACON	Tactical Control
TAI	Target Area of Interest
TCC	Troop Contributing Country
TECHINT	Technical Intelligence
TOB	Temporary Operating Base
ToT/TTT	Training of Trainer / Train the Trainer
TPME	Task, Purpose, Method, End state
TTP	Tactics, Techniques and Procedures
U2	Force level intelligence
UAV	Unmanned Aerial Vehicle

UN	United Nations
UN HQ	United Nations Headquarters
UN MDMP	Military Decision-Making Process
UNBFAC	UN Buddy First Aid Course
UN-CIMIC	United Nations Civil Military Cooperation
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDSS	United Nations Department of Safety and Security
UNFMAC	Nations Field Medic Assistant Curriculum
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNHQ	United Nations Headquarters
UNIBAM	United Nations Infantry Battalion Manual
UNMAS	United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMiM	UN Military Manual (Cross-cutting issues)
UNMLO	United Nations Military Liaison Officer
UNMO	United Nations Military Observer
UNMUM	UN Military Unit Manuals
UNOE	UN Owned Equipment
UNPOL	United Nations Police
USG-DPO	Under Secretary General – Department of Peace Operations
UV	Ultra Violet
UXO	Un-Exploded Ordnance
VBIED	Vehicle-borne Improvised Explosive Device
VG	Vital Ground
VHF	Very High Frequency
VLf	Very Low Frequency
VRN	Vehicle Registration Number
VTC	Video Tele-Conferencing
WARNO	Warning Order